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Introduction 
 
Traditionally in the field of aesthetics the genres of comedy and tragedy have been 
depicted in opposition to one another. Within the resulting hierarchy of dramatic 
forms comedy had been relegated to an inferior position, the reason for this being a 
paternalistic preoccupation with the identification and validation of particular objects 
considered suitable for intellectual scrutiny. If tragedy is regarded as the 
philosophically superior of the two genres, and an implicitly masculine form in this 
dialectic, then comedy, because of its ‘popular’ historical identification with social 
mores, is relegated to an inferior position.  This thesis seeks to reconsider the place of 
comedy as an object of serious intellectual enquiry, and will argue that its historical 
importance traces a dialectical movement that informs both the aesthetic form itself, 
and the passage of history.  Indeed, the dialectic of desire that informs comedy, and 
that always poses a threat to the existing order, may be said to resemble the dialectical 
movement of history itself as a process whereby existing social tensions are identified 
and negotiated.  It will be argued that Shakespeare’s comedies represent these 
conflicts in particular ways, and that the conclusions that they reach leave a residue of 
unresolved tensions that remain to threaten even the revisionary order that the plays 
posit. 
The dialectic of comedy that this thesis identifies exposes the inherent tension 
that is present in all antitheses, and the argument proceeds by making the 
contradictions inherent in the form explicit. Comedy is concerned primarily with the 
categories of the explicitly sexual and the implicitly political, and in the case of 
Shakespeare, the interest is in patriarchal law: the patriarchal law sanctioned by the 
state, but also what is presumed to be natural law. Thus although the substance of 
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comedy may be said to emphasise the libidinal energies that seek to challenge that 
law, its manner of dealing with this potentially disruptive force is anything but 
irrational or inconsequential since it attempts to resolve tensions and dilemmas 
through forms of rational discussion.  In fact, it will be argued that the initial 
hypotheses of Shakespearean comedy lead directly to the exposure of contradictions 
that mount challenges to their claims to represent the source of truth.  These 
hypotheses, often involving the assertions of patriarchal law, function as obstacles that 
require resolution.  But that resolution involves more than simply a capitulation to the 
extant power; indeed, what we might call the idiom of patriarchy requires to be 
expanded and transformed in order to accommodate those energies that it seeks 
initially to neutralise.  To this extent comedy is frequently involved in a process of 
cross-examination, deploying as it does a Socratic method whose momentum 
simulates that of the progress of a law-suit.  In its inclusivity, comedy resembles the 
Hegelian dialectic insofar as it is concerned ultimately with epistemological questions 
that inform the business of living in society. 
  Some recourse to a Hegelian historicism will be an important component of 
the following arguments because it indicates that all human societies, and, indeed, 
human activity generally, are defined by their histories, to the point where their 
essences can only be understood through history as the operation of a temporal 
dialectic.  The relationship between Shakespearean comedy and the canonical law of 
literary genre will be explored within this context. But close scrutiny will reveal that 
far from resolving contradiction, the diacritical method that the following arguments 
identify disclose, often involuntarily, an ontological undecidability that offers 
momentary glimpses of other possibilities.  In this way Shakespeare’s comic art 
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interrogates both the existing order, and the commonplace by occasionally (and 
temporarily) propelling its audiences towards visions of alternative futures. 
 The social specificity of comedy acts as a counter to any claims to 
universalism. Humour and laughter, the phenomenological effects of comedy, are 
notoriously poor travellers as indicated by the nature of regional and geographically 
specific jokes. The same might be said of the temporal dimension of comedy since 
topicality is a constant trigger for humour. Moreover, the appearance of jokes and 
comic interludes immediately following traumatic events, validate the process as a 
means of ameliorating, if not purging, social anxiety. Elizabethan and Jacobean 
culture and the comedies that they produced are of particular interest precisely 
because of the traumatic and often perplexing paradigm shifts that were taking place 
at the time. The anxieties that these shifts produced are recorded in historical 
documents, but they are also theatrically represented in stage-plays, that, as historical 
artefacts themselves encode at a domestic level these intense social concerns. 
 In Chapter 1 the choice of genre will be introduced as a source of historical 
evaluation: that is to say, initial emphasis will be placed upon the dramatist’s 
conscious endeavour to represent aesthetically intense socio-political upheaval from 
within a particular frame of consciousness.  A dramatist may enter into a form of 
contract with an audience by declaring that a play belongs to one particular genre, but 
the conventions of generic nomenclature are rarely as stable as this suggests, as 
evidenced in the titular changes in the Comedies themselves.  For example, the 
interchangeability of the genres of ‘comedy’ and ‘history’ during the Elizabethan 
period require some degree of articulation since both forms represent renewals of 
social harmony that follow on from the disorder of a diseased body politic. In 
focussing on the awareness that comedy is a kind of festive form of history, it is 
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necessary to trace initially the outline of Renaissance definitions of comedy that 
emphasise the festive nature of the theatre as an institution. 
  C.L.Barber’s definition of comedy as “a kind of history”1 privileges an 
historicist methodology that asserts an understanding of the original context of 
reception. Barber’s view of comic history as “the kind that frames the mind to mirth”2 
recalls Hayden White’s identification of comedy as an historical mode of 
‘emplotment’ that uses the trope of synecdoche to integrate parts into a larger 
historical whole where “struggle, strife, and conflict are dissolved in the realisation of 
perfect harmony.” 3 Although the following arguments make little explicit use of 
Barber’s Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy (1959) they do owe a debt of gratitude to his 
study of the historical nature of Shakespearean comedy. His description of the fusing 
together of Classical, Medieval and Renaissance theatrical traditions with early 
modern forms of holiday festivity points towards the significance of ritual as “a 
paradoxical human need, problem and resource.” 4  Barber’s work has subsequently 
been taken up and developed by scholars such as Francois Laroque, and Naomi Conn 
Liebler, 5 but he does not elaborate on the politics of race and gender that 
contemporary criticism now recognises as an important element in Elizabethan and 
Jacobean comedy. 
 The politics of comedy can be viewed with greater clarity as a result of the 
juxtaposing of law and low culture, the sacred and the profane, or indeed the tragic 
and comic elements of everyday experience.  This is theorised and applied in Chapter  
                                                           
1 C.L.Barber, Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy, (Princeton, 1959), p.12 
2 Ibid. 
3 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in CulturalCriticism, (Baltimore and London, 1985), 
pp.67-8  
4 Op.cit., p.15 
5 Francois Laroque, Shakespeare’s Festive World: Elizabethan Seasonal Entertainment and the 
Professional Stage, (Cambridge, 1991), and Naomi Conn Liebler, Shakespeare’s Festive Tragedy: The 
Ritual Foundations of Genre, (New York and London,1995).  
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2 of this thesis through an analytical exploration of representative Shakespearean 
comedies that betray a self-consciousness of their own generic classifications. 
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice (1597) and Measure for Measure (1604) are 
two plays that exemplify the conflict between comic and tragic modes. Identifying 
moments of potential tragedy in these ‘dark’ comedies serves as a means of 
positioning generic conflict as a structural principle that proves to be as important as 
the plays’ comic themes of the conflict between genders. The process of resolution 
with which both these plays are preoccupied, and their preoccupation with a quasi-
legalistic staging of conflict suggest an analogue with Jean-Francois Lyotard’s 
concept of the differend. Lyotard argues that the differend is a term he uses to identify 
“the case where the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes for that 
reason a victim,” but he goes on to suggest that: 
 
  A case of differend between two parties takes place when the ‘regulation’ 
  of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties 
  while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom.6 
 
 
Lyotard goes on to argue that the differend “is signalled by this inability to prove. The 
one who lodges a complaint is heard, but the one who is a victim, and who is perhaps 
the same one, is reduced to silence.” 7    
The incompatibility of idioms, and the need to arbitrate cases, along with the 
resultant negotiations that are brought into play, render the concept of the differend 
more serviceable that Northrop Frye’s definition of the action of comedy as being one 
that resembles a ‘law-suit’,8 since it can be argued that in this case aesthetic form  
                                                           
6 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele, 
(Manchester, 1988), p.9 
7 Ibid., p.10 
8 Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, (Princeton, 1957), p.166 
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constitutes a mode of intellectual enquiry that is capable of formulating alternatives to 
any ideological imperative. This is not to say that art is a substitute for the 
epistemological objectives of a philosophy, but rather to suggest that it can furnish a 
knowledge that philosophy itself cannot.  In short, it is the underside of philosophy in 
just the same way that alternative meanings escape the straitjacket of ideological 
form.  What the dramatist does is to clarify the opposition between repression and 
subversion and in doing so articulates what cannot be expressed.  The discovery of the 
means within critical discourse to articulate radical alternatives despite the constraints 
imposed by a dominant ‘idiom’ replete with its linguistic, epistemological and 
political prohibitions, is the motivation that lies behind the dialectical drive of this 
thesis. 
  The proximity of the categories of the philosophical, the ethical and the 
political to that of the aesthetic narrows, but does not obliterate entirely, the gap 
between the philosophy of the human subject in law, and the dramatic persona subject 
to the law that regulates genre. Each subject is subjected to a series of rules and 
prohibitions; but the capacity of comedy to interrogate epistemological categories, to 
cross-examine ‘reality’ results in a challenge to ontological certainty, producing a 
radical undecidability that aggravates and disturbs notions of boundary and authority. 
Such aggravations are generally relegated to the level of the cultural unconscious, but 
the logic of the differend implies a source outside signification that can be identified 
as a proximate origin of human creativity, and the starting point for a radical politics. 
In his essay ‘Before the Law’ Derrida’s identification of the philosophy of law 
as the means of generating moral, juridical and natural law is regarded as a fiction 
whose main purpose is the narration of the prohibition of desire.9 In another essay,  
                                                           
9 Jacques Derrida, ‘Before the Law’, Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, (New York and London, 
1992), p.190 
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‘The Law of Genre’ the historicity of the law and the regulation of literary forms in 
terms of the prohibitions placed upon the mixing of genres, are regarded as forms of 
miscegenation.  The second chapter of this thesis attempts to explore the Derridean 
conception of the ascription of gender to genre, and pays particular attention to the 
phallogocentric nature of the policing of boundaries. The hierarchical imbalance that 
is involved in the process of governing, and carrying out surveillance on the 
boundaries of the genre/gender divide, testifies to an anxiety generated by the fear of 
monstrous or hybrid progeny.  This fear is exorcised at a psychological level through 
the taboo on incest, but it is also present in an analogous form in the critical 
disapproval of the miscegenation of genres. 
 Chapter 2 tests the theoretical preference for a purity of aesthetic form in the 
face of the differend that is performed in every comedy when comedy and tragedy are 
forced to appear together on the Comic stage, and where one ‘idiom’ is enjoined to 
accept the conditions of articulation of the other. Beneath the exclusions that both 
proffer as a discursive restriction imposed upon the other lies a mutual dependency 
that each denies the other but that they both need to accept.  The refusal of each to 
submit to the law of the other makes for the irresolution that Lyotard locates as the 
matter of ‘dispute’, but in the comic resolution of conflict, say between different 
generations who ostensibly speak different languages, there is an awareness of the 
need to control the dominant discourse of the tragic in order to provide a resolution 
that keeps the main characters alive and morally exemplary.  The law of genre 
demands that comedy must end happily, but because the differend can never be 
completely resolved, the discriminations that it initiates resist synthesis, so that the 
dialectic will always be imperfect. The negative term is always expelled from the 
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solution, or dealing with it is postponed, but it always returns as the excess that 
escapes full signification.  
 In Shakespearean comedy the institution of marriage becomes a central trope, 
and Chapter 3 engages with this as central to the thesis. Comedy and tragedy are 
presented as culturally specific projections of human consciousness capable of 
entertaining both forms as alternative representations.  Within the ritual of marital 
union psychology merges into symbol, and events frequently take on the logic of 
dream, departing from the appearance of the everyday in order to articulate its inner 
truth.  Central to this symbolism is the figure of woman, who is simultaneously the 
heart of life but who is also, within the Christian tradition, radically destructive, and 
ultimately a path to redemption.  This may be the reason why no masculine villain is 
as evil as Goneril in King Lear or why no hero is as good as Portia in The Merchant of 
Venice.  What renders Shakespeare’s comic heroines so interesting is their capacity to 
re-order society almost single-handedly. In such cases woman is the antithesis of a 
male consciousness that is forced to move out of itself in order to confront a force 
with which it must come to terms if the social order is to survive. This dialectic that is 
played out between genders in the Comedies achieves a provisional resolution that is 
an analogue of the Hegelian synthesis pressed into the service of a patriarchal model 
of society in its returning of the potentially anarchic force of ‘woman’ to a 
predominantly phallogocentric hierarchy. 
 Hegel demonstrates philosophically, and Shakespeare dramatically, that at the 
heart of Christian doctrine lies the assertion that human life does not begin until 
consciousness divides, and that this division and its articulation are the motor for 
history itself and are what comprises the motion of existence.  For Hegel human and 
divine rationality are identical, and in accordance with the dictates of Enlightenment it 
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is assumed that Man’s reason is infinite in its capacity to contemplate, and control 
existence. What for Hegel is a primary separation of Man from God, becomes for 
Shakespeare the consequence of the creation of Eve. Woman becomes that which is 
taken from Man and that causes his fall.  She is wife and mother and threat: she is 
forever ambiguous, untrustworthy, fecund, and ultimately redemptive. Viewed in this 
way, then the tension between Man and Woman is articulated as a division of Man 
from himself that can only be repaired at the end of Comedy through the institutional 
ritual of marriage. This is the reason why Chapter 3 regards nuptial rites as the focal 
point of any theoretical analysis of comedy.  Here the importance of the Derridean 
philosopheme of the hymen in addition to conceptualising the notions of union, 
boundary and disruptive force10 also glosses the term as a symbol of female purity.  
The questions of female purity and the fear of its violation are of direct relevance to 
issues of propriety and authority. A consideration of the historicity of these concepts 
is essential to an understanding of early modern comedy just as the Christian 
distinction between woman as corrupter and redeemer, whore and virgin, are central 
to an understanding of the identity of early modern woman.  
  The responsibility imposed upon the female gender as custodian both of male 
sexual desire and the harmony of the entire social order is what troubles the 
superficially happy resolutions of comedy.  The all-male mode of production upon the 
early modern stage may represent an important social ritual whereby division is 
rendered whole, where a union of opposites, or the reconciliation of differences can 
reasonably be anticipated.  But the inversion of femininity by transvestite male actors 
                                                           
10 Throughout Spurs/Éperons, trans. Allan Bass, (Chicago, 1978), and the Double Session, Derrida 
figures the aporetic or the indeterminate vulvically as the hymen, as that which characterises “The 
general law of textual effect” (écriture), in direct opposition to the law of the phallus, or the desire for 
the apodictive or the determinate. These explicit gender identifications of the apodictic with the 
masculine and the aporetic with the feminine appear throughout Spurs as “That which will not be 
pinned down by truth is in truth – feminine”, p.55. 
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has been questioned as a male projection of how women should behave, even if these 
were men imitating women imitating men. I will therefore argue that the double 
negation of this theatrical practice helps to destabilise gender identity through an 
explicit disclosure of the artificiality and performativity of gender construction; an 
exposition that is as beneficial to men as it is to women.  
  Using Foucault’s analyses of the ‘technologies of sexuality’, the gender 
identities represented in Marston’s The Dutch Courtesan (1605) and Middleton and 
Dekker’s The Roaring Girl (1611) disclose an early modern preoccupation with the 
cultural construction of gendered subjectivity, through descriptions of identity which 
are formulated differentially in and through a range of social institutions, such as 
marriage and the family. Comedies rarely end in actual marriage, however, as 
anticipating marriage, progressing towards the ‘medicine of marriage’, describes 
more accurately the teleological thrust of this dramatic form. This chapter therefore 
interrogates C.L. Barber’s structuralist assumption that comedy performs ‘dramatic 
epithalamia’ where “the power of love” is expressed “as a compelling rhythm in man 
and nature”.11 The trope of marriage undoubtedly represents the inevitable and 
irresistible force of an essentialist cosmic order where the regulation of libido 
functions as a panacea for social disorder, and although the design of this prescriptive 
force is concealed behind the appearance of social and cultural forms, its ideal reality 
is destabilised by the ‘realist mimesis’ of comedy which ascribes to the symbolic form 
of marriage a material existence. Applied specifically to the realm of early modern 
comedy the implicitly sexual and the explicitly political investments made by the 
social ritual of marriage can be effectively repositioned within the poetic sub-genre of 
                                                           
11 Barber, op. cit., p.9 
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the prothalamion where a new and stable future is evoked through the symbolic 
economy of courtship. 
  This central chapter rotates the thesis on the axis of gender politics, as the 
dialectic of desire further preoccupies those institutions designed to secure domination 
and subjection. Proposing that the dramatic prothalamion of comic art has the capacity 
to produce alternatives through which representation of the conflicts between these 
complex forces is effected recalls Catherine Belsey’s description of the early modern 
theatre’s capacity to disclose “meaning and the contests for meaning” within 
particular institutions, such as marriage.12 This unremitting concern with the 
regulation of human libido permits a liminal view of Renaissance society in which its 
phallogocentrism is threatened by energies that undermine social order. Thus the 
centrifugal force of moral politics can be felt throughout this thesis as a crucial 
analogue for the maintenance of social power and control which is nonetheless 
challenged by an equally potent centripetal force of desire. Scrutinizing Shakespeare’s 
Comedies from their early inceptions in the late sixteenth century, to the ‘dark’ 
comedies of the early seventeenth century, to the romances of his late career discloses 
the interrelations of early legal history, drama and desire and although the marketing 
of flesh may be more conspicuous in the comedies of his contemporaries, Shakespeare 
also explores the commodification of the female body within the domestic domain, in 
a conscious decision to make drama out of the socially symbolic rituals of courtship 
and marriage.  
 Implied within hymeneal rites, the necessity of self-sacrifice which is affected 
by the ceremony of marriage is also the symbolic articulation of a particular kind of 
ritual activity. The social anthropologist Rene Girard defines sacrifice as a ritual of 
                                                           
12 Catherine Belsey, The Subject of Tragedy, (London, 1985), p.4 
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containment, a means of “prevention in the struggle against violence”13 through a 
form of mis-identification which isolates an individual within whom the dis-ease of an 
entire community can be located. Thus far, the argument has been concerned with the 
experience of comedy as a means of coming to terms with human identity within a 
larger state sanctioned social order. However, in addition to revealing the resilience 
and potential of the human animal comedy also discloses the extent to which that 
potential is necessarily contained. Framing a selection of interrelated scenes from 
Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew (1594), Love’s Labours Lost (1595), and The 
Merchant of Venice (1596) with contemporaneous hymeneal comedies discloses the 
extent to which the moral ambiguity of the wider community is represented 
stereotypically through the characterisation of promiscuous men and women, 
prostitutes, usurers, or simply braggarts. Regardless of their social identity, these 
‘blocking’ characters or alazons fulfil the communal demand for the containment and 
purgation of social ills and are disclosed in comedy as a sophisticated and displaced 
form of the ritual sacrifice of the scapegoat or pharmakos.  
 Chapter 4 better seeks to engage theoretically with the problematic and 
necessary solemnity of comic sacrifice and the immanence of ritual becoming drama. 
The argument deals with the historical materialisation of the early modern theatre as a 
crucible for the hopes and fears of society, as a space where anxieties could be 
exorcized and alternatives imagined. This historical pragmatism is deeply rooted in 
primitive religious rites and the Derridean concept of theatre as pharmakon will be 
deployed to analyse this phenomenon since it addresses the realm of the aesthetic as 
the last remaining remnant of ancient sacred ritual, albeit in a cultivated and decorous 
form. Derrida’s tracing of the chain of signification between the theatre of 
                                                           
13 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory, (Baltimore and London), p,17 
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representation that expels unconscious anomalies from conscious thought and the 
degrading scapegoat or pharmakos ritual, which was used in ancient Greece to purge 
ailing communities, offers a means of supporting the claims that division demands 
wholeness, and that dialectic conflict demands resolution. As the trope of the 
scapegoat displays, throughout early modern comedy, social order demands harmony 
at any price, even if the restoration of balance is of the most perfunctory kind. 
  In his essay ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, Derrida observes that the pharmakon is a 
double-edged remedy which “can never be simply beneficial”14 Indeed, when Mark 
Antony turns to his attendant Eros, in Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra, and 
demands that “with a wound I must be cured” (IV.xiv.93), the logic of the pharmakon 
is present: the wound is essential to the cure, and the dialectic includes both in its 
redeeming motion. What Derrida and Girard provide for this chapter is a structural 
account of the tragic conflict inhabiting comic form which is invaluable to a semiotic 
account of the conflict between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of metaphysically 
sanctioned order, and those materialist historical forces which challenge hierarchical 
structures. Evidence of the rite of the pharmakos in early modern comedies 
demonstrates the destabilising but necessary effects of the negative dialectic upon the 
positive, inclusive form of comedy. It also indicates that tragedy is present in the 
margins of every comic play. In their similar presentation of the identification and 
subsequent punishment of moral ambiguity Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, 
Twelfth Night (1600) and The Merry Wives of Windsor (1600) are useful in 
augmenting accounts of the place and function of the early modern theatre as the 
performance of the pharmakon itself is shown to be an indispensable part of the 
                                                           
14 Jacques Derrida, Disseminations, trans. Barbara Johnson, (London, 1982), p.99 
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dialectical production of meaning through a variety of proposed fictional solutions to 
cultural tensions. 
  The location of the theatre outside the jurisdiction of the City of London 
allows us to survey the early modern stage15 as the reification of a ritualised form of 
drama that believed in transformation, transition, in trance, just as so-called primitive 
ritual did. The construction of the theatre out-with the walls of the city proper 
produced a permissive irreverence which interrogated existing structures of power at a 
point in history when state surveillance and censorship were intensifying their grip 
upon everyday experience. The necessity of challenging increasingly repressive state 
mechanisms from ‘ground-level’ thus positions the genre choices made by early 
modern dramatists as means of organising and understanding the sources of, and 
potential solutions for, a number of persistent anxieties. It can also now be argued that 
‘power’ was being displayed upon the early modern stage as a social and material 
phenomenon rather than a metaphysical force through the medium of the comic form. 
It is still a matter of enthusiastic debate as to whether the Elizabethan and Jacobean 
public theatre simply consolidated the dominant order through its representations, or 
whether it fulfilled a more subversive function, but to move through and beyond this 
dialectic is to embrace the utopian idealism of comedy and admit the liberating effects 
of ambiguity, incoherence, and a certain (temporary) loss of control.  
  Comedy is in this case a unique and privileged type of cultural and psychic 
material capable of producing both pleasure and power; this locates comic play as 
both emancipator and as meaningless abstract negativity, or excess. In Chapter 5, 
comedy is presented as societal semblance, as a necessary illusion capable of 
dispelling illusions. The double bind of this stance, however, does not negate its logic 
                                                           
15 Steven Mullaney, The Place of the Stage: License, Play and Power in Renaissance England, 
(Chicago, 1988), pp.26ff 
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because a third position is located within every comic resolution. Theodore Adorno’s 
formulation of dramatic art as societal semblance16 therefore becomes important for a 
coherent understanding of the aesthetic as mimesis, as the best art, and politically the 
most effective, so thoroughly works out its own internal conflicts that the hidden 
contradictions in society can no longer be ignored. Dramatic comedy is therefore 
recognisable as social or political unconscious, disclosing itself as the default sphere 
for failed dreams of human emancipation. Re-enacted upon the stage these dreams can 
be kept alive in a volatile space that not only decentres the strong constitutive subject 
through a dismantling of notions of self as a cultural construction but produces 
meanings and values, which propose fictional solutions, for a society that is riven with 
fundamental antagonisms. According to Adorno, the only way to expose these, and 
thereby point towards their possible resolution, is to think against thought, in other 
words, to think in contradictions as “to proceed dialectically means to think in 
contradictions. A contradiction in reality, [dialectics] is a contradiction against 
reality”.17 The point of thinking in contradictions is not simply negative, however. It 
has a fragile, transformative horizon, namely, a society that would no longer be torn 
apart by fundamental antagonisms. 
 Again, functioning at the level of the Hegelian dialectic, comedy oscillates 
between two opposite poles of thought, mediating the space between what is accepted 
traditionally and what can be imagined as possible. Hegel’s concept of the Aufhebung, 
as outlined by Derrida,18 depicts a dialectic of confrontation at work which 
simultaneously negates and conserves. This diametric formulation explores the 
oppressed position of the ‘under-dog’ and produces idealist propaganda, a duality that 
                                                           
16 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.132 
17 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton, (New York, 1973), p.144-5 
18 Derrida, ‘From Restricted to General Economy A Hegelianism without Reserve’, in Writing and 
Difference., (London, 1978), p.135, n.13 
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demands a diacritical reading of the comic genre. Thus, comedy’s construction of 
what Derrida names the u-topia, or, non-place, can be usefully explored as a liberating  
play space which perpetuates the principle of the excluded middle.19 Illuminated in 
this way, comic discourse is identified as a form of deconstruction as close to the 
ludic postmodernism of Derridean philosophy as is possible. 
 The use of both deconstruction and psychoanalytical terms within this chapter 
assists in the formulation of a postmodernism of resistance which could be traced 
back to the Renaissance texts under analysis, through a critique of high-rationalist 
theory that resists a descent into relativism. Thus, Chapter 5 is an attempt to escape 
the relativism of historical context whilst simultaneously maintaining a contextual 
link. Such critical judgements need to grasp both the artwork’s complex internal 
dynamics and the dynamics of the socio-historical totality to which it belongs. Such 
content is not a metaphysical idea, or essence hovering outside the text, but neither is 
it a merely human construct. It is historical but not arbitrary; non-propositional, yet 
calling for propositional claims to be made about it; utopian in its reach, Comedy is 
firmly tied to specific societal conditions. Therefore, in contradistinction to the 
Derridean hymen20, that ubiquitous symbol of boundary, historical emblem of purity, 
and post-modern figure for the division between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, the Lacanian 
phallus is employed to double as not only the symbol of logocentric desire but also as 
                                                           
19 Derrida’s use of the u-topos, u-topia, or non-place in ‘Deconstruction and the Other’, in Richard 
Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage, 
(Manchester, 1984), pp.108-12 and Positions, p.43 is his most explicit critique of the Law of the 
Excluded middle that is a basic tenant of Aristotelian logic, hence at the foundations of Western 
philosophical thought. Equivalent to the principle of bivalent logic the Law of the Excluded Middle 
proposes a binary opposition between truth and falsity with nothing in between. The u-topos of 
deconstruction rejects this dialogic and passes out of its binary plenitude and into excess.Kristeva’s 
Revolution in Poetic Language explicates this concept in her appropriation of the Platonic Chora as the 
excluded middle, the third position, or third gender, pp.25-6. 
20 Derrida, ‘The First Session’, Acts of Literature, p.128 
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the priapic totem21 of comedy. This permits the double entendres and shifts of 
signification that slip constantly out of the cultural unconscious to reveal themselves, 
recharged, within the psychosexual dynamics of those early modern comedies which 
have been selectively analysed throughout this thesis.  
 Slippages of signification perform a dialectical exchange between the realms 
of the imaginary and the symbolic which perpetually attempts to reveal the ‘real’, a 
movement which can be identified as a form of philosophical scepticism. The very 
fact that Comedy’s production of pleasure, or jouissance, rushes off and escapes 
signification, therefore demands interrogation through a number of different 
methodologies. Both John Marston’s The Malcontent (1605) and Shakespeare’s The 
Taming of the Shrew (1594) disclose the aporetic structure of comedy by 
demonstrating a practical pessimism that stands in dialectical tension with a certain 
variant of philosophical utopianism. This tension cannot be denied in the performance 
and reception of these dramatic comedies. The apparent linking of semantic 
determinateness with the phallocratic privileging of the male in early modern drama is 
destabilised by the semblance of subjectivity in comedies which rewrite traditionally 
proscribed gendered positions. 
  In comedy humanity’s unwitting collusion with the patriarchal appropriation 
of the symbolic as the field of full human subjectivity is forever called into question; 
comedy breaches the boundary between the imaginary and this logocentric order both 
to release its tension and reinscribe it, always however, in a different location. This 
permits a celebration of our humanity, providing not only the pleasure of  
 
                                                           
21 See Chapter 5, p.260 ff. in ‘Comedy’s Privie Parts’, especially p.209 for a fuller explication of the 
fescinine aspects of the ‘feminine’ form of Comedy. See also Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection,  
pp.1302-1310 for a psychoanalytical definition of the phallus as totemic. 
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entertainment but also a sense of power, by demonstrating that relationships and  
subjectivities can exist beyond the restraints of patriarchy. The libidinized economy of 
comedy is that bio-power of history which is inscribed upon the once living bodies of 
that which we may vicariously refer to as the masculine and the feminine. Beyond the 
binary distinction of Western metaphysics, a third position or radical infinity is 
divulged in the non-positive affirmative of the comic form. The laughter, or 
jouissance, comedy produces, is therefore an affirmation without reserve; it does not 
conceal itself behind irony. In being repulsed or disturbed by the grotesque elements 
of comedy, by the awful spectacle of the scapegoat ritual, we are forced to experience 
our negative relationship with the other, to interrogate our assumptions sceptically, 
whether they relate to the ways in which we ascribe generic assumptions to gender, or 
to the ways in which we subscribe to notions of genre as gendered. 
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Chapter 1 
Shakespeare and the Law of Genre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Genre’ as a descriptive term of classification and demarcation can be understood in 
various ways: as a means for writers to streamline production, as a way for critics to 
impose some semblance of order on the ceaseless profusion of cultural texts, and as a 
source of pleasure or identification for audiences and consumers. But how and by 
whom are genres defined? And what role does gender play in those definitions? 
Throughout this chapter gender is used as a central category of analysis as introducing 
the gender differentiation between comedy and tragedy raises some important 
questions about contrasting male and female principles. The male principle is often 
associated with the origins of tragedy22 in its preoccupation with the individual in 
conflict with the world whereas the female principle is often associated with the 
comic acceptance of that world. As this thesis unfolds it will be argued that, 
characteristically, Shakespeare associates the drive to impose both political and 
personal order on society with the ability, or rather the inability, to accept the 
sameness in difference. 
                                                           
22 See Marilyn French, Shakespeare’s Division of Experience, (London: Abacuss, 1982) pp.219-51.  
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 Traditional classifications of drama normally begins with the basic distinction 
between tragedy and comedy, a separation common in Greek and Roman drama, and 
clearly established by Shakespeare’s time. By common traditions then, tragedies were 
serious, involving some ultimate questions about the moral framework of human 
existence in the face of a common fate, death. Tragedies were by this definition 
serious and formal, ‘high’ art, if you will. There was no such formal agreement about 
comedy, and upon the early modern stage there was fierce competition between rival 
companies seeking to win audiences over with different ‘brands’ of comedy. This 
inventiveness and structural flexibility when matched with the popularity of early 
modern comedy underscores an undeniable aesthetic beauty and cultural value in a 
period when this protean form was recognised as being resistant to definition, as 
somehow exceeding the binary opposition of a gendered system of genre. 
 Derrida’s fascinating post-modern appraisal of the regulation of genre bearing 
a striking resemblance to the regulation of gender re-opens the debate which has raged 
for centuries as to whether or not comedy is an aesthetically inferior form in need of 
continual correction. As David Daniell notes “the history of literary criticism is also 
the history of attempts to make an honest creature, as it were, of comedy”23 a point 
which will be reiterated throughout this chapter as the sources for this ‘dishonesty’ are 
sought. Standing accused of corruption and promiscuity, a defence is mounted in 
favour of comedy, which will require close scrutiny of the system of prohibition that 
is genre and the ways in which comedy seeks to inhabit and destabilise that system. 
 
 
 
                                                           
23 David Daniell, ‘Shakespeare and the Traditions of Comedy’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Shakespeare Studies, ed. Stanley Wells, (Cambridge, 1997), p.102 
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I 
 
Derrida cites Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Literary Absolute 
on the relationship between genre (Gattung) and gender, through the many resonances 
of the terms “gattieren (to mix, to classify), gatten (to couple), and Gatte/Gattin 
(husband/ wife)”.24 This may provide a connection to Wittgenstein’s theory of generic 
resemblance as a form of family resemblance where a sequence of influence, imitation 
and inherited codes connect individual works together, marrying characteristics or 
conventions in order to produce specific effects. Primitive though this 
Wittgensteinian25 theory of family grouping within genre is, it suggests that there is a 
need to leave room for polygenesis, for the unobvious, underlying connections 
between the features (and the works) of any one isolated genre.  
In the phenomenon of remote influences Derrida’s view of the hymen as the 
symbol of the madness of essentialising sexual difference bears some relation to the 
ideology of genre as a form of classification freighted with a political imperative: 
The genre has always in all genres been able to play the role of order’s 
principle: resemblance, analogy, identity and difference, taxonomic 
classification, organisation and genealogical tree, order of reason, order of 
reasons, sense of sense, truth of truth, natural light and sense of history.26  
 
There is a temptation in genre theory to define the opposition between comedy and 
tragedy as somehow interminably separate and antithetical. This predilection towards 
defining literary form against what it is not establishes a juxtaposition between 
‘official’ and ‘non-official’ modes of communication which expresses form in 
association with a sort of genre hierarchy. Definitions of tragedy may be more easily 
                                                           
24 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Law of Genre’, Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, (New York and 
London, 1992), p.243 
25 ibid., p.252 
26 ibid. 
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made, especially since Aristotle began by making them from within the theoretical 
confines of a generic binary which, in itself, reveals the deeply ingrained social 
symbolism of genre as a chronotypical system of evaluation. 
Properly used, genre theory must always in one way or another project a 
model of the coexistence or tension between several generic modes or strands: and 
with this methodological axiom the typologising abuses of ‘traditional’ genre 
criticism can be definitely laid to rest. In The Law of Genre, Derrida opens with the 
literary mantra: “Genres are not to be mixed./ I will not mix genres./ I repeat: genres 
are not to be mixed. I will not mix them”.27 But he then embarks on an exploration of 
how the taxonomy of genre is at the heart of the Law itself a law of impurity, 
according to a principle of contamination.  
For the remainder of this chapter I will argue that it is this possibility of cross-
contamination that prevents the eternal recurrence of the same and permits invention 
and difference. The issue of difference also highlights the fact that some genres are 
‘looser’ or more open-ended in their conventions or more permeable in their 
boundaries than others. This permeability is of intense concern to more rigid aesthetic 
theories as it quickly undermines typology, as the movement of comedy throughout 
time demonstrates. The dramatic comedy that grew out of the boisterous choruses and 
dialogue of the fertility rites of the feasts of the Greek god Dionysus could not have 
contrasted more dramatically with the dignity and seriousness of tragedy with its 
homogenising and spiritually redemptive symbolism. Representative of the central 
and ancient principles of sexual and social inversion, comedy swiftly positioned the 
early modern public stage as a locale wherein the collective consciousness of its 
audience could wrestle with notions of power and propriety. The dramatic comedy of 
                                                           
27 ibid., p.223 
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the Renaissance was capable of staging dramatic comedies that mimicked rituals of 
purification and purgation in a historical period that was experiencing a seismic shift 
in cultural values. 
Historically, literature has been classified according to a law of genre which 
has sought to impose a sense of order upon a literary history of invention, hybridity, 
and disorder.  But the question of how this ‘disorder’ both mutates and oxygenates 
order in literary discourse is simultaneously the story of how the genre of comedy 
evolved from a ‘goat-song’ to an aesthetic form.  
 
Laying Down the Law 
 
Over the past one-hundred years, comedy has been studied as a dramatic form which 
has retained its characteristics from ancient folk practices long after the beliefs that 
nurtured them had either become obsolete or been subsumed into the secular aspects 
of theatrical practice. It has been the aim of twentieth century writers like F.M. 
Cornford,28 Suzanne K. Langer29 and C.L. Barber to imbue comedy with the Classical 
credentials required for serious academic scrutiny. Their studies of agrarian fertility 
rituals, rites of passage and the social inversion of public revels gave comedy an 
anthropological credibility that had long been denied. In the wake of these readings, 
the cultural significance of the comic was analysed through a multitude of theoretical 
critiques as a form with well defined structural components and vital social elements. 
Indeed, not since the Renaissance has a definition of comedy been so clear, or, at 
times, so symmetrical. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
28 F.M. Cornford, The Origins of Attic Comedy, (Michigan, 1993) 
29 Suzanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form (London, 1977) 
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 Many poststructuralist theorists are drawn to comedy’s apparent indifference 
and resistance to definition.30 The fluidity and plurality of the comic form may house 
the division of the inauthentic subject, so beloved of postmodern theory, but the ironic 
delivery of humour is often the product of the sheer diversity of comic locations. 
Comedy can equally refer to a genre, a tone or a series of events which force us to 
think multilaterally, as it is both a literary tradition with recognisable structural 
qualities, and a way of describing isolated events or passages within other types of 
work.  
As a dramatic form, the historical development of comedy appears to confirm 
the idea of a relatively permeable entity adapting to suit the demands of the day. It is 
this generic permeability that caused such scholarly exasperation during the 
Renaissance, since the desire to impose conformity upon dramatic form was 
synonymous with the desire to impose order upon society. The Elizabethan stage was 
also continually under attack as the source of various forms of contamination, both 
psychological and physical and as comedy deals with so much sexual and scatological 
humour a literary defence had to be mounted against accusations of impropriety. 
Nevertheless, during the early modern period comic plays, poems and other vehicles 
for humour existed in a populist schema which continually evaded scholarly 
precision, as a purity of form was sought for a genre that dealt with themes thought to 
be local and vulgar. This quasi-Aristotelian attempt to produce a symmetrical literary 
system reflective of humanity as an amalgamation of two competing facets of 
character has shaped all subsequent Western theory by positioning comedy 
                                                           
30 See Andrew Horton, Comedy/ Cinema/ Theory, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1991) and 
Kirby Olson, Comedy After Postmodernism: Rereading Comedy from Edward Lear to Charles 
Willeford, (Texas, 2001) for a discussion on the indefiniteness of comedy as one of its postmodern 
virtues. 
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antithetically to a vision of art that can somehow communicate beyond the moment of 
its creation like tragedy. 
The ultimate authority on genre theory in the Renaissance is to be found in 
Plato’s Laws, where the socially inferior form of comedy is divided into two 
categories: the satirical or the farcical. Out of the various ‘sub-genres’ of farce and 
satire, the romance paradigm became fluid in the hands of many early modern 
dramatists, who developed a variety of comic formulae such as ‘domestic comedy’, 
‘city comedy’ and ‘humours comedy’. Whether these new idioms were developed in a 
scathing backlash to the idealism of late Elizabethan romance can only be determined 
after a close analysis of the social aspects of comedy. However, it is the ‘mongrel’ 
form of tragicomedy that possesses the key to a fuller understanding of the aesthetics 
of comic drama, contesting, as it does, the rigidity of genre from the stand-point of a 
dramatic hybrid once denounced by Dryden31 as an ill-bred dog, ‘barking’ in the face 
of convention. 
 
Mongrel Tragi-comedy 
 
Plautus32 may have coined the term ‘tragicomoedia’ to denote a play in which gods 
and mortals, masters and slaves, reverse the roles traditionally assigned to them, but 
this social inversion has indeed caused a great deal of controversy throughout the 
ages. In the Renaissance and thereafter, tragicomedy was mainly comic, although 
Elizabethan and Jacobean tragedy almost always included some comic or grotesque  
 
                                                           
31 John Dryden, ‘Essay of Dramatick Poesie’, in The Works of John Dryden, 17 (Berkeley, 1971), 
pp.44-9 
32 See the Prologue to Plautus’ Amphitryon (Loeb Classical Library, 1916), pp.1-122. 
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elements. It is the synthesis of these two generic modes, or strands, that is of interest,  
as comedy overthrows the tyranny of the tragic while tragedy destroys the comic. It is 
my contention that tragedy is installed along the margins of every comedy, regardless 
of sub-genre, and that tragicomedy is a loose definition capable of encapsulating the 
absurdity of much comic drama where laughter is the only response left for 
individuals faced with an empty and meaningless existence. Working from the 
assumption that there exists no formal definition of this generic ‘mongrel’ from the 
classical age, it appears that Aristotle used something like the Renaissance meaning of 
the term (serious action with a happy ending) in mind when, in the Poetics,33 he 
discusses tragedy with a dual ending. 
Tragicomedy was the most popular dramatic genre of the early seventeenth 
century, and one possible reason for this popularity is the genre’s emphasis on 
hybridity, and hence its daring propensity for subversion. While critics have often 
sought to resolve the paradoxes of tragicomedy, the politics of the genre can only be 
fully understood if we engage with, rather than attempt to synthesise, its stubbornly 
mixed nature. It is inherently political, foregrounding the tension of opposing and 
uneasily reconciled forces brought into the servile flattery of an absolutist court or the 
constitutionalist subversions of absolutism within the City of London. One could 
therefore suggest that its formal structure encodes important aspects of early Stuart 
England’s national, sexual, racial, religious and political hybridity.34 
 Claims of form at the expense of substance heralded a fascinating new idiom 
that enabled dramatists to explore the frontiers of known sexual reality. One of the 
prime achievements of tragicomedy is the serious treatment of the darker potentialities 
of sexuality in a comic framework. Thus, illicit or problematic sex drives imply some 
                                                           
33 See George F. Hand, Aristotle’s Teleological Theory of Tragedy and Epic, (Heidleberg, 1995), p.21 
34 Jean Howard and Phyllis Rackin, Engendering a Nation, (Routledge, 1997), p.ixff 
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broader dislocation in the social moral order. In certain tragicomic scenes, sexual 
malaise indicates the protagonist’s temporary alienation from the spiritual universe, 
but the ingenuity of tragicomic conventions ensures that both audience and characters 
are generically protected from theatrically exciting and psychologically compelling 
explorations of sexual dilemmas that skirt the boundary of the tragic.  
The special province of tragicomedy is the exploration of the anxieties and  
fantasies that exist between desire and fulfilment, between sexuality and sex. By its 
defining dramatic requirements, tragicomedy connects sex with both death and 
laughter, effectively providing an aesthetic bridge between the ontological turmoil of 
tragedy and the concupiscence of comedy. According to the genre’s chief Renaissance 
theorist, Giambattista Guarini,35 there is a combination of the “comic order” (in the 
development of the plot towards a happy ending) and the laughter of comedy with 
“the danger but not the death” of tragedy. Following Guarini, in his preface to The 
Faithful Shepherdess (1609) John Fletcher wrote that a tragicomedy “wants deaths, 
which is enough to make it no comedie” and that its characters can range from “a 
God” to “meane people” who are generically the source of laughter. 36 
 Sex and death are presented as alternatives to one another with the 
consequences of the sex-death symbiosis generating representations of sexuality that 
are morbid, warped, and often disturbing. Sexual desire is therefore presented as 
sudden and unavoidable madness, a sickness, a harbinger of death, but clues are still 
provided for the audience to anticipate a happy ending of sorts. Such generic markers 
are conventionally cryptic asides or indications of the presence of a controlling 
character. This provides a safe perspective from which to observe as well as to 
                                                           
35Giambattista Guarini (1601), The Compendium of Tragicomic Poetry, selected and translated by 
Allan H. Gilbert, Literary Criticism Plato to Dryden, (New York, 1940), pp.505-33 
36 John Fletcher, The Faithful Shepherdess, in The Dramatic Works of the Beaumont and Fletcher 
Canon, ed. Fredson Bowers, (Cambridge, 1966), III.483 
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participate in the sexual fears and anxieties of the characters. From within the 
confines of the ‘comic order’ however, sexuality leads not only towards the possibility 
of death but also to ridiculous behaviour which further shields the audience from the 
sufferings of characters by portraying various forms of insatiable desire and 
indulgence which arouse satiric laughter. This helps to create a complex portrait of 
sexual obsession as both horrifying and absurd. 
 This generically determined mix of tragedy and comedy may be designed to 
provoke both pity and laughter but the ‘happy’ endings often fail to subsume entirely 
the guilt and misery which have preceded them. Technical rather than emotional 
difficulties have been altered and as these overtly artful resolutions do not adequately 
compensate for the elaboration of sexual difficulties, the discomfort at the end of 
tragicomedy often translates as aesthetic dissatisfaction. This emotional and aesthetic 
discomfort is intrinsic to the endings of tragicomedy as painful consequences are 
always short-circuited. The serious is often undercut by an incongruity, a falling short 
of an agreed upon standard of seriousness. These ludicrous, obviously absurd, 
incongruous, exaggerated or eccentric conclusions may not always be comic, but 
nonetheless, they display one of the main generic markers of comedy. 
 
Generic Progress 
 
Ever since Leo Strauss began arguing in the 1950s that “tragedy and comedy are from 
Plato’s point of view equally necessary and equally problematic” 37 critics have been 
developing a view of Plato’s philosophy as itself tragicomic. Following on from 
Hayden White’s Metahistory, it has become apparent that historians and philosophers 
                                                           
37 Leo Strauss (1959), On Plato’s Symposium, ed. Seth Benardete, (Chicago, 2001), p.171 
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of history consistently use more than one trope or mode of ‘emplotment’ to express 
ideological preferences, which determine the ways in which political and ethical 
issues are handled. Invariably, moralistic or aesthetic choices determine the inclusion 
or exclusion of certain details, be they structural or stylistic. This appropriation of the 
telos of history as inherently poetic and rhetorical provides readers of historical texts 
with a code capable of unlocking the ideological remit of the literary. Why an author 
would choose to present their ideas in a particular mode is revealed as a polemic and 
strategic confrontation with the exigencies of time since stylistic or generic 
conventions contain socio-symbolic messages historically specific encryptions of 
concern. White argues that form is therefore immanently and intrinsically an ideology 
in its own right.38 Therefore, the modes of emplotment that White identifies are 
inevitably structured ideologically, as generic modulations which follow an organised 
hierarchy with a political imperative.  
The materialisation of genre as a system of regulatory norms that have over 
time produced “the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface”39 exhibits the strenuous 
cultural labour required to produce a dramatic corpus and inscribe it with the marks of 
generic difference that eventually come to be taken as natural. The premise that genre  
entails a hierarchic and retrogressive social philosophy has resulted in many of the 
abuses of categorisation which ordained a rank-ordering system that corresponded to 
the divisions of feudal society. Critics such as Northrop Frye have not been alone in  
 
                                                           
38 Genre choices affect certain ideologically overdetermined categories (harmony, order, concord and 
discord, energy, nature, paternity, art, and so on) and offer at different times the possibility of a 
semantic fusion through which a text can thematize its own ambivalent relation to the structure of a 
social power. See also Macherey and Balibar, ‘On Literature as Ideological Form’ in Robert Young ed., 
Untying the Text (London, 1981), p.85ff. 
39 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ”Sex”, (New York and London, 
1993), p.9 
 
 
 30 
detecting the political bias of the relegation of comedy and satire to a lowly status,  
that reflects the moral standards and social classes they symbolise.40 Tragic drama 
may have been thought since Aristotle to represent “men better than they are” while 
comedy depicted “men as worse”41 but, the very fact that Plato’s anti-tragic dialogues 
appear to have been overlooked by those critics keen to adopt an Aristotelian rigour 
for tragedy, points to a preoccupation with decidedly unpleasant emotions. 
George Steiner, who perhaps identifies images of humanity doubled up in 
agony to be more acceptable than images of humanity doubled up in laughter has 
advanced the view that tragedy displays “in the very essence of his suffering… man’s 
claim to dignity”.42 Frye has also counselled against searching for moral or realistic 
conflicts in the comedies since only tragedy will satisfy those who believe that 
“literature’s essential function is to illuminate something about life, or reality, or 
experience, or whatever we call the immediate world outside literature”.43 He goes on 
to argue that comedy merely “seeks its own end instead of holding the mirror up to 
nature”, to such an extent that he understands the comedies to be so “obviously 
conventionalised that a serious interest in them soon leads to an interest in convention 
itself”.44 We may read this as a claim that comedy holds up a mirror to custom, 
reflecting the tastes and limitations of any and every society. Similarly, Cicero 
claimed that comedy held up a “mirror to custom and an image of truth”,45 although 
he was well aware that it was a somewhat distorted fairground mirror.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
40 Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, (Princeton, 1957), p.22 
41 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Ingram Bywater, (New York, 1947), p.5 
42 George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy, (London, 1961), p.9 
43 Northrop Frye, A Natural Perspective: The Development of Shakespearean Comedy and Romance, 
(New York, 1965), p.8 
44 ibid 
45 Ben Jonson, Every Man Out of His Humour, ed. Helen Ostovich, (Manchester, 2001), p.248 
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White identifies Hegel as the philosopher who employed the comic mode of 
emplotment through his use of the trope of synecdoche to integrate parts into a larger 
historical whole. One way of reading Hegel may provide a sense of satisfying 
resolution, reconciliation and organic completion in the present, but this conservative 
position is disputed by theorists such as Georg Lukàcs who regard Hegel’s 
commitment to tragedy as bearing testimony to his “utter integrity” as a thinker.46 
Rather than concerning itself with the ultimate verities sustained by a commensurably 
profound ontology, comedy is seen to have a limited focus dealing with the immediate 
and the pragmatic, and hence ephemeral and philosophically insignificant issues. But 
the question remains, what can comedy teach us about life? Is comedy about 
superficial and sometimes even grotesque pleasures? Or does it give us insight into 
the highest realms of human desire?  
 
Binary Objectives 
 
Not only has comedy been deemed inferior in terms of its material content, rather, its 
status as the putative antithesis of tragedy has frequently been described not in a 
relation of antithetical equivalents, but of dependent subordination. Working from 
within the series of oppositions: serious/light-hearted, profound/frivolous, 
eternal/transient, tragedy has been seen as the primary form which establishes the 
norms on which comedy is reliant. Walter Kerr advances this theory by describing 
                                                           
46 Georg Lukàcs (1938), The Young Hegel, trans. Rodney Livingstone, (London, 1975), especially Part 
III, Chapter 8, ‘Tragedy in the realm of the ethical’. 
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comedy as “a parasitical form, and no absolute” as it needs “a richer form to feed on 
being in essence a shadow”.47 The shadowy origins of comedy have further enhanced  
this mistrust of the comedic, as it developed out of the satyr plays of ancient Greece 
and the dream-like Komos so closely related to the Dionysiac frenzy of ancient 
festivity. Furthermore, the Aristotelian classification of comedy, at least in the 
material sense, hinges on the treatment of “deformity”, “the ridiculous”, “the ugly and 
distorted”48 which sets comedy in differential opposition to the putative concern of 
‘art’, namely the aesthetic appropriation of the ‘beautiful’.  
As an idiom that is concerned with continuity and survival, comedy is 
concerned with ‘living on’ sometimes happily ever after, but always unharmed. This 
has made for a particularly resilient literary form, capable of mutating along with 
changes in social and political conditions. Dependent on the presentation of 
imperfection comedy did however, during the late Elizabethan and early Stuart 
periods, strive for a perfection of form. Not easily definable by structure alone or 
subject matter, early modern comedy can be identified through its celebration of the 
capacity to endure adversity, to turn turmoil and confusion into stability, even to take 
the ‘ugly and distorted’ and perceive an undiscovered ‘beauty’ therein. Attempting to 
locate itself in a perfect society, in some form of u-topia, comedy reaches out towards 
acceptance, integration and reconciliation. If such a world could exist, dramatic 
comedy would represent the highest of all poetic art forms. It would have the ability 
to triumph over the tragic, to overturn the tragic mutability of our bodies and celebrate 
a universe free from distortion and corruption.   
 At the root of both tragedy and comedy, however, lies the same pretence: in 
comedy the pretence to wisdom which although farcical attempts to take the human to 
                                                           
47 Walter Kerr, Tragedy and Comedy, (New York, 1967), p.314-5 
48 Aristotle, Poetics 5 in The Comic in Renaissance Comedy, ed. D. Farley-Hills, (London, 1981), p.9 
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the limits of experience; in tragedy, the pretence to wisdom allows humans to go 
beyond what appears as the limits of existence and to painfully, and, nobly discover 
those limits. Between these two genres lies a hybrid which has been deemed 
‘problematic’ by genre theorists as it reveals the very instability of generic 
classification that is at the root of the inventiveness of literature. Tragicomedy occurs 
because of a lack of agreement about values and behaviour, which therefore demands 
a more acute portrayal of life. Ambiguity and danger force the amusing to turn serious 
and the serious to dissolve in laughter, avoiding the idealism of tragedy and the lack 
of realistic immediacy associated with comedy.  
The mixture of the comedic and the serious reveal that the separation of 
categories are not inherent in nature, rather it is human intellect which identifies 
similarities between individual texts and deploys aspects of the grouping to predict 
other aspects of a social hierarchy within the group. Genres may have been defined 
through characterisation: kings and gods in tragedy, slaves and commoners in 
comedy, but it is within the very restrictions of this definition that ‘value’ is 
associated specifically with class affiliations. This interest in ‘value’ reveals to what 
extent genre choices are social evaluations, which must be investigated 
philosophically if culture is to be described, not in neutral terms, but as an activity 
with political and moral objectives. 
Genre theory, as limitation, as prohibitive construction, permits the invention 
of new idioms because it allows audiences to grasp the social significance of the 
confrontations between generic categories and the organisation of the classes 
themselves. Throughout this thesis, the problematic status of generic definition will be 
explored through an analysis of texts which question the very categories they have 
been placed in. The ‘tragicomic’ is therefore addressed primarily as a sub-genre of 
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comedy but more significantly as a marker of the generic ambiguity which lies at the 
very heart of the aesthetic. The question as to why a hierarchy of genres exists, opens 
up a debate on the nature of hierarchy itself as an epistemological model. From such a 
perspective, the disclosure and reflection of the structuration of power, not only 
between generic categories in dramatic literature but also between gendered, corporeal 
bodies in early modern England, suggests the instability of all classification. This 
scrutiny of boundaries explores the concept of the genreless text as impossible: any 
one text can belong to any number of genres, but no text can remain out-with the 
inclusivity of the generic. This means that it is in principle only ever possible to work 
with the category of genre as a hypothesis projected onto texts which never quite 
conform to an empirical definition, but which must be read as though a master list of 
genres existed. 
 
Genre Knowledge 
 
Jacques Derrida, suggests that the law of genre is a taboo on miscegenation, but that 
the condition of this taboo is the counter-law of the impossibility of not mixing genres 
(and genders).49 Derrida exposes the ideological horizon whereby the law of genre is 
conflated with the law of Nature. He illuminates the guiding assumption of all genre 
theory, from the past to the present, which upholds that generic combinations and 
mixtures are not acceptable, and that the law of genre must be preserved at all costs. 
The notion that ‘kinds’ are somehow naturally simple is underscored by the belief that 
the natural is thus the principle by which the world is a self-generating succession of 
sameness, and not the propagator of the ‘hodge-podge’ of hybridity referred to by  
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Renaissance playwrights such as John Lyly.50 
 This restrictive classical requirement is revealed as a partially totalitarian 
dictum, which is utterly violated by the ‘irresponsibility’ of artistic representation. 
Take for example the plethora of generic categories that were available in the period 
of intense literary experimentation that we refer to as the early modern period. Here, 
writers appear to specialise in hybrid forms and generic mixtures: the emblem book 
(of icons and adages), the florilegium (collections of different types of verse), the 
book of essays (Montaigne’s The Essayes is the most famous example), or the 
anatomy (where a subject of intense topicality is dissected). The law of genre, or more 
precisely the law of nature, was presumably threatened by this large diversity of 
literary ‘kinds’ thus posing a threat to the idea of generic classification. The fluidity 
and multivalence of genre was possibly perceived as a threat to the whole notion that 
there must be an order of ‘kindness’ to things. Strict taxonomic regulations were 
seemingly applied to almost every area of early modern existence with the taboo on 
miscegenation policing both private and public realms. It is perhaps possible to say 
then, that rather than finding genre mixing inadmissable, certain authorities were 
terrified by the possible results of generic hybridity, which they perceived as going 
against nature with the consequent horrific inevitability of the production of either 
monstrous or ridiculous creations. 
 What emerged from this period of literary development was the provision of a  
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totalizing perspective for a new empiricism, the promotion of a theoretical order  
capable of accounting for nature as something concrete, constant and universally 
uniform, as something that obeys laws while admitting diversity. But in order to see 
nature as a single and unique realm that embraces a diversity of species and genres, 
dramatic genres can no longer be viewed as objects of and for imitation, but as objects 
of and for representation. 
 
Historical Symbiosis 
 
From the standpoint of Sidney’s Apology for Poetry, which is an exemplary treatise, is 
to recognise this period in literary history as a time of polarisation, where both generic 
flexibility and neo-classical rigidity stood in direct opposition to one another. In fact, 
as Carolyn Miller suggests, “the number of genres in any one society…depends on the 
complexity and diversity of that society”.51 From this complex and diverse historical 
locale Shakespeare’s own satirically fatuous depiction of the number of genres, sub-
genres, and even super-genres at the early modern dramatist’s disposal seems all the 
more farcical as evinced in Old Polonius’s dazzling parodic recitation of an inventory 
of genres: 
Tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, 
tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral,  
scene individual or poem unlimited. 
      (Hamlet, II.ii.407-11) 
 
Many of the problems normally associated with defining a literary genre have been 
side-stepped by the assumption that Shakespeare is central to it. Shakespeare’s plays 
can be praised – paradoxically – for their willingness to break generic conventions, 
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for their blending of satire or tragedy with history, for providing the ultimate comic 
history, and even, in the early plays and the late plays, for absorbing elements of 
romance and the heroic play. So the Shakespearean canon itself can be identified as an 
example of this Polonian nightmare.  
A revaluation of the generic divisions of the First Folio prompts a revaluation 
of the early Shakespeare and undoes the assumption that Heminge and Condell were 
performing a confident exercise in dramatic taxonomy. Francis Meres may have 
enthusiastically described Shakespeare as “among the English…the most excellent in 
both kinds for the stage”, the best in both “Comedy and Tragedy”,52 but the textual 
materialisation of the Shakespeare canon into three distinct categories tends to 
occlude the bare and incontrovertible fact, that the variety and scope of the early 
modern stage presented the editors of the First Folio with several challenges. 
Even the best efforts of contemporary critics seem to endorse Samuel 
Johnson’s 1756 verdict that 
The players who in their edition divided our author’s work into comedies, 
histories and tragedies, seem not to have distinguished the three kinds by any 
very exact or definite ideas.53 
 
Around the time that Shakespeare’s 1 Henry IV  (1596) was published as a ‘history’ 
there seems to have been a shift away from identifying new historical plays as 
tragedies. Meres, in 1597, identified Richard II, Richard III, Henry IV and King John 
as tragedies, but the various qualifying terms ‘famous’, ‘chronicle’, ‘famous 
chronicle’, ‘true chronicle’, and the ‘true and honourable’ begin to appear more 
frequently to denote a play’s historical veracity.  
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Elsewhere however, the word ‘history’ denotes simply a story: Marlowe’s  
Doctor Faustus (1604) is termed a ‘tragical history’, as were the first two quartos of  
Shakespeare’s Hamlet (1601). The Taming of A Shrew (1594) was referred to as a 
‘pleasant conceited history’ and The Merchant of Venice (1596) as a ‘most excellent 
history’ (and a ‘comical history’ in head titles).54 Earlier uses of these terms also 
sometimes distinguish between ‘famous’ (well-known and true) historical subject 
matter and what the players or writers made of it, although William Webbe, in 1586, 
states that he understands poetry to be divided into three sorts, “which are Comicall, 
Tragicall, Historicall”.55 It is not wholly facetious to suggest then, that the first canon 
of the ‘history’ play, as opposed to that designated by the epithets ‘true/famous/ 
tragical/chronicle/reign’, consists solely of those ‘histories’ the First Folio attributes to 
Shakespeare. The genre has remained Shakespeare’s ever since, and his dominance of 
it, unequalled elsewhere by any of his contemporaries, is still a significant feature of 
his reputation. 
Recent Shakespearian scholarship has stressed the extent to which the cosy 
demarcation of texts, into the Histories, the Tragedies, the Comedies, is itself the 
product of a particular, distinctively early modern, ideological frame of mind which 
preferred to see history or politics as something performed only in the public sphere, 
whilst comedy is somehow a matter for private delectation.56 In fact, as the cultural 
materialist critique has emphasised, the substance of the comedies is every bit as 
political as that of the histories, and in these terms, the politics of Illyria or Arden are  
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as relevant to the discussion of constitutional issues in Shakespeare as is the politics 
of Richard II’s England or Caesar’s Rome. According to Peter Smith, the comedies 
best illustrate Shakespeare’s appreciation that politics should be understood as the 
relations between individuals within communities, the definition of which is 
constantly shifting, as it is a “labyrinthine world with no fixed signposts”.57 
As Jean Howard notes, the only way to interrogate the consequences of the 
textual materialisation of the Shakespeare canon into its three distinct categories, and 
the questions of ontological status that his ‘problem’ plays raise, is to put each 
individual text into conversation with their contemporaneous texts.58 One may quickly 
surmise that a remarkable proportion of Shakespeare’s comic concerns – whether 
patterns of action like the exposure of hypocrisy, depictions of the legal system as 
corrupt, or the exploitation of women in a patriarchal society are shared with his 
contemporary dramatists, but with subtle and surprising differences. When Measure 
for Measure stands shoulder to shoulder with Marston’s The Malcontent then the 
revolutionary potential of the romance paradigm can be viewed afresh, as it is only 
through providing a conversational forum for the disparate texts in this vast body of 
writing that we can hope to undo the production and reproduction of Shakespeare’s 
uniqueness, or at least challenge a blind faith in its efficacy. This last point may seem 
polemical but the contention should rest with the realisation that Shakespeare did not 
work in isolation. 
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Generic Materialisation 
 
The illusion or appearance of isolation or autonomy, which a single printed text 
evokes, also constructs the very real possibility of the creation of a great cultural 
monument. It should be recalled, that the publication of the Jonsonian and 
Shakespearean Folios were, indeed ‘monuments’ which marked the end of an 
ostensibly oral tradition. Both Jonson’s Works (1616) and Shakespeare’s First Folio 
(1623) have become identifiable as monolithic markers of literary invention, but in the 
much later publication of the Beaumont and Fletcher canon (1647) a monument to the 
laughing Cavalier was erected. As Peter Thomas states, what is peculiarly pertinent to 
the Beaumont and Fletcher project was that 
the folio was not…simply a commercial or aesthetic venture: it was also a 
morale boosting gesture of defiance, a propagandist reassertion of the Stuart 
ethic at a crucial moment in the fortunes of the Court.59 
 
It is therefore possible that the sense of identity and self-respect which this text sought 
to provide is also reflected in the purposeful urgency that seems to accompany the 
fraught publication of both Shakespeare’s and Jonson’s collective works more than 
twenty years earlier. The possibility of grasping texts as socially symbolic acts, as 
ideological but formal and immanent responses to historical dilemmas is therefore 
both unavoidable and necessary.  
 The recent account of the publication of the First Folio, offered by Stanley  
Wells and Gary Taylor, addresses the question of why the editors do not arrange the 
plays in chronological order, as Jonson had. Either because they did not know the  
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order of composition, the order of publication, or perhaps because the generic  
distinctions were too ephemeral, appears to be the overall, and somewhat 
disappointing conclusion as to why the collection was given the title of Comedies, 
Histories, and Tragedies.60 I agree with the Oxford editors that this title 
successfully navigates between the Scylla and Charybdis of ‘works’ or ‘plays’, 
while at the same time confidently advertising the range of Shakespeare’s  
output – as successful in three genres as Jonson had been in one.61 
 
But it is nevertheless possible to suggest a different genealogy for the volume. 
Heminge and Condell’s publication is inclusive where Jonson’s is selective: though it 
excludes some plays attributed to Shakespeare (The London Prodigal, A Yorkshire 
Tragedy, 1 Sir John Oldcastle, and The Troublesome Reign of John, King of 
England), it greatly extends Shakespeare’s dramatic oeuvre.  Where Jonson rejected 
collaborative work, the editors of the Folio included plays which they knew to be 
collaborations, and others whose sole authorship by Shakespeare may well have been 
as doubtful to them as they are to modern scholars. 
 Moreover, where Jonson did not distinguish by genre (although the engraving 
on the title page of the 1616 Folio features personifications of tragedy, comedy, 
pastoral, satire, and tragicomedy), Heminge and Condell positively embraced the 
universals of Comedy and Tragedy, which presented Shakespeare as a dramatist who 
had surpassed Jonson’s dramatic output, with the addition of a genre that Jonson had 
not even attempted; the ‘history’ play. It is perhaps significant then, that the first play 
in Jonson’s Folio of 1616 is dedicated to the foremost historian of the day, William 
Camden. Every Man In His Humour is prefaced by his famous allusion to 
Shakespeare’s histories which promises that this play will not “with three rusty 
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swords/ And help of some few foot-and-half-foot words,/ Fight over York, and 
Lancaster’s long jars”, nor will a “Chorus waft you o’er the seas”.62 Jonson’s satirical 
animus towards the isolated, and in his view, falsely venerated, genre of the history 
play seems irrefutable as historical drama flouted the classical unities of time and 
place. 
 Like Marlowe before him, but with greater explicitness, Jonson announced his 
purposes in prologue and ‘induction’, but his programme was based on Aristotle’s 
three unities of action, place, and time, to which he stringently adhered since he 
sought a precision of form. Condemning the discursiveness of the romantic mood he 
wanted ‘realism’, believing that it was the mission of comedy to depict contemporary 
life with moral intent, not by telling pleasing tales of fairies and Calibans. He believed 
in the presentation of boldly conceived types, each representative of some folly or 
vice, in order that through the resultant satire men might laugh and be cured of their 
errors. In the Prologue to Every Man In His Humour, Jonson engenders comedy as 
feminine, claiming that “she would shew an image of the times, and sport with human 
follies, not with crimes”.63  
Jonson’s definition of comedy was nevertheless complex and not easily 
reduced to a single formula, but in the Induction to this same play, Cicero’s tripartite 
dictum that ‘comedy is an imitation of life, a mirror of manners and an image of truth’ 
is reworked thus: 
 And to these courteous eyes oppose a mirror, 
 As large as is the stage whereon we act; 
 Where they shall see the time’s deformity 
 Anatomized in every nerve, and sinew, 
 With constant courage, and contempt of fear.64 
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The general theory of this period, that comedy reprehended vice, was combined with 
the Horatian view that the genre of comedy satirised contemporary behaviour. This  
was a position wholeheartedly embraced by late Elizabethan and Jacobean dramatists,  
but however, the theorisation of the comic genre aroused little interest until this  
historical juncture with Jonson at the forefront of a new emphasis upon the variety of  
possibilities within the conventions of a singular form. 
 M.C. Bradbrook describes the history of comedy in the early seventeenth 
century as the history of the traditionalists’ slow retreat before the advance of the 
“more rigorous” Jonsonian art, which was based less on insight than upon general 
standards of decorum, order and hard work.65 After Jonson, literary criticism was 
never quite the same. Even though he is generally accredited with the business of 
dramatising humoral psychology, Every Man In His Humour, Every Man Out Of His 
Humour and Bartholemew Fair subvert this view. He recognised how comedies 
embraced the odd rather than the ordinary, the idiosyncratic rather than the 
stereotypical character, subscribing to Sidney’s Platonic sentiment, that the ‘odd as 
well as the even’ was required for comedy. The delight, or sympathy, of 
Shakespeare’s romantic comedies paraded a host of prototypical characters, closer to 
types or species rather than individuals. In contrast, the mocking ironic laughter of 
Jonson’s satire is intentionally designed to distance and estrange the viewer, to 
promote a virtual cognoscenti amidst his audience. But then, Jonson and Shakespeare 
were both at the forefront of their profession, continually assessing and addressing the 
tastes and peccadilloes of their audience. 
                                                           
65 M.C. Bradbrook, The Growth and Structure of Elizabethan Comedy, (London, 1955), pp.103-11 
 
 44 
 These different approaches to comedy show how dense networks of affiliated 
texts collectively receive and shape the ‘form and pressure of their times’, by 
mediating social change and contestation. This returns us to the recognition of 
comedy as a complex mode of perception, one whereby the possibility of wholeness 
and coherence is confirmed in the face of incoherence. The ultimate authority for this 
can be identified within the Platonic-Aristotelian inheritance of eidos and genre, 
which was applied to comedy as a ‘family’ grouping, in whatever form it took: 
romantic, satirical, or farcical. From this perspective genre became the validator of 
good ‘taste’ from the pedagogue’s point of view, which attempted to define, and 
defend, comedy as a species of cautionary tale. 
 
Didacticism and the Defence of Comedy 
 
George Whetstone (1578) was not alone in perceiving the presentation of comedies as 
demanding the correct balance of “vertue intermyxt with vice” whereby evil would 
not be ‘taught’ but discovered: 
For by the rewards of the good the good are encouraged in wel doinge: and 
with the scowrge of the lewd the lewd are feared from euill attempts: 
maintayning this my oppinion with Platoes auctority.66 
 
This pedagogic imperative seems to rely upon recommending the work of  
Ancient dramatists and philosophers as they upheld the Ciceronian edict of ‘mirroring 
man’s life’, of drama as mimetic representation. Comic mimesis was also defended by 
Harrington who appreciated and promoted the fact that the moral aspect of comedy 
ensured that “vice [was] scorned, and not embraced,” with Puttenham in agreement 
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that it “tend[ed] altogether to the amendment of men by discipline and example”.67 
Thomas Lodges’s careful use of Horace conflates the effect of early Roman comedy 
with the new type of comedy on the late Elizabethan public stage where “a thefe was 
loth to be seen [at] one [of] there spectacle[s], a coward was neuer present at theyr 
assemblies, a backbiter abhord that company".68 
 Lodge’s premise is to be understood as a well-crafted counter-attack against 
the anti-theatrical assault upon the London stage, and his Defence of Poetry is an 
admirable attempt to assuage the deluge of prejudice which Sidney, amongst others, 
superficially advocated. In An Apology for Poetry, Sidney asks why the Puritanical 
assault has been so virulent upon the drama and he offers the following speculation: 
“perchance it is the Comik, whom naughtie Playmakers and Stage-keepers haue iustly 
made odious”. He goes on to state that this cannot be so as: 
Comedy is an imitation of the common errors of our life, which [are] 
representeth in the most ridiculous and scorneful sort that may be; so as it is 
impossible that any  beholder can be content to be such as one.69 
 
Of course, Sidney was concerned with the “right vse of Comedy”, and as such his 
argument begins to dismantle the accusation that “Comedies rather teach then 
reprehend amorous conceits”. He focuses on the neglect of those rules which govern 
time and unity in structural precepts as “grosse absurdities”.70  
 Sidney’s condemnation of theatrical practices may focus on what would have 
been traditionally viewed as matters of generic convention, but his famous reference 
to the stage as being filled with performances which violate both aesthetic and social 
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principles repays closer scrutiny. Sidney thus accused the early modern stage of 
producing: 
Neither right Tragedies, nor right Comedies; mingling Kings and Clownes, not 
because the matter so carrieth it, but thrust in Clownes by head and shoulders, 
to play a part in maiesticall matters, with neither decencie nor discretion: So as 
neither the admiration and commiseration, nor the right sportfulnes, is by their 
mungrell Tragy-comedies obtained.71 
 
More seems to be revealed about the politics of Sir Philip Sidney than the nature of 
genre, but it is always telling that such systematic critics disclose more about 
themselves than the object of their scrutiny. Nevertheless, Sidney was not alone in 
displaying a complete abhorrence of the generic hybridity fostered by the stage, as it 
implied the dissolution of other boundaries of both a sexual and political nature. 
 
‘Very tragical mirth’ 
 
The ‘comic relief’ afforded by the “mingling of Kings and Clownes” works through a 
deep and ancient principle in comedy. Historically monarchs relied on the licensed 
speech of their court jester, or fool, to remind them that they were mortal, that 
regardless of their sovereign power, they were not divine. In tragedy, the failings of 
kings who have forgotten, like Lear, that to be truly regal and authoritative is to “see 
feelingly” (King Lear, IV.vi.148) is magnified by swift juxtapositions between 
‘reason’ and ‘madness’, between tragic and comic motifs. In that “most piteous tale of 
Lear” (V.iv.213) or The Tragedy of Hamlet where “One woe doth tread upon 
another’s heel” (IV.vii.162) the many variations of Sidney’s depiction of  
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‘mongrelisation’ are demonstrated alongside the curious volatility of laughter. Within  
these two highly revered tragedies an analysis of the dramatic discourse between fools 
and their masters, between the subversion of comedy and the authority of tragedy 
appeals to the very distinction between these two monolithic super-genres. 
 Far from enjoying a total freedom of speech, clowns had to resort to complex 
linguistic strategies to disguise their criticisms for fear of punishment. One should 
note how eager Lear’s Fool is to avoid being “whipp’d” although he does use certain 
conversational strategies to control or influence the linguistic behaviour of his social 
superiors. The relative power of his conversational prowess originates in his condition 
of being a ‘primary knower’,72 as he rarely asks a question that he sincerely wants 
answered. More like the “schoolmaster” who offers to “teach thee a Speech”, 
(I.iv.115) Lear’s Fool already knows the answers and his elicitations have the purpose  
of signalling his intention to joke and to obtain from his interlocutor permission to 
deliver a punchline. However, the control he exerts is relative, it is based on 
persuasion and manipulation and therefore requires a fragile maintenance within each 
conversational turn: 
I marvel what kin thou and thy daughters are. They’ll have me whipp’d for 
speaking true; thou’lt have me whipp’d for lying; and sometimes I am whipp’d 
for holding my peace. I had rather be any kind o’ thing than a fool; and yet I 
would not be thee, nuncle; thou hast pared thy wit o’ both sides, and left 
nothing i’ th’ middle. 
      (I.iv.182-8) 
 
Here, comedy enters the tragedy without ceremony to demonstrate that the filial 
disloyalty that the great king is experiencing can be expressed best through the 
metaphor of poor housekeeping. The domestic and social elements with which 
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comedy is associated - the ‘lower’ stuff of the quotidian universe - is used to 
intuitively relate to Lear’s confusion over his abrupt loss of social status. 
 The specific status of tragedy as a form of entertainment relies repeatedly on 
the interactive context of dialogue, where the linguistic tools of comedy – puns, 
quibbles, and riddles – are all employed in constraining the conversational options left 
open to the other character in the dialogue. Somewhat surprisingly, the ‘melancholy 
prince’ Hamlet displays a jocular familiarity with the tonal and verbal ambiguities of 
comic language and is involved in many diverse instances of humour within his 
dramatic play-space. There is the exchange of verbal repartee with Polonius of which 
the following is only an example: 
 POL:   Will you walk out of the air, my lord? 
 HAM:    Into my grave? 
 POL:      Indeed, that’s out of the air.     
(II.ii.209-211) 
 
And there is the conflict of comic and tragic tonalities in his response to the 
whereabouts of the murdered Polonius: 
In heaven; send thither to see; if your messenger find him not there, seek him 
I’ the other place yourself. But if, indeed, you find him not within this month, 
you shall nose him as you go up the stairs into the lobby.                                
   (IV.iii.34-8) 
 
There is a darkness here which focuses more sharply on the tragic as the pleasure 
induced from Hamlet’s antic humour becomes more of a thrusting snort of aggression 
rather than the free and spontaneous laughter which comedy seeks. As the realisation 
increases that the ultimate authority in this drama will be tragic, a social commentary 
on class structure manifests itself. Hamlet may toy with rhetorical sophistry but he 
stands in opposition to Lear’s Fool. As his social inferior, Lear’s Fool performs 
cultural negations and symbolic inversions whereas Hamlet’s wit is the mark of his 
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social superiority, and his power of mind takes expression in both his attempts to 
puzzle out the meaning of life and death, and his humorous adroitness. 
Renowned as one of dramatic literature’s finest and most enigmatic 
achievements, Shakespeare’s Hamlet is not only a dramatic work filled with pathos 
and violence, it also exploits fully the conventions of comic relief to alleviate the 
tensions resurrected by its tragic form. In fact, in 1604 one Anthony Skoloker praised 
Shakespeare for combining light and heavy matter in a single play: “Friendly 
Shakespeare’s Tragedies, where the Comedian rides when the Tragedian stands on 
tip-toe…pleas[ing] all, like Prince Hamlet”.73 Thus, as the image of Shakespeare the 
man was associated with social mobility so the image of Shakespeare the dramatist 
was characterised by stylistic range and generic flexibility. 
 
Infectious Humour 
 
The idea that badly made plays violated class and gender distinctions positioned the 
stage as a place where improbable events took place which stretched the audience’s 
credulity. Comedies were highly lucrative products of the burgeoning theatrical 
industry and were subject to the same suspicions as the ‘common comonties’ or 
commodities of the market place. This identification between comedy and commerce 
conflated the idea that the corporeal presence of actors upon a stage (particularly in 
connection with the theatrical practise of cross-dressing) was tantamount to a 
marketing of flesh, to a prostitution of poetry. This perhaps had more to do with the 
location of the early modern public theatres in the liberties of London where brothels, 
bear-baiting pits, and barracks were its close neighbours, and hence, the source of a 
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good deal of its custom. However, since Aristotle, comedy has been invariably 
denounced as an inferior form of drama as it deals with an inferior class of person. 
Almost one hundred years after Shakespeare’s comedies were performed John Dryden 
was still displaying the classical aversion to comedy in his work A Parallel of Poetry 
and Painting (1695) where he describes the distinction between comedy and tragedy 
as a “Lazar in comparison to a Venus”.74 As Dryden progresses along the somewhat 
dubious neo-classical perspective that comedy’s only redeeming feature is that it may 
act as a placebo “suitable to dampen the dangerous political propensities” of “the 
vulgar gazers” and “the beastly audience” he becomes a useful point of departure back 
towards the historical conception of the public, professional theatre as a 
‘contaminating’ influence upon an unwitting ‘vulgar’ public. 
In A Treatise on Daunces, the 1581 pamphlet attributed to Stephen Gosson, 
the theatre is described as one of the “accessories and dependents (or things annexed) 
to whoredom”.75 John Northbrook in 1577 had also queried the moral didacticism of 
the stage, producing his own pamphlet the Treatise wherein Dicing, Dancing, Vain 
Plays are reproved. The theatre had become a centre for dubious activity, a place to 
“learn how to be false and deceive your husband…how to ravish and beguile, how to 
betray, to flatter, lie, swear, foreswear, murder…poison…rebel…”76 As Steven 
Mullaney has pointed out in his book, The Place of the Stage (1988), the theatre easily 
slipped into the socially dubious nature of the enterprises which surrounded it, located 
as it was in the Liberties that housed “marginal spectacles” ranging from “hospitals 
and brothels to madhouses, scaffolds of execution, prisons and Lazar-houses”.77 
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 The theatre was bound to be associated with, to be seen in terms of, these more 
familiar spectacles, with the geographical location indicating the status of the theatre 
within the culture: as something to be kept apart, a distrusted alien that threatened the 
civil, moral and social order. Thus, the theatre came to be likened to the disease and 
prostitution which surrounded it, not only in the minds of its Puritan opponents but 
also in the minds of almost everyone who witnessed these spectacles. 
 According to Mullaney, the most iconographically contaminating of these 
spectacles was leprosy, which, he writes: 
entered into the moral imagination of medieval culture at an early date, such 
that it altered and determined not only the lives of those afflicted but also the 
metaphors, customs and institutions that shaped the lives of those otherwise 
untouched by the disease.78 
 
The disease metaphor no doubt revived by periodic outbreaks of the plague, continued 
to shape social policy long after the last lepers were ferried to Southwark in 1557, an 
event Mullaney carefully describes. In fact, the initial attempts to control the public 
theatres were made on the basis of public health. Letters between the Lord Mayor of 
London and the Privy Council during the years between 1580 and 1600 testify to the 
changing perspective on the theatre and to the supercession of one kind of vision by 
another. 
 Throughout this period, the Lord Mayor repeatedly petitioned Elizabeth’s 
government to discourage public plays as a means of curbing the danger of infection: 
 
It may please your honor According to our dutie I and my brethren have had 
care for staye of infection of the plague and published orders in that behalf 
which we intended god willing to execute with dilligence. Among other we 
find great and dengerous inconvenience of people to playes, beare bayting, 
fencers, and phane spectacles at the Theatre and Curtaine and other like places 
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to which doe resorte multitudes of the basist sort of people; and many enfected 
with sores running on them.79 
 
It is the sight of open sores, a disfigurement historically associated with leprosy now 
attributed to the plague and to syphilis, that one sees at “the Theatre and the Curtain”, 
not the plays, bear baiting or fencing that are performed there.  
If as Mullaney argues, the spectacle of leprosy affected the metaphors of the 
early modern imagination, the same is no less true of spectacle itself: the physical 
process of ocular speculation (the way of seeing was conceptualised in metaphoric  
terms as a form of intercourse). The eyes were viewed as a channel, a vagina, if you  
will, the means through which a mind is impregnated.80 However, this impregnation is  
itself a transgression, an unnatural submission that results, in the mind conceiving 
illegitimate ideas. As Cressida pronounces, “minds swayed by eyes are full of 
turpitude” (Troilus and Cressida, V.ii.112) and by implication, venereal infection. 
Thus, the Liberties themselves become a kind of ‘running sore’ infected by ‘the basist 
sort of people’, which threatens the ‘body’, both political and visceral, of London. 
This association of the corruption of both mental and physical health infused 
much debate on the propriety of the early modern theatre. However, until the diseased 
and infectious ‘body’ of London had at last dragged itself out from the terrifying grip 
of plague, the long arms of the State attempted to grasp and display the infectious 
potential as synonymous with the ‘latent’ moral corruption of the theatre. The late 
1580s witnessed a shift in the public attitude to theatrical entertainment, with Philip  
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Henslowe signing the partnership agreement for his new theatre, to which the 
infamous Little Rose ‘inn’ lent its grounds, its name and evidently its reputation as 
one of the original ‘Bankside stewes’ licensed by Henry II in 1161 and owned for 
nearly two centuries by the good sisters at Stratford-at-Bowe. Thus, the principal 
employer of players also became an employer of prostitutes. 
It was shortly after Henslowe’s acquisition of the Little Rose and the erection 
of the Rose that the Lord Mayor’s office altered its objection to the theatres, 
emphasising decadence over disease. At about the same time, those within and around 
the theatre community, who had before been silent, began to note – some with 
amusement, some with mockery, some with dismay – the coupling of the stage and 
brothel. John Davies satirises the courtier who replaces the theatre with the 
whorehouse on his daily round; Henry Chettle, with tongue in cheek, scolds the player 
for taking trade from the prostitute; and Thomas Nashe defends the theatre as a place 
of social and cultural improvement, not of moral decay.81 Of course, mention of 
prostitution was invariably accompanied by its relationship to disease, since the 
association of the theatre with the brothel was not merely a puritanical conceit or an 
accident of locale but a material fact, one seemingly recognised by everyone from 
Puritan to player to Privy councillor. Therefore, the rhetoric behind the accusations of 
the seductive powers of illusion gathered momentum, and to a large extent a bizarre 
comic hubris since the material situation of the theatre was reflected in the volatility 
associated with the comic form. 
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Derision Medicinable  
As Lawrence Danson points out, Shakespeare’s romantic comedies and histories may 
have been denounced as old fashioned and fantastic romances or “mouldy tales”, but 
it is not only the ‘romance’ plays which expose the seamy underside of contemporary 
urban life; The Merchant of Venice (1596), and Measure for Measure (1603) “know 
all about a world of universal prostitution”.82 In fact, under analysis these two plays 
display startling similarities to the ‘city’ comedies of Shakespeare’s contemporaries. 
They may both contain the courtly figures associated with romantic comedy, and both 
allude to absent monarch plays, but their focus on urban merchants, artisans and the 
lower classes intervenes in contemporary ideological struggles. The relevant historical 
and ideological content of city comedy is thus identified with the materialistic 
ideology of the capital during the early modern phase of its expansion. The emergence 
of the urban marketplace as a “central urban institution of the preindustrial city”83, 
and its displacement of the “feudal order and the moral values that uphold it”84 also 
relate well to Shakespeare’s most problematic comedies.                                                      
 In addition feminist readings have detected in city comedy the salient traits of 
a dominant early modern discourse that constructs woman as naturally incontinent and 
inconstant85. From this perspective, therefore, the characterising feature of city 
comedy turns out to be its treatment of gender and sexuality which brings such 
comedic anomalies as The Taming of the Shrew into close proximity with this 
posthumous sub-genre. As Mary Beth Rose has noted, while Elizabethan and  
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particularly Shakespearean romantic comedy “concentrated on the complexities of 
eros, dramatized as sexual desire seeking and finding fulfilment in the heroes’ 
successful resolution of the process of courtship”, by contrast “Jacobean city comedy 
brings into the light of representation precisely those dissociations of Renaissance 
sexual ideology which romantic comedy evokes but seeks to reconcile and 
constrain”.86                                                                                                                           
 The early Elizabethan fashion for romantic comedy was gratified by notable 
playwrights such as John Lyly and Robert Greene, but it is with Shakespeare that the 
romance genre really flourishes. The formalist theorist, Northrop Frye, has presented 
certain universal genres and modes as the key to organising the entire literary corpus, 
perceiving the romance paradigm as pertaining to the “mythos of Summer” which is 
“perennially childlike” in its “extraordinarily persistent nostalgia, its search for some 
kind of imaginative golden age in time or space”.87 This thematic code relates well to 
Lyly’s Gallathea (1588), Greene’s Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay (1590), and among 
Shakespeare’s early romances, As You Like It (1600) and Twelfth Night (1600), where 
the farcical abounds in a host of mistaken identities and other fantastical feats of 
substitution. However, moving from the pastoral to the urban does more than 
substitute one geographical location for another. There is a distinct reflection of 
history in this thematic concern, as the relaxed laws of the country are replaced by the 
strict statutes of the city.                                                                                                       
 The highly conventionalised formulae of As You Like It, Twelfth Night, A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream and Much Ado About Nothing, all display a close 
association with the pastoral archetype and the idyllic myth of pleasant pastures.  
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Indeed, although many romantic comedies take Italy for their scene, the green and 
pleasant lands, fertile countryside, and game-filled forests, all seem to work on the 
principle of a kind of national comedy, wherein not only England’s precarious present 
but its perilous past is presented with a vision of history as a romance replete with a 
happy ending and a new sense of community. Danson is swift to point out that this is 
not irrelevant to Shakespeare’s “contemporaneous development of ‘history’ as a genre 
that alludes to the conventions of both tragedy and comedy”.88 It is also interesting to 
note that the comedy which infiltrates the history play tends towards a form of 
politically subversive humour  which mocks the master/slave dichotomy. In this 
sense, comedy is given a voice in   history, a voice of dissent which demands 
explanation.                                                                                                                           
 The dialectic between Elizabethan dramatic form and social process is 
especially conspicuous in the triadic romance pattern of exile and return, or as C.L. 
Barber constructs it, as “release through clarification”.89 On the one hand the 
experience of the characters can be seen as a fictional analogue of both the theatrical 
and social experiences of its audience. Actions can also be related to moral patterns, 
most succinctly described by Frye as the pattern of entering, responding to and 
leaving a “green world”.90 There are several other comic structures such as that of 
illusion and enlightenment, which Frye applies specifically to both Much Ado About 
Nothing (1598) and Twelfth Night (1600). Nevertheless, the idea of English history as 
a romantic comedy began to wane as the ‘mortal moon’, chaste Elizabeth herself, 
grew closer to death. This may allude to a crude simplification of generic evolution, 
but perhaps this was the reason why many of Shakespeare’s contemporaries began to  
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relocate their lush comic scenes within the decaying urban territory of the city.              
 The comedies of Thomas Heywood and Thomas Dekker both display 
transitional features, with middle-class realism proceeding alongside sentimental and 
romantic fantasies. The Shoemaker’s Holiday (1599) is a nostalgic attempt to indulge 
in a comic fantasy of universal nobility whilst working within an optimistic view of 
absolutist politics. Dekker and Middleton’s The Roaring Girl (1610) and Marston’s 
The Dutch Courtesan (1605) explore the transient forms of the commodification of 
the human subject, particularly in relation to women as ‘movable’ goods. Both these 
plays will be studied more closely in Chapter 3 as examples of patriarchal law. 
Although these plays are classified as ‘comedies’ generically encoded with comedy’s 
structural preoccupation with marriage, there is an obvious alteration in values in 
relation to convention. These ‘city’ comedies dramatise a credit-based socio-
economic order where the demonisation of women underlines the critical implications 
of disenchantment with ‘legitimate’ sexual and social exchange. Both are fascinating 
considerations of the link with the principle of simulation that cross-dressed actors 
and prostitutes stage as identity is shown as a social construct. The genre of Comedy 
may have been gendered feminine, but in disclosing the constitution of gender as a 
theme, the dramatic selections which have been made throughout this thesis 
exemplify their importance within the literary canon Thus, in scrutinising the shifting 
boundaries between popular genres an analysis of the once immovable distinctions 
between genders becomes inevitable.                                                                                                    
 In Middleton’s biting satires we are led towards a new set of generic 
conventions, invariably termed as ‘city’ comedy, where only the most entrepreneurial 
rogues triumph, as in the case of A Trick to Catch the Old One (1605) or A Chaste 
Maid in Cheapside (1613). The earlier play anticipates the much darker comedy of 
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Massinger, in particular A New Way to Pay Old Debts (1620) and The City Madam 
(1623). But the emergence of city comedy as a distinct genre is complexly interwoven 
with other phenomena at the end of the sixteenth century. While the existence of 
Roman urban comedies in particular provided a precedent of the city plays of Jonson, 
Marston and Middleton, in the first decade of the seventeenth century the obvious 
popularity of this genre suggests that it could not have taken hold in such varied and 
sophisticated forms had it not addressed the particular anxieties and struggles of a 
specific historical paradigm. It is within the classical ‘intrigue’ comedies, the 
‘humour’ comedies and the city comedies that we can detect the introduction of a 
social note into the equation which bears an unmistakably bourgeois flavour as the 
concerns of the mercantile classes are addressed.                                                      
 Playwrights such as George Chapman, Philip Massinger, and Thomas 
Middleton form a much needed bridge between the ‘romantic’ affiliations of early 
Shakespearean comedy and the darker, more problematic disclosures of his later 
comedies. These darker comedies employ social critique and interrogation as themes 
which run throughout Jacobean comedy displaying luminously the intertextual 
relationship which exists between texts. It is not enough to claim that Shakespeare 
was attempting to resolve the conflict between comedy and tragedy in his dramatic 
comedies, but that he was attempting to rival the increasingly popular ‘city’ comedies 
within a progressively competitive market. This competition stimulated invention and 
the evolution of generic forms as the demand for novelty increased. The way in which 
particular plays have been in ‘conversation’ with other genres and sub-genres 
throughout their performative lives, reveals an often forgotten process which is 
nonetheless an indispensable component in the genealogical progression of genre. We 
can either view these texts with their multiple plot structures, dubious origins and 
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collaborative constructions despairingly as ‘curs of mixed blood’ or more positively 
as expressions of inevitable social and aesthetic change, where intense cultural 
concerns were exorcised. In light of the confused milieu in London following the 
accession of James I, this confusion in the romances stems from a confusion of 
allegiance.                                                                                                                                   
 In the plays written by John Fletcher and Francis Beaumont, the self-conscious 
representation of aristocratic manners made them the Cavalier’s favourites, and much 
more suited to the political machinations of the Restoration stage, and yet, the 
enormous variety of their plays makes any kind of classification difficult. In fact, the 
prologue to The Woman Hater (1606) exploits this generic ambiguity stating that one: 
dare not call it Comedie, or Tragedie; ‘tis perfectly neyther: A Play it is, which 
was meant to make you laugh, how it will please you, is not written in my 
part: For though you should like it to day, perhaps your selves know not how 
you should digest it tomorrow.91 
 
The taste for comedy changes: what one society (or indeed, generation or class) finds 
hilarious, may be perceived by another as horrifying. The emergence of Jonson’s 
humour comedies, Fletcher, Beaumont and Middleton’s city comedies, and Dekker 
and Heywood’s more celebratory version of the same sub-genre displays just how 
much the field of comedy was filled by satire in the early seventeenth century. 
Nevertheless, Shakespeare did not turn automatically to this satirical vein, but to a 
different set of generic conventions. Pericles (1606), Cymbeline (1609), The Winter’s 
Tale (1609) and The Tempest (1610) are all genre-conscious works which not only 
veer away from the ‘realism’ of their contemporary texts, to magical islands, 
mysterious mountains or pastoral retreats, but they also seem to signal a realisation 
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that the remorse-ridden fathers and lost children, the torn families in search of 
wholeness, do not quite fit into society’s organising rubric.                                           
 Perhaps these despairingly problematic plays illuminate the ephemerality of 
the generic distinctions in the First Folio, but equally they are, perhaps, as Jean 
Howard has defined them: exemplary city comedies, ‘anti-romances’ produced by the 
great ‘romantic’ Bard.92 According to this formulation traditionally held definintions 
of Shakespeare’s ‘problem’ plays as generically ambiguous, can be extended to both 
his ‘late’ plays and his early comedies. Throughout these dramas generic fluidity not 
only signals theatrical experimentation, but also the mutability of existence is 
deconstructed; for as Lukàcs reminds us, the fact that the truth can only be expressed 
ironically is a sign of the fallen state of the world.93 The irony of the problem plays 
and the hidden complexities of the romance paradigm is to be found in an emblem of 
the frustration of human impulses in a world which has become alien to them.                   
 As Charles Taylor suggests, the age of Shakespeare was the last era to address 
as well as experience the acute sense of alienation and despair which pervades 
contemporary public philosophy, an age which witnessed a fundamental struggle 
between those who clung to an idea of community, or commonwealth, and those who 
sensed that a natural state of disorder better described political reality.94 In the end it 
was an intellectual struggle won by the pessimists, crystallised in the writings of 
Machiavelli and Hobbes. Man was indeed, as Machiavelli claimed, ‘hell-bent’ on 
‘self-ruin’ and the only mechanism for the conservation of society lay with an 
emergent liberal legalism, the fiction of public and private spheres of government and  
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mythologies of ‘rights’ dedicated to patrolling these notional boundaries.                                                        
 However, the legislators of early modern convention: the aristocracy, the local 
judiciaries and the puritanical theologians, try as they may, found it exceedingly 
difficult to contain the subversive tendencies of dramatic production. The basic 
mystery of theatrical performance, that sudden epiphany of intoxication which the 
cathartic laughter of the comedies releases proved harder to restrain than the 
rebellious restlessness of the populace. The violence and insensitivity of a comic form 
which practised detachment and distance from the everyday exposed not only the 
faults, foibles and injuries of others but depicted ‘masked’ characters who maintained 
themselves in a hostile world by exploiting the realisation that everything can be 
reduced to pure surface and inessential appearance. By a process of ostentation the 
comic character was able to stand in for an entire class who were experiencing the 
disillusionment and despair of standing at the nadir of a paradigmatic shift, stifling the 
recognition that the repetitive, obsessive, foolish behaviour of the Theatre of Cruelty 
that was their governing body, would go on and on indefinitely. Walter Kerr puts an 
escapist twist on this theme, suggesting that “within comedy there is always despair” 
but also adding that it is “a despair of ever finding a right ending except by artifice 
and magic”.95 For comedy is an escape aid; its celebration and affirmation of life 
requires a triumph of fantasy and imagination over the realities of life (and death). 
One must rise above and beyond the ‘real’ world, without gravity – one must detach 
oneself from the way things are – in order to accomplish one’s desire. 
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Conclusion 
 
As Lawrence Danson so ingenuously puts it: “Tragedy has flourished sporadically in 
theatrical history, but comedy is forever”.96 We must however, proceed with caution 
when adopting the biological analogy of evolution, with its implication that only those 
genres that are well adapted to their functions survive. Idealist theoretical approaches 
may seek to categorise ‘ideal types’ in terms of essential textual characteristics but  
their inevitably structural appropriations should be recognised as a-historical. Steven 
Neale stresses that “genres are not systems: they are processes of systematisation”.97 
As a result of their dynamic nature as processes, Neale argues that definitions of genre 
“are always historically relative, and therefore historically specific”.98 Similarly, Boris 
Tomashevsky insists that “no firm logical classification of genres is possible. Their 
demarcation is always historical, that is to say, it is correct only for a specific moment 
of history”.99 Generic conventions therefore need to be studied as historical 
phenomena. 
 Current genres progress through phases or cycles of popularity, sometimes 
becoming ‘dormant’ for a period rather than disappearing completely. On-going 
genres and their conventions themselves change over time, and in reviewing this 
‘evolutionary change’ one may acknowledge the dynamic fluidity of genres without 
positing the final demise of genre as an interpretive framework. As the generic corpus 
ceaselessly expands, genres (and the relationship between them) change over time; the 
conventions of each genre shift, as new genres and sub-genres compete for longevity. 
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And yet, we would do well to recall that formalist theorists such as Todorov have 
convincingly argued that “a new genre is always the transformation of one or several 
old genres”.100 
 As Alastair Fowler notes, the Renaissance debate on genres was not unlike our  
own,101 although we must remain vigilant to the specific differences which prove that  
the boundaries of literature were not the same as those that critics now dispute, since  
Art’s universality resided in broad principles. Early modern scholars102 thought of the 
‘kinds’ as adaptable, not in particular generic forms. We can therefore look to 
characteristic action patterns as defining features of certain types of drama, or attempt 
to recognise similarities in plot structure, theme, or motif. However, identifying and 
attempting to isolate tragic and comic components, or designating comedy as that 
which is not tragedy will only reassert Fowler’s warning to the unwary that no sooner 
has a generic label been applied, than it can be falsified.  
Take for example Byron’s generic definition as “all tragedies are finished by a 
death,/ All comedies are ended by a marriage”.103 While it may be irrefutable that 
nowhere is the formal model of convention, more obviously present than at the ending 
of a play, delineated thus, comedy is the opposite of tragedy. A comedy contains no 
deaths; if death were to enter, comedy would not exit. In the case of Love’s Labour 
Lost (1598) however, death does enter the play, in the form a letter, which halts the 
comic proceedings abruptly. This dramatic comedy may concern the subject of love, it 
may include passages of rhetoric and witty verbal exchanges between characters, and 
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crucially, it has a ‘happy’ ending of sorts, but according to matters of generic 
taxonomy, Love’s Labour Lost defies convention, it does not end with a marriage. If 
this were typical of its ‘kind’ all four (or five) couples would wed in the final scene, 
but there is a critical comment on the reasoning behind this diversion. The characters 
note the way in which this play differs from the norm. When the Princess and her 
attendants depart, Berowne says: 
 
Our wooing doth not end like an old play; 
Jack hath not Jill: these ladies’ courtesy 
Might well have made our sport a comedy 
     (V.ii.873-5) 
 
Here Berowne suggests that the play cannot be a comedy as it does not conclude with 
a marriage and that this is a ‘modern’ play, a new type of comedy which entertains 
and provides pleasure but nonetheless flouts convention. 
 While the mixing of comic and tragic episodes was undoubtedly considered a 
stylistic flaw in classical dramatic theory, Elizabethan and Jacobean drama is notable 
in its effective use of comic and tragic ‘relief’, and it is within these aspects of the 
Renaissance appropriation of generic classification that we find a parallel with more 
‘modern’ dramatic theories. “The words of Mercury” may indeed be “harsh after the 
songs of Apollo” (LLL, V.iii.923-4) and comedy observes the fact that there can be no 
death admitted into the dramatic space. Death would violate specific structural 
constraints which necessarily condition the work of the comic dramatist. Typically 
entering its last act with all of its subplots unresolved and with all of its characters still 
alive, comedy reveals the two major factors which complicate its resolution, and 
hence its generic ‘kind’. These features push the termination of the plot in the 
direction of complexity which can only ever be resolved through artifice and a sense 
of strained interconnection, but perhaps this is because the simplifying device of death 
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is denied to the democratic art of the comedian. Since the comic character is 
immortal, the dramatist is denied the tragic opportunities for murderous 
simplification, which the tragedian so frequently exploits. 
Tzvetan Todorov may have bemoaned the dissolution of genre classification in 
the twentieth century by stating that “it is even considered a sign of authentic 
modernity in a writer if he ceases to respect the separation of genres”,104 but he was 
not alone. René Wellek was also dismayed by the declining respect for generic 
classifications, observing fearfully that:  
boundaries are being constantly transgressed, genres combined or fused, old 
genres discarded or transformed, new genres created, to such an extent that the 
very concept has been called into doubt.105 
 
And yet the slightest attention paid to the conventions of dramatic comedy upon the 
early modern public stage reveals that the tendency has been perpetual. 
 Sir Philip Sidney’s pronunciation of the genres, ‘kinds’ or species of his time, 
that “if seuered they be good, the coniunction cannot be hurtfull”,106 appears to share 
the more progressive, post-modern celebration of the perennial literary ‘fashion’ for 
hybridisation and experiment. However, Sidney’s exploration of the preoccupations of 
his time with ‘invention’ is a problematical one, as later in his Apology for Poetry, he 
reveals his ultimate concern as the need to ascertain the ‘right use’ of genres, or to 
promote the correct context for genres in the maintenance of decorum. His concern 
with the propriety of dramatic representation is reflected in the depictions of a 
hierarchically stratified society which was experiencing what David Underdown has 
termed the Renaissance “crisis of order”. According to Underdown, the sense of  
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impending breakdown was never “more widespread, or more intense, than in early 
modern England”; moreover the breakdown was one that he sees as having developed 
out of a “period of strained gender relations” that “lay at the heart of the ‘crisis of 
order’.” 107 The particular impact of this crisis was felt in and around the public 
theatres of London, in the liberties which housed them, as men and women struggled 
with startling shifts in both social and sexual mobility and the perceptions of propriety 
attendant upon them. 
 Nevertheless, out of the complex organic relationship between the authors of 
late Elizabethan and early Jacobean drama and their environment, the processes of 
generic evolution are rarely restricted by theoretical writings. Close scrutiny of 
generic formulae only seems to confirm that literary theories and fashions do not exist 
in a vacuum, but divide and multiply through a form of imitation. It is not an 
evolution in the strictly Darwinian sense of the word, because this sense is based on a 
conception of the identity of the organism throughout its mutations, whereas social 
change is endless, it has no point of maturity, and it is not structured by a goal.108 
 For the Italian aesthetician Benedetto Croce, writing at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, an artistic work is always unique and artistic genres are merely 
prohibitive and restrictive. This harbouring of the Romantic ideology of the primacy 
of authorial ‘originality’ and ‘vision’, which emphasises individual style and artistic 
‘self-expression’, follows a tradition that celebrates the position of the artist either 
working ‘in tension’ with generic taxonomy, or breaking the mould of convention 
altogether. The Renaissance may have indulged in abstract hypotheses about the 
origins of genre, but as we can see, from our own modern preconceptions of genre, it  
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entailed a hierarchical and retrogressive social philosophy, that brings them into 
alignment with early modern literary theory. The class-specific break between the 
genres can be perceived as carrying the force of reaction through into ideological 
conventions. And the clear and precise antithesis between the two forms of tragedy 
and comedy may now be reassessed as the mirror of each other’s elements, the one 
informing the construction of the other’s image. For without the comic we could not 
survive the tragic, and without tragedy there would be no need for comedy. 
This preliminary chapter may have surveyed the basic framework of the ‘law 
of genre’ but it has not yet addressed the parameters of judgement which inflect 
Shakespeare’s dramatic comedies. The law of genre is a form of legislation imposed 
on literary works by the bureaucrats of the academy and since the early modern period 
these scholarly attempts to restrict artistic invention have largely passed unheeded, as 
dramatists continually demonstrated a fluidity of style that challenged the confines of 
genre. In the next chapter, the generic flexibility of comedy is explored with the 
assistance of several genre conscious plays. The Merchant of Venice and Measure for 
Measure, stand as two of Shakespeare’s most legally fixated comedies appearing to 
doubly interrogate the judicial nature of literary demarcation and early modern 
litigation as an endless source of ambiguous humour. As matters of judgement give 
way to matters of individual preference a similarity is fused between generic law as it 
is imposed upon what is presumed literary and the legal constitution of Renaissance 
London. What therefore stands out in the comedy of impossible legislation and the 
tragedy of its enforcement is the utopian escapism of the comic form, as it strives to 
survive beneath a hostile authority. 
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Chapter 2 
Shakespeare Before the Law 
 
 
 
 
In an attempt to set out the stakes of judgement, the parameters of law, one has 
already made a judgement, become involved with judgement, placed oneself before 
the law. To be in the proximity of the law, to enter its precinct, is to stand between 
right and wrong, propriety and impropriety: a no-man’s land, or hinterland, a non-
place, or indeed a u-topia where the possibility of equanimity is eternally promised, 
and yet perpetually deferred. Therefore, of the law’s fictional and figural 
representation as a phantasm, which moves through blurred or invisible boundaries, 
we are assured of only one thing: that visibility will be poor. Justice, constantly 
blindfolded, asks us to follow her blindly. 
 To illuminate this hazy rebus, it becomes necessary to think of opening a dark 
labyrinth to the light of a kind of philosophical adjudication: a flashlight of thought 
via a systematic engagement with, amongst others, Jacques Derrida and Jean-François 
Lyotard, who in placing certain texts before the law of philosophy investigate the site 
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and presuppositions of judgement. The task then, of this chapter, puts us in the 
situation of having to judge the case for comedy, which thus prescribes judgement 
without grounding its possibility; we therefore repeat the presupposition of judgement 
in the attempt to examine its origin and form with a selection of plays which provide 
examples (which cannot be just examples) of this situation. The contestation of this 
peculiar and interminable suit is that as comedy is instituted in violence, this violence 
returns to question the institution even as it simultaneously defends it. 
The status of the community and the nature of judgement figure in different 
ways, in the early modern comedies before us. Indeed, part of the strategy for 
summoning these specific comedies for exegesis is to sanction the rehearsal of 
différends. In Lyotard’s terms, a différend is when:  
[A] case of différend between two parties takes place when the ‘regulation’ of 
the conflict which opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties, 
while the injustice suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom. 109  
 
Geoffrey Bennington in ‘Ces Petits Différends’ also cites Lyotard as stating an 
explication of the différend as “a case of conflict between (at least) two parties that 
could not be resolved equitably for lack of a rule applicable to the two modes of 
argumentation”.110 We shall see that time and again the confrontations and strategies 
of generic taxonomy or those implicated in the topoi of, not only the différend, but the 
frontier, and the legislator, complicate and contaminate or, are presented and repeated 
by, dramatic comedies which interrogate the prescription of a rigorous hierarchy of 
generic boundaries and ends.  Indeed, in his Anatomy of Criticism, Northrop Frye 
speaks of the ‘action’ of comedy in:  
                                                           
109Jean-François Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Vab Den Abbeele, 
(Minnesota, 1984), §12 
110 Geoffrey Bennington, Judging Lyotard (London and New York, 1992), p.151 
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moving from one social centre to another [as] not unlike the action of a 
lawsuit, in which plaintiff and defendant construct different versions of the 
same situation, one finally being judged as real, the other as illusory.111  
 
Hence the importance of the theme of creating and dispelling illusion in comedy: the  
deceptions caused by disguise, obsession, or hypocrisy, invariably through the  
negation of reality, resolution or revelation.  
Two of Shakespeare’s most problematic comedies, The Merchant of Venice 
(1596)112 and Measure for Measure (1603), display an obvious fascination with the 
Law which slides towards a dark contempt for the potential illegitimacy of the Law. 
Although forced betrothal and banishment are redeemed by a comic celebration of the 
Law’s openness to interpretation, the presentation and repetition of the cause for 
différend is exacerbated by those silenced by the law. How we attempt to negotiate 
these endings will also have a bearing upon our representation of not only  
judgement, but also the politics of comedy, as the peculiar conclusions of comedy 
continually demand a reconfiguration of justice. As we shall see, in comedies 
contemporaneous with Shakespeare’s, such as Middleton’s A Trick to Catch the Old 
One (1609), Marston’s The Malcontent (1604), and The Dutch Courtesan (1605) and 
Webster’s The Devil’s Law-case (1619), we are repeatedly confronted with the 
general problem of the structure of subjectivity and the specific problem of the 
construction of the legal subject.  
All of these city-comedies dramatise the effect to which changing economic 
conditions disrupt social relations: as the individual’s relationship to the material  
                                                           
111 Frye, op. cit., p.166 
112 This play may not be traditionally identified as a ‘problem’ play but its anti-semitic themes are now 
considered problematic in conjunction with its generic classification as a comedy. See also A.G. 
Hammon, Eternal Bonds, True Contracts: Law and Nature in Shakespeare’s Problem Plays, (New 
York, 2004) for a lucid defense of this play as ‘problematic’. 
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world changed, the ways in which they thought about themselves, their ideas of 
subjectivity also changed. For as the social technologies, to use Foucault’s 
terminology,113 and the discursive practices by which ideas of identity had previously 
been constructed no longer met the need/values of the current conditions, Jacobean 
society faced an ‘identity crisis’ in the broadest sense of the term. It is therefore hoped 
that scrutiny of these texts will allow us to view more perspicaciously the scenes of 
judgement demanded by the différend which have, in principle, been involved in the  
production of these plays as formal and ideological constructions. Inquiring more 
generally into the cultural work performed by city comedies and the drama’s role in 
the social struggles of its time of production, the degrees to which comedy is involved 
in the constitution of those forms of masculinity and femininity suited to civic life 
become apparent. From within the confines of a society which had rigidly controlled 
an economy regulating the generic claims of love, paternity and sovereignty, the 
gendered interplay of the comic form seems to signify a potential within civic life, 
especially the potential that sexuality and desire will spin out of control unless certain 
forms of regulation, internal or external, control the appetites which lead to social 
catastrophe: poverty, plague, murder, violence, adultery. 
 
Making a Case for Comedy 
 
In the type of conflict we are examining, the genres of tragedy and comedy enact in 
exacerbated form legal processes that cannot easily be dismissed. The point is that 
there is no tribunal which could settle their disputes properly as litigation due to the 
                                                           
113 Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self, eds. L.H. Martin, H. Gutman, P.H. Hutton, (London,  
1988), p.19 ff 
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possibility of an exacerbated differend. Lyotard defines the différend as a matter of 
judgement where no tribunal could ever pretend to properly settle a dispute as though  
it were a matter for litigation. According to his formulation litigation becomes  
impossible as matters of judgement are continually arbitrating between two possible 
positions. Thus, the location of the specificity of this différend becomes a general 
question of the relationship of genres: 
A différend requires the attempt of one genre (be it cognitive, performative,  
economic) to impose its hegemony on another genre (be it ethical or 
speculative), to enforce judgement of cases pertaining to one genre in terms of 
another.114 
 
In these terms, the best (because most testing) situation would clearly be that in which  
the claims of the subordinated genres are the hardest to overcome. Ultimately any 
defence of comedy is similarly a defence of propriety, for decorum, for property, for 
possession of knowledge, for control of desire. The challenge we face then, in 
mounting a defence for comedy is problematised by the emphasis of comedy and the 
comic on the discontinuity and the arbitrariness of the law itself, of both legal and  
literary legislations. This challenge is further complicated by the curious repetition 
and mimicry in the comedies of both the laws of comedy and the relationship between 
Comedy and the Law.  
On the one hand, this means that comedy usually represents the dominant 
society or practices of its play as operating according to arbitrary laws, perhaps 
positioning the dominant order as the result of some fortuitous chance, rather than as a 
form of necessity. Take for example, the number of comedies that begin within not 
only a tyrannical milieu but, a social system as bewildering for the ordinary citizen as 
it is beneficial to the pretentious legislator, where unjust laws and confusing edicts are 
                                                           
114 Geoffrey Bennington, Judging Lyotard, op. cit., p.152 
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part and parcel of a dramatic existence. The judges and jurors who people city-
comedy willingly seem to embark on a single course of action without fully knowing 
their destination, perhaps accepting as inevitable later collaborations, revisions, 
improvisations or afterthoughts; swept along by the excitement and entertainment the 
scandal of public trials afford. The petty solicitors or ‘tramplers of time’ are 
terrifyingly captured in enduring caricature, particularly in Middleton’s creation of 
Harry Dampit in A Trick to Catch the Old One who combines the role of lawyer and 
usurer. In ‘trampling’ the time or wasting time, the time that is always the client’s 
money, unscrupulous men like Dampit ‘trample’ the law in their desire to be rich and 
successful. There is a direct challenge to the sovereignty of the law through imitation 
by characters like Dampit and the entire role-call of “whoreson fogging rascals” (The 
Devil’s Law-Case, IV.i.24) who would practice legal chicanery for little more than 
their own self-aggrandisement. This prompts a recurring question throughout these 
comedies: are the representatives of the law beings of such moral stuff that they can 
safely administer the power of judicial law? And more crucially, the Law may specify 
the destination, but what then is its right to judge? 
The impetuousness of the legislators in the comedies is mirrored by the 
oddness of the juridical in that the law has an essential relation to the accidental. 
There is a peculiarity at work within the juridical in that it must take account of a kind 
of necessity of the accidental, not only in the form of the event, or the object of 
litigation which, in comedy tends towards the contingent or the opportunistic, but also 
in the form of the case, or the hearing of the case: where the unscrupulous can balance 
the truth on a knife-edge. This relation to the accidental can be elaborated in terms of 
an essential fictional or fictioning activity of the law in its constitutively impossible 
drive to predict the case, or the accidental origin of the case, which cannot be 
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predicted as such. Furthermore, as Derrida puts it, the law must attempt to take itself 
as a case and fictionalise its own origin or institution, stating the law of the Law (as 
case) in the form of a narrative which constructs the illusion of absolute authority and 
wisdom.115 The hypocrisy of a grand-narrative which recounts an absolute authority 
not based on fact lays bare the incentive comedy requires for mocking the tyranny of 
the Law. 
 Judgmental laughter, or at least, the losing of oneself to laughter and the 
discombobulation of one’s ideologies in a single moment of comic revelation is a rare 
and wonderful thing. However, the task of adjudication, of fair and balanced 
judgement, invariably shares with purely critical laughter this enormous difficulty in 
arriving. Derrida reminds us of the inaccessibility of the law, of its need to be 
mediated, citing as the first sign of its inaccessibility its ability to defer interminably, 
to adjourn or delay judgement. In Derrida’s essay, ‘Before the Law’,116 this law of 
delay, becomes related to a question of time, of timing, with the man from the country  
enacting the legal subject’s discomfort at being left before the Law, or, out-with the 
Law. The law of delay becomes an experiment in comic timing, or rather tragic-comic 
timing, as Derrida’s work on Kafka’s fable joins problems of ‘antipredicative’ 
judgements to questions about the nature of ethics. The epistemological and 
deontological or temporal areas of the Law’s original premise are never affirmed to 
the man from the country, who delays or defers his own entry to the law of the city. 
The authority of the Law seems to exclude all historicity and empirical narrativity 
which positions its rationality as alien to all fiction and imagination. Derrida goes on 
to illustrate the dangers in the lack of imagination that prejudgement and prejudice 
possess, revealing the extent to which they are instrumental in both the construction 
                                                           
115 Derrida, ‘Before the Law’, op. cit., p.190 ff 
116 ibid., pp.181-220 
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and destruction of justice. Moral law, judicial law and natural law are all implicated, 
behind the façade of the ‘wise and necessary fiction’ of the Law, erected as it is to 
restrict and prohibit the very inhumanity of humanity. From cradle to grave the law 
prejudges the human species as an acrimonious animal in need of strict regulation just  
as ‘mankind’ prejudges the Law as ‘impenetrable’ or inaccessible. We are all 
therefore out-with the Law, in that we stand before its universality and generality as 
singular examples of potential law-breakers; otherwise there would be no need for the 
impenetrable edifice of the Law. This revision between the law and what is out-with 
the law, is reflected in the operation of comedy, where these energies are aesthetically 
negotiated. In this respect the formalist constraints of genre can be seen to flow into, 
by analogy, the larger concerns with the restraining powers of law as part of the 
process of regulating social behaviour. The formal concern in one sphere offers a 
thematic resource that comedy is able to take up because of its own generic 
implication in the business of the ‘law’. 
The fear of death, the terror of the final judgement and the potential for torture 
- somehow beyond imagination - in some form of punishment, is what gives all law, 
both ecclesiastical and political its hold. The legislators of the comedies who mediate 
this process – the dukes, surrogate fathers, pimps and usurping tyrants- are banking on 
that fear. In comedies where indecision and stasis signal the deferral of little more 
than cruel games of cat-and-mouse, this seemingly endless procrastination displays an 
acute insensitivity. As a result, for all the apparent sociability of the comic u-topia, an 
isolated, narcissistic individualism seems to prevail. In many Shakespearean comedies 
the relinquishing of individualism is a precondition of social harmony, but the 
uneasiness of this resolution is always underpinned by the apparent unwillingness of 
those requested to make that sacrifice.  There is, therefore, always the possibility that 
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in the incongruous world of the comic the wailing plaintiff, declaring itself as the 
victim of a crime may well become the victim of the Law, but then this all becomes a 
matter of presentation, of identifying an appropriate mode of representation. 
 
Representing civic instability 
 
In what follows, I will suggest that the civic stability being constructed in comedy 
depends for its ultimate supplementation on the state and on the state’s acting out a 
sanctioned violence supposedly denied to the individual members of the 
commonwealth. The reliance on civic institutions is notable throughout the comedies 
with the Law and the city’s sites of incarceration and control frequently given as the 
clear alternatives to private duelling and brawling. In Middleton’s The Roaring Girl 
(1611),117 Sir Davy Dapper contrives to have his prodigal son, Jack Dapper, 
incarcerated in The Counter, a notorious debtor’s prison, in order to effect the reform 
he himself cannot achieve.118 In many of the comedies, self-regulation goes hand in 
hand with enhanced state regulation. The violence of gallants and courtiers was as 
worrisome as the violence of petty criminals and apprentices and as such Elizabeth 
forbade private duels while the London City fathers attempted to control brawls and 
street crime. William Gouge advised husbands that if their wives absolutely required 
physical correction, perhaps it would be better to have the constables undertake it, 
                                                           
117 Thomas Middleton, The Roaring Girl (1609), in The Best Plays of the Old Dramatists, ed. Havelock 
Ellis, (London, 1890), pp.1-114 
118 The sub-plot of The Dutch Courtesan (with Cocledemoy and Mulligrub) contains elements of 
trickery aimed at punishing the embryonically bourgeois Mulligrub for his pretentiousness and 
cheating, which sees him taken all the way to the gallows before Cocledemoy reveals himself as the 
cause of the Puritanical vintners incarceration and has him freed. See also Jonson, Chapman and 
Marston’s 1605 collaboration Eastward Ho!, a rollicking tale of conycatching and doggerel repentence, 
where a great deal of time is spent in the lowest levels of the Counter, in what is apparently either the 
Hole or the the Twopenny Ward, where a prisoner could starve to death if they did not secure some 
form of support external to the prison. 
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rather than the husband himself.119 It is crucially historical, that at this point in time 
the constables begin to employ the force the good subject eschews as the state takes 
over the management of violence from private and particular citizens. Indeed, one of 
the tasks of the Tudor-Stuart state was to accomplish this transmission of authority 
over violence.120 
There is indeed a heavy reliance upon civic institutions and carceral 
enterprises within the comic form which is not so historically accurate as  
ideologically interesting. Over half the scenes in Measure for Measure take place in a  
prison or in the Ducal chambers, and the legalistic language in The Merchant of 
Venice has been frequently commented upon by critics.121 Webster’s The Devil’s 
Law-Case or When Women go to Law, the Devil is full of Business (1619),122 warns of 
the misuse of the public court as a site of vengeful lambasting where the “cause of any 
fame” will quickly be engendered in “scurvy pamphlets and lewd ballets”. (IV.ii.34) 
This seems to serve as a reminder that the court-room has always been viewed as a 
particular form of entertainment and, of course, a source of scandal. The elaborate 
court-room drama formula, so successful that it was repeated from one play to the 
next, appears as a complex fantasy about class struggle, gender, and above all about 
the role of the state in supplementing citizens, supplanting the prerogatives of a  
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degenerate aristocracy, and asserting control over the use of violence. The need to 
control unruly masculine subjects was achieved by suturing the male subject to the 
state and its institutions, supplementing deficiency with the imagined plenitude and 
rigour of the law and its institutions of incarceration and correction: thematically this 
is also the preoccupation of comedy. 
The Foucauldian idea of magisterial surveillance and the kind of government 
of ‘shadows’ described in Measure for Measure allows us to examine the case of 
Duke Vincentio, who is “very strangely” (I.iv.50) absent from his ducal duties, having 
transferred the task of reawakening the “strict statutes and most biting laws” (I.iii.19) 
he believes are required by his hedonistic vassals, to another man. He also believes 
that his authority is no longer feared and is thus useless, but in staging a fictional trial 
he reinforces the need for benevolent rule by pardoning almost everyone. This 
particular Duke hazards the lives of the people of Vienna by passing his absolute 
authority to a man renowned more for an icy temperament than merciful impartiality. 
But then, Vincentio has seemingly indulged his citizenry for too long, in the 
benevolent role of “father of their idle dream” (IV.i.64) and must devise an ingenious 
method for the reintroduction of socially cohesive and corrective legislations. He may 
leave Lord Angelo “To th’ hopeful execution” of his plans, but secret intentions 
invariably signal the inception of cross-purposes and tragic possibilities.  
In the romances there is a tendency to depict a world, however harsh it may 
initially appear, as fundamentally and essentially benign. In the gentle comic Arcadia 
of the romance we could describe comic play as a dreamlike spectacle of desire which 
escapes the self-conscious, censorious restraints and prohibitions of consciousness. 
Not so in the ‘problematic’ comedy of Measure for Measure where the humour 
descends into shades of nightmare. In the trial scenes of this and certain other late 
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Elizabethan and early Jacobean city-comedies, reality appears to be invoked, only to 
be dismissed. The representation of the fluidity of both identity and language displays 
the limits of legalism as the Law is presented as being capable of performing acts of 
aggression which are directed not so much against the pleasures of life as against the 
desire that challenges the sovereignty of rational consciousness. 
An aversion to death and its uncanny deferral is rigorously instituted 
throughout the plays under examination. However, the beheading of a comic character 
may be prevented by the substitution of a decapitated prisoner who has already died, 
but this does not quite side-step the sacrilegious treatment of a corpse. Moreover, the 
lewd and insidious acts that are concealed under cover of darkness of night still 
whisper the dirty little secret: that lust annihilates difference. Both disguised rulers 
and rogues intervene at the ‘eleventh hour’, revealing their identity to us in the face of 
catastrophe; this serves as a reminder not only of comedy’s enormous reliance on 
chance and coincidence, but also its exploration of humanity’s similarity in sex and 
death. This appeal to universality may invariably be deferred but the ever-questioning 
nature of the comic pushes unsettling realisations onto the stage which interrogate 
notions of singularity and generality. The annihilation of the individual may appear to 
be the province of tragedy, but the darker purpose of the tragi-comic thrust is 
demonstrative in the challenge to our sentimental notion of individual significance. 
More subtly disturbing is the renewed recognition of what Falstaff called “food for 
powder… mortal men”, (1 Henry IV, IV.ii.65-6) that from the perspective of power 
politics, in the functions of biology or the state, indifference makes perfect sense. As 
many of the female characters reveal, the body can become a mere coin in a 
terrifyingly usurious biological economy, with one body substituted for another, in 
bed-tricks and dark walled gardens. Indeed, the clipping of a beard, the shaving of a 
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head or the donning of a friar’s habit attempts to convince the disbelieving that 
singularity is an illusion, and in death, as in life, we are all unique in our similarity. 
 
In Defence of the Imitation of the Law 
 
The Merchant of Venice explores another facet of this problematic two-sided 
valorisation of the singular individual. Portia’s abhorrence of the law’s indifference to 
justice is fantastically enacted throughout The Merchant of Venice, where a series of 
trials are installed within a comedy which demands that “there is no power…can alter 
a decree established”, lest “many an error, by the same example…rush into the state”. 
(IV.i.216-20) The exasperated Venetian duke, who presides over the court of justice 
in The Merchant of Venice, is so disgusted by Shylock’s inhumanity and 
vengefulness, that he threatens to adjourn the hearing indefinitely. This disregard for 
the cries of ‘justice’ cannot simply mitigate the irreducible concern for the sanctity of 
oath and contract which congests the comedies, otherwise the Law would be revealed 
as a sham and the absolute authority of the state as a mere simulacrum. This eminent 
judge postpones the proceedings in readiness for the arrival of a “more learned 
doctor”, who just happens to be a comic cross-dresser (with a vested interest in the 
case), and yet, Portia’s law-trick is undeniably based on a sound grasp of the 
(fictional) Venetian law. Indeed, Portia’s bizarre position as law-giver, attired in a 
false suit of men’s clothing is to pursue Shylock until it is clear that he has himself 
brought forward a false suit. Shylock may demand ‘the law’, ‘stand’ for law, but 
through the absolute necessity of preserving the law Portia reveals him to be a man 
filled with hate.  
As the wise little lawyer Ariosto declares in The Devil’s Law-case, it is 
invariably, “Bad suits, and not the law, breed the law’s shame”, (IV.i.72) and as the 
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numbers of inventive lawyers and credulous claimants mount up throughout the 
comedies, it becomes apparent that it is somehow the supposed guardians of the law 
who permit the breeding of its infamy. Of course, rather more than being mirrors for 
magistrates these plays are all displacements. The historicity of these plays is revealed 
primarily through the kinds of stories they tell and as such these dramas are places 
where cultural fantasies, anxieties and the crisis points of certain social logics are 
revealed. 
One could only speculate on the position that Portia shares with Isabella on the 
early modern stage, as representations of female subjects in a society ruled by a 
female monarch. Both women are “enskied and sainted” (Measure for Measure, 
I.iv.34) as they possess that “prosperous art” where they may “play with reason and 
discourse” (I.ii.182), and “well [they] can persuade”, (I.ii.183) one with the force of a 
mystic and the other with the will of a learned lawyer. However, both are subject to 
the social contract drawn up by patriarchy with Portia advising herself on a husband 
of her own chosing and Isabella being advised that there is no choice. However, at the 
beginning of Measure for Measure, the “prone and speechless dialect” (I.ii.180) of 
Isabella’s pleading eyes searches for an idiom in which to phrase the (as yet) 
unsayable or to present the (as yet) unpresentable. Later she finds a way of pleading 
for Claudio’s life through the silent seduction of her body, in a language she herself is 
not even aware of. She maintains this assertivness and focus until the final scene of 
the play when she returns to the speechless dialect that is a consequence of the Duke’s 
surprising offer of marriage. Her voice is unusual in the comedies as it joins the ranks 
of the melancholy who find themselves out-with the protection of the Law, and 
although justice is seemingly done, in favour of her brother and his young family, 
Isabella is ‘taken’ as a wife without ever uttering her response.   
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Measure for Measure, Point for Counterpoint 
 
We can account for Isabella’s melancholic voice as resulting from several astonished 
encounters with doubled or multiple perspectives in Measure for Measure. Her 
confusion and sense of victimisation repeatedly function as dramatic epiphanies for 
the spectator as they accompany epistemic shifts, which confound interpretation 
whilst simultaneously illuminating contradiction. We have already argued that 
Isabella’s body acts as a site of aporia, or paradox, where epistemological, ontological 
and sexual issues converge symbolically. She is consistently located on the threshold 
of the dialectical movement between the convent and the brothel through her 
representation of woman as the abject other. However, her depiction of the 
dichotomous split within the gendered identity of woman not only dazzles and 
destabilises the spectator through a relentless repetition of unresolved and 
unresolvable problems, her actions result in an effective deconstruction of sexual 
politics beneath the aegis of patriarchy. Isabella achieves this by raising questions on 
prohibition and permissiveness through a dialectic which forces a reevaluation of 
cognitive and cultural presumptions, and yet, she herself is a paradox: able to 
persuade others to her point of view while somehow unable to verify her own 
subjective existence.  
Thomas Playfere, an Elizabethan preacher, called paradox “the intermingling 
of extremities”123 which suggests the challenge made by the dialectic to conventional 
thought and to single, presumably stable truths. As Rosalie Colie puts it, “paradox is  
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always somehow involved in dialectic: challenging some orthodoxy, the paradox is an 
oblique criticism of absolute judgement or absolute convention”.124 In light of this 
statement paradox is revealed as enjoying an intimate relationship with epistemology 
particularly upon the early modern stage in comedies such as Measure for Measure 
where social and gendered subjectivity is represented as highly performative. Through 
the elaborate staging of a chain of oppositions and numerous substitutions, sexual and 
social difference is posited as complicated instances of differance, which recognise 
the theatrical manipulations of subjectivity between men and women, rulers and 
subjects. This differance is, in the words of the fantastical Duke, “not a resemblance, 
but a certainty” (IV.ii.188) as the opposed figures throughout this play, and the ethical 
or aesthetic attributes that are attached to them, bear the signs of an extreme 
instability, incompleteness, and apparent reversibility. The antitheses between genders 
and social categories thus generate oppositions between rhetorical and psychological 
categories, or, as it becomes clear, between the tropes of “resemblance” and 
“certainty” themselves. 
 Isabella’s interrelationships with the Duke and Lord Angelo reveal the ease 
with which the dialectic of comedy can provoke and legitimate certain political and 
sexual substitutions. These ‘substitutions’ of one body for another, in the demand for 
Isabella’s ‘maidenhead’ to substitute for her brother’s ‘head’, or the exactitude of 
punishment enacted upon Lucio the scurrilous gossip instead of Angelo the corrupt 
legislator, allude to the world as a system of tropological deviances and the 
institutional, political and sexual consequences of such a mechanism. Through the 
language of concealment and exchange in Measure for Measure an examination is 
conducted into the hidden influence of the state upon society as the dialectic of guilt 
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and justice turns to guilt and mercy. However, it is not justice which is vanquished by 
this movement, but the pride associated with self-interest; a pride evident in the 
Duke’s conceit, Angelo’s egotism, Isabella’s haughtiness and Lucio’s unfounded 
superciliousness. 
The dialectic of comedy suffuses this dark stage-play not only through an 
interrogation of the episteme of truth but also through the rhetoric of astonishment and 
amazement. Contradiction is expressed verbally by both bawds and brides, the 
cloistered and the incarcerated. This dialectic, or anamorphic oscillation between one 
perspective and another, underscores the ‘inbetweenness’ of the paradoxical state, and 
this is registered in liminal sites as seemingly diverse as the convent and the brothel, 
the gaol and the court-room. The dialectic of comedy reveals another of its facets and 
poses another of its questions: how can such places of figurative stability remain so 
literally in flux? In what ways do these institutions exist within and out-with the law? 
To what extent do the professions of the bawd and the executioner disclose a political 
paradox?  
Isabella’s “unhappy brother” (I.iv.21) Claudio is presented as a youth “most 
strait in virtue” (II.1.9) who has entered into a contract marriage in good faith but 
breached the legal requirement of abstaining from conjugal relations until after the 
public, church ceremony. The confusion surrounding hand-fasting marriages and pre-
nuptial engagements during this period will be examined thoroughly in the next 
chapter, but for the moment our focus should remain upon the dialectic movement of 
Measure for Measure in its representation of the paradox of juridical law. The 
impregnation of Madam Juliet “Expresseth [the] full tilth and husbandry” (I.iv.45) of 
Claudio but their ‘embrace’ also emphasizes the dialectic within each and every 
subject: to be human is to desire; to be human is to err. As Pompey declares, sex out-
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with marriage would be ‘lawful’ “If the law would allow it” (II.i.128) and as the law 
will not allow unregulated sexual activity it appears that the only possible solution 
will be “to geld and splay/all the youth of the city” (231-2). In the symbolic castration 
of Claudio’s execution, the sacrifice of a scapegoat125 is required. The fact that 
Claudio was once reputed as a ‘virtuous’ youth, informs his moral collapse as 
instituting an especially harsh penalty, a contradiction in terms when the hypocrite 
Angleo is his judge. Claudio’s literal aphanasis will be performed as a lesson to be 
learned by all: that the law has the power to both civilize and dehumanize. The law 
thus narrates the origin and continuation of a boundary between the bestial and the 
rational; the law in Measure for Measure is therefore depicted as foundationally 
flawed, constructed, as it is, upon contradiction. 
The political paradox Measure for Measure discloses can be explored in the 
connection between the dialectical movement of comedy and that uncertain, 
paradoxical liminalty the court-room possesses. Gaston Bachelard has shown us that 
the “majesty of the threshold” can perform cognitive functions by means of a 
“dialectics of outside and inside”,126 however, Michel Foucault is even more useful 
for our purposes in his discussion of:  
 
sites…that have the curious property of being in relation with all the other 
sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations 
that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect.  
 
Foucault breaks these sites down into two types: “utopias,” which “are sites with no 
real place [and] present, society itself in a perfected form, or else society turned 
upside down” which alludes perfectly to the comic universe; and “heterotopias,” 
which are,  
 
                                                           
125 The importance of the figure of the ‘scapegoat’ will be studied in greater depth in chapter 4. 
126 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston, 1994), pp.223, 231 
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places that do exist…which are something like counter-sites, a kind of 
effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, like all the other real sites 
that can be found within culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, or 
inverted.127  
 
The court-room, or the Court of the aristocratic legislator can be described as a 
heterotopia that is often portrayed as a utopia, as it is a site ultimately more 
contestatory and suspecting than ideal and perfect.  
As such, the law and its legislators must be subjected to frequent and rigorous 
interrogation because within the notion of the law as reconciliatory or harmonizing, a 
resonating play of opposites often slides into a quagmire of dishonesty and deceit. The 
heightened visibility of legislation is important here as Lord Angelo attempts to 
reintroduce “strict statutes and most biting laws” (I. iii.19) to a populace which has 
run past the “hideous law,/As mice by lions” (I.iv.63-4). His analogy of the law as a 
precious gem that can only be appreciated  
if it is visible is extolled in his speech on ignorance as an inadequate justification for 
wrong-doing:  
 
The jewel that we find, we stoop and take’t 
Because we see it; but what we do not see 
We tread upon, and never think of it.  
(II.i.25-6)  
 
Angelo’s unconscious motivations are perceptively interpreted by Claudio who 
recognises this new government as an aggressive attack on the ‘bestial’ within society. 
The disturbing imagery of Lord Angelo’s view of “the body public” as “a horse 
whereon [he] doth ride”, that will “straight feel the spur” (I.iii.66-69) of his resolve 
denotes the destructive face of patriarchal legislation. Claudio for all his weakness, 
knows that men are by nature corrupt but it must be left to Isabella to teach Lord 
                                                           
127 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”, Diacritics 16 (Spring 1986), 22-27, p.24 
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Angelo the cruelty of possessing a “giant’s strength” and of using it “like a giant” 
(II.ii.108-9) devoid of pity. 
 When Angelo first hears Isabella’s disquisition on pity as the sibling of mercy 
his view of the paternalism of justice is destabilized, and he finds himself in an 
unexpectedly erotic state of temptation, where not only “prayers cross” (159) but 
previously held cognitive ‘truths’. Claudio has previously described Isabella as both 
physically alluring and linguistically adept when he beseeched Lucio to “Implore her, 
in my voice, that she make friends/To the strict deputy: bid herself assay him,” as he 
has a profound and inscrutable faith in his sister’s ability to “move men” (I.iii.186-
91). The image of a young woman about to cloister herself in the convent of the silent 
Order of Saint Clare could not contrast more significantly with the world of this play 
where “liberty plucks justice by the nose” (I.iii.29) and fornicators beg to receive their 
“punishment in thanks” (I.iv.27), but this dichotomy powerfully exacerbates the 
movement of the dialectic. As a result, a world of paradox and contradiction begins to 
gape at the seams as the ‘stitching’ of reality starts to give way against the pressure 
felt from numerous contradictions between opposed characteristics. 
 The dichotomy which manifests itself in the encounter between the stern Lord 
Angelo and the ‘pleading’ Isabella reflects a sadistic trait in this man of “professed 
abstinence” when the possibility of sexual servitude is presented to him. But how can 
we account for this split within Angelo’s subjective identity?  Foucault emphasizes 
how disciplining mechanisms themselves set in motion a wild proliferation of what 
they endeavor to suppress and regulate: the very ‘repression’ of sexuality gives rise to 
new forms of sexual pleasure recognizable as forms of surplus-enjoyment or 
perversion128. Angelo embraces this excess and attempts to keep secret his desire “to 
                                                           
128 See Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), p.43 
for a comparison between Hegel and Foucault’s approach to the effect of diciplinatory activity. 
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sin, in loving virtue” (II.ii.183) with a woman he perceives as “bait” (181). His self-
referential ‘confessional’ in the second act, does more to underscore the relationship 
between sexuality and its disciplinary control than exorcise it. This confessional self-
probing unearths a new layer of Angelo’s sexuality, as the confessional activity itself 
becomes sexualized, giving rise to a satisfaction of its own where he will “write ‘good 
Angel’ on the devil’s horn” (II.iv.16). According to Judith Butler “the repressive law 
is not external to the libido that it represses, but the repressive law represses to the 
extent that repression becomes a libidinal activity”129.  Paradoxically, it seems that the 
eternal game Power plays with itself may well set in motion a process which leads to 
its own ultimate downfall.130 
 This structure of double (and thereby self-effacing) disavowal also expresses 
the patriarchal matrix of the relationship between man and woman. Isabella is an 
insubstantial shadow, hysterically imitating, but never quite able to acquire the moral 
stature of a fully constituted self-identical subjectivity. Isabella’s ultimate form of 
servitude is to mis-represent her femininity as autonomous while her feminine 
submissiveness and compassion embody the projection of an early modern male 
sexual fantasy. What appears to excite the patriarchal figures of power in this play is 
the image of a chaste, compassionate anchorite, willing to take a vow of silence and 
prostrate herself before the authority of the Lord. Angelo realizes that “to catch a 
saint,/With saints dost bait thy hook” (II.ii.180-1) and the “enskied and sainted” girl 
who has been sent to him thus ‘moves’ him more than any common strumpet. 
                                                           
129 Ibid., p.49 
130 According to Slavoj Zizek, in The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, 
(London and New York, 1999)Marx made the same point about capitalism: “It will meet its end not 
because of resistance to it from external forces of pre-capitalist tradition, but because of its ultimate 
inability to master and restrain its own inherent antagonism - as Marx put it, the limit of capitalism is  
Capital itself, not the islands of resistance that still elude its control (sexuality, nature, old cultural 
traditions)”, n. 7, p.306. 
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 Angelo’s demand that Isabella “lay down the treasures of [her] body”  
(II.iv.96) prostitutes her femininity beneath the tyranny of “the voice of the recorded 
law” (61) by threatening “ling’ring sufferance” (167) to those who would contest its 
authority, an authority it does not truly possess. Isabella’s decision that her chastity is 
worth more than her brother’s life is as monologic as Angelo’s interpretation of the 
law. Neither appear capable of entertaining the playful double vision of comedy that 
either Pompey or Mistress Overdone exemplify and remain embittered and 
dissatisfied till the play’s end. This tragic outlook is counterpoised by those other 
voices, which speak out in different registers, to raise the question of the legitimacy of 
the law. Such voices can be heard in the libidinal world of Pompey and Mistress 
Overdone whose trade in the pleasures of the flesh provide an example of the 
impossibility of full legalistic control whilst the ‘fantastic’ Lucio, who slanders almost 
everyone he meets, serves to complicate matters even further.  
Lucio describes Pompey’s imprisonment as his “right” (III.ii.68) as a bawd, as 
his fate in such an illegal and immoral profession. Of course, every word Lucio utters 
is imbued with irony and he himself is no stranger to the bawdy-houses of Vienna. 
Pompey’s status as an untouchable in early modern society is reiterated by the Duke 
who refers to the “filthy vice” of his trade along a nexus of contradictions regarding 
purity and danger. The disgust attendant upon the bawd’s trade is summarized by the 
juxtaposing of eating, drinking and clothing oneself from the profits obtained through 
“abominable and beastly touches” (III.ii.25). But this ‘trade’ in women as sexual 
commodities can be profitably compared to the ‘business’ of marriage. Lucio’s trick 
of speaking more than he knows impels us to question the relationship between 
prostitution and marriage when he asks Pompey whether there are, “none of 
Pygmallion’s images, newly made woman, to be had now, for putting the hand in the 
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pocket and extracting it clutch’d” (III.ii.45-6). Pygmallion’s images, his statues, grow 
into action from a rigid and lifeless stone, become human in order to be married, and 
can thus seem to provide a counterpart not only to the figural growth of prostitution, 
but the thematic movement from convent to matrimony enacted by Isabella. 
 Each and every heterosexual union in this play appears to conceal the 
business acumen of marriage and sexual relations behind the prohibitive façade of the 
law. Claudio and Juliet’s union has been hindered by “the propagation of a dower” 
(I.iii.156) while Lord Angelo has spurned his fiancée Mariana as her dowry “came 
short of composition” (V.i.217), a situation which “disvalued” her reputation. Lucio 
may have “purchased …many diseases” (I.ii.46) in the houses of resort but the 
financial impetus of marriage is continually counterbalanced against the 
concupiscence of an embryonically capitalist society which buys and sells pleasure. It 
is therefore important to recall that in the light of early modern moral psychology it 
might be suggested that Shakespeare’s Vienna is a place of more than one kind of 
prostitution where Pompey the bawd’s casuistry is both frivolous and historically 
meaningful. Pompey’s defense of his trade as a necessary vice where “good 
counsellors lack no clients” (I.ii.110-1) is supported by Sherwin Bailey who notes that 
theologians throughout the ages have “found it difficult not to concede that the harlot 
was in some sense indispensable to the well-being of the body-politic.”131 He points to 
Augustine’s De ordine which raises the question of the inevitability of prostitution: 
“What can be called more sordid, more void of modesty, more full of shame than 
prostitutes, brothels, and every other evil of this kind? Yet remove prostitutes from 
human affairs and you will pollute all things with lust.”132 The bawd therefore  
                                                           
131 D. Sherwin Bailey, The Man-Woman Relation in Christian Thought, (Condon, 1959), p.161 
132 Ibid, p.161-2 
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represents a truth that supports the dialectic of law and love as it is reiterated within 
the ‘holy bands’ of matrimony: that lust is out-with the jurisdiction of legally 
sanctioned nuptials. In this way, human nature is revealed sometimes remorselessly, 
sometimes comically, as the mortifying consequences of the law are transposed 
against the vivifying power of sexuality. 
 Throughout Measure for Measure the play of antitheses is all but illusory as 
the dialectic of love and law has rarely been so clearly and antagonistically presented. 
Angelo, or Lust, is contrasted with Isabella, or Purity. The Duke, or Rule is opposed 
to Pompey, or Misrule and we may find that although the Duke is morally superior, 
the whore-monger is a good deal more honest. However, each individual character 
faces a different concept of the law, which offers mutually impossible alternatives: 
honour and life are opposed while honesty and deception are united. Their lapses can 
be viewed sometimes in the light of tragedy and sometimes in that of comedy but one 
thing is always certain; this comedy is profoundly concerned with awakening a sense 
of consciousness in humanity. 
 
Reinstating differance 
 
In using Lyotard’s theory of the différend we can open up this and other plays to 
another possible interpretation: they all show the limits of abstract legalism in a 
society where the central code that subjects believe in (or at least subscribe to) has 
become suspect through misappropriation. Of course, a good deal of Elizabethan and 
Jacobean comedy participates in the process of re-inscribing cultural norms: 
specifically in relation to the patriarchal constraint of women. In the discourse 
whereby what is seen as dangerous and excess to the social order is gendered female, 
the other of the patriarchal domain, and as such, all women are perceived as a direct 
 92 
threat to patriarchal stability. In comparison, Measure for Measure differs most 
dramatically from other city comedies, where order is (to some degree) reinstated – or 
as Thomas Nashe writes, where “pride, lust, whoredom, prodigality, or drunkeness” 
are “beat down utterly”– for it, in the end, brings in “the halter and the gallows” as a 
threat for the unrepentant.133 Nevertheless, plots revolving around teaching husbands 
and wives, lovers and whores ‘proper’ behaviour, invariably leave some score 
unsettled, and as Catherine Belsey states, “there are no perfectly happy endings”.134     
The cause for différend is exacerbated by the necessary violence of passing 
sentence, of providing an end to the deferral of serious business. To return to 
Lyotard’s terms, a différend is “signalled by silence and/or sentiment, a frustration of 
language trying to phrase something in the absence of the means to do so.”135 In many 
ways, the only answer to the injustice of an unfair sentence is silence, exasperation.  
However, silence very often commands complicity, as does the laughter generated by  
comic displacements. Therefore, we could cautiously concede that the privileged 
witnesses to the différends staged by these comedies are collaborators in the 
simultaneous creation and ruination of meaning, by displaying that their privilege is 
part of a rhetorical hierarchy that depends on the repression of an opposing term. The 
aporetic structure of comic closure is erected by the impossibility in which jurors are 
situated as themselves dispensers of impossible sentences. The text may lay claim to a 
comic resolution but instead offers only an uneasy oscillation between contrary poles 
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134 Catherine Belsey, Desire: Love Stories in Western Culture, (Oxford, 1994), p.34 
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of discourse where certain elements cannot be harmonised within the rhetoric of 
redemption and inclusion, and are thus, merely ignored. Chapter 4 will analyse this  
degraded character position in full as the expulsion of anti-comic figures are 
identifiable as symbolic inconsistencies which punctuate the text and give it its 
texture, however, as they are obliged to choose where no choice is available, their 
position as tropological deviances signpost them as markers of a mise en abyme: or at 
least keys to the abyss in any comic text, as it is in any event a linguistic problem, a 
question of language as such.  
The anti-comic figure is charged with breaking the rules of comic harmony. 
They are therefore brought before the Law of comedy where the offence that has been 
committed is punished through mockery or ritualistic humiliation. The moments 
which leave the anti-comic figure before the Law of Comedy are examples of what 
De Man calls ‘undecidability’ or ‘unreadability’, where questions of epistemology are 
suspended within rhetoric and ways of knowing reveal their dependence upon ways of 
saying. Derrida uses this concept of judgement in very specific ways in both ‘Before 
the Law’ and ‘The Law of Genre’ where the laying bare of the différend in this way 
marks an aporia or deconstructive event, a rupture or epistemic break, that signals a 
shift from one dominant episteme to another. In this sense, Frye’s theory that the 
movement from pistis to gnosis, “from a society controlled by habit, ritual bondage, 
arbitrary law and the older characters to a society controlled by youth and pragmatic 
freedom”136 may not always, conclusively be a movement from illusion to reality, 
particularly if one perceives the crystalisation of a new reality to be as illusory as the 
last. One could then argue, that as the comedies take their point of departure from 
                                                           
136 Frye, op.cit., p.169 
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accidental or incidental features, they show the arbitrariness of the Law by enacting it, 
by staging and suspending all the preconceived notions of the presumably absolute,  
categorical authority of a Law which assumes an authority it does not have.  
Invariably, Shakespeare’s comic dramas present a certain original and extreme 
tension or torsion within the antinomy of the Law. There always (already) exists a 
split in the Law between description and prescription, value and validity, regularity 
and ruling, generality and particularity, freedom and necessity, subjecthood and 
subjection. It is this logic of performativity that comedy rails against. The comic 
pushes itself up against the generic rules which constrain it, interrogating the dialectic 
of the Law, playing one argument off against another, demanding straight answers 
from an epistemology which finds itself caught between a formalism of the Law and 
an empiricism of events. A lawgiver of logic via marvellously illogical routes, the 
Comic knows that philosophy is the Law, and so, plays along as philosophical 
artificer. The philosophical experience we encounter is not unlike the critical 
application of deconstruction: a certain questioning, a certain crossing of boundaries, 
limits…frontiers. It proffers a certain questioning of legislations, and a certain 
interrogation of the subjectivity of legislators who would forcefully impose their will 
upon society.  
 
Accidental Absolutes 
 
That a legislator may be a charlatan is always already implied in both the comedies 
and deconstruction. Rousseau characterises the legislator thus: as the possessor of a 
“great soul” whose “true miracle” is that he must “prove his mission”.137 But  
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Rousseau knew that there are no indubitable signs, that nothing can prove a miracle to 
be a miracle, that in the moment of his coming, the legislator may, in the final analysis 
be a charlatan. To put it another way, legislation implies forms of exclusion that 
always threaten to return; in relation to comic theory laughter may well function as 
that excess (i.e. the sign of excess) and comic form as the site where it occurs and is 
presumably ‘tamed’. The miracle of legislation, perhaps all legislations, is that the 
charlatan may well succeed by enforcing an illegitimate politics upon an unsuspecting 
citizenry, or at least a socially detrimental but ultimately credible politics upon an 
unsuspecting citizenry.  
Wielding an authority one does not truly possess excites the tyrant and 
unnerves the charlatan. Lord Angelo fears that he is acquiring the mantle of the 
charlatan legislator in his sovereign’s absence, as his initial references to counterfeit 
currency imply. His expressions of anxiety about having “so great a figure…stamp’d 
upon” him (I.i.48-49) are so unlike Portia’s declarations of imposture, as she enters  
wholeheartedly into the spirit of a game wherein all shall think that she and her 
waiting woman “are accomplished / With what [they] lack”. (MoV, III.iv.61-2) But 
then, Portia’s heroic law-trick is commendable in its comic deferral of death, whereas 
Angelo’s corruption of the Law incites shame and horror. Angelo’s ‘game’ becomes  
his desire to enforce his will through the force of Law, a force which he commands 
and yet cannot control. Portia’s desire is also to temporarily turn the Law to her 
advantage; however, she interprets the process of trial and judgement as a necessary 
means to control and repress the disruptive forces of unruly masculinity. 
Just as her father had devised the trial of the three caskets to safeguard her, 
Portia counters the advances of unsuitable matches through her inventive application 
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of ‘mood music’.138 This example of Portia’s recourcefulness demonstrates how 
potentially disruptive a well educated Renaissance woman could be and although the 
comedies depict young men in need of direction they also broach the problem of the 
unruly and cunning woman. The desire to repress disruptive forces, can be seen 
especially in Jacobean tracts like Hic Mulier (1620) or Swetnam’s Araignment 
Against lewd, idle, froward and unconstant women (1615), and rests upon the 
formulation that all the “ills attendant” upon a society that is becoming more capitalist 
are “excess, abuses, or even subversions of the system”139 rather than inherent in the 
system. Powerful, independent women, sexually active women, or women dressed in 
men’s clothing disturb categories by challenging the status quo through insubstantial 
glimpses of another future, as “spectres”140 capable of disrupting perceived reality. 
As Slavoj Žižek explains, what we experience as ‘reality’ depends upon 
symbolisation or representation – as, for instance, we depend upon language to 
explain something that happens to us, to explain our material and immediate 
experiences – but in the process of symbolisation something is always left over. This 
non-symbolised material, that which escapes the symbolic order (Žižek calls it the 
‘big Other’), remains to ‘stain’ the fabric of reality; it is what does not fit into the 
‘normal’ world and thus threatens to expose the stitching of reality. Hic Mulier’s 
vehement attack on ‘mannish women’ can, in this way, be explained as a reaction 
against the ‘gap' opened up “between the supposed reality of one’s social status and 
sexual kind, and the clothes that were to display that reality to the world”;141  
                                                           
138 “As are those dulcet sounds in break of day/ That creep into the dreaming bridegroom’s ear./ And 
Summon him to marriage.” (MoV, III.ii.51-3) 
139 Thomas Moisan, “’Which is the merchant here? And which the Jew?’: Subversion and Recuperation 
in The Merchant of Venice”, Shakespeare Reproduced: The Text in History and Ideology, eds. Jean E. 
Howard and Marion F. O’Connor, (New York and London, 1990), p.196 
140 Slavoj Žižek, “The Spectre of Ideology”, in Mapping Ideology, ed. Slavoj Zižek, (New York, 1994), 
pp.26-28 
141 Jean Howard, The Stage and Social Struggle in Early Modern England,,(London and New York, 
1994), p.96 
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in other words, women in men’s clothing escape and then threaten the distinction 
between ‘men’ and ‘women’ as ‘mannish woman’ escapes symbolisation as that 
supplement at the source which challenges the symbolic order. These disruptive 
forces are supplements brought into being by transgressing the boundary between 
masculine and feminine. This exemplifies the process of selection and exclusion 
which always seeks the supplement at source.142 
For the citizens of Venice/Belmont, Shylock embodies the destructive force of 
abstract legality (a capitalist condition) and his downfall serves to (symbolically) rid 
society of the stain or ‘spectre’ of the unruly sexuality of youth, standing, as he does, 
on the margins of society, a foreigner and a Jew. Less symbolically, in The Dutch 
Courtesan, Francischina herself serves as the spectre who interrupts the attempt to  
create a complete unified reality. She is the externalisation of commodification in a 
society that depends upon misrecognising its foundation: a foundation that places  
commodification at the heart of an embryonic capitalism. 
In speaking of anxiety in The Merchant of Venice, an anxiety produced by the 
rise of capitalism and, therefore, the destabilisation of the traditional social system, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of ‘territorialization’ is useful. This theory provides an 
explanation for the process of cultural ‘de-coding’ or the destabilising of the official  
vision of the world, a process that the citizens of Venice work to suppress. In Anti- 
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, they argue that 
the prime function incumbent upon the socius has always been to codify the 
flows of desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists 
that is not properly dammed up, channelled, regulated.143  
 
                                                           
142 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore and London, 
1974) 
143 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem, Helen R. Lane, (Minneapolis, 1983), p.33 
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This coding of the ‘flows of desires’ structures society as it determines acceptable 
behaviours. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari view society as a ‘body’ of codifying desires, 
or, in other words, through the process of ‘territorializing’ (coding) flows of desire, 
our vision of reality emerges since society exists as an arrangement of shared codes. 
Antonio and Bassanio’s use of Christian rhetoric that demands that the Jew should 
dispense ‘mercy’ depends upon a shared or internalised view of mercy as an essential, 
universal quality. 
Portia’s eulogy on the ‘quality of mercy’ subtly parodies this universality 
which superficially perpetuates and supports the status quo while other forces escape 
and resist containment. The Merchant of Venice provides an excellent example of a 
society experiencing deterritorialization. We must observe, however, that it is justice - 
Law - not the ‘quality of mercy’ that prevails under Portia’s direction. Portia stands 
for the emblem of the ‘good’ daughter, who insists on the putative letter of the law, on 
the absolute necessity of preserving the law. However, whereas Shylock may expect 
the judge and jury to stick to the ‘letter of the law’ Portia wants to locate something in 
excess of it. It is only after the verdict is rendered that Portia allows mercy its proper 
place and function, “to season justice”. (IV.i.196)  
Conversely, Angelo, whose very blood is ‘snow-broth’, commands the law 
with such arctic logic that mercy is devalued. Lord Angelo’s corruption of the law 
issues from his inability to balance licence and repression not only within the state, 
but also within himself, as he steadily draws Isabella into the marketplace of the 
physical, into a mentality that thinks more about desire than piety, or indeed pity. His 
argument that Isabella should be willing to commit fornication in order to save her 
brother’s life, since she has implied that an act of fornication is not enough of an evil 
to merit death, becomes an experiment in the tragicomic timing of the antipredicative, 
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and the ‘demigod’ “voice of the recorded law”. (II.iv.61) Lord Angelo may well 
attempt to expound that measure for measure, an eye for an eye; the law will match 
like for like but fails to complete the Old Testament dictum, that vengeance belongs to 
God the creator, and He alone. Curiously, it is left to another charlatan, the feigned 
holy ‘father’ (as he is repeatedly called in disguise), the Duke Vincentio, to expedite 
the pietistic deceptions of Angelo the fraud, and to reveal that an excess of desire, for 
either love or money, and the frustration of that desire, can open up the sluice gates of 
madness. 
That the legislators of the comedies are invariably impostors or ineffectual 
sovereigns points to the necessarily flawed aspect of sovereignty and the requirement 
of the state to employ an ‘outsider’ to repair, and make whole the society impugned 
by autonomy:  
He who rules men ought not to control legislation, he who controls legislation 
ought not to rule men; otherwise his laws, being ministers of his passions, 
would often serve only to perpetuate his acts of injustice; he would never be 
able to prevent private views from corrupting the sacredness of his work.144  
 
The conflation of legislative authority and sovereign power is obviously viewed by 
Rousseau as a socially destructive force. Nevertheless, the position of the legislator as 
a “fortunate impostor”,145 reinforces the eternal possibility of charlatanism, and serves 
as a reminder of the aleatory nature of power and political domination. But whereas  
there is always the potential for violence or force to emanate from the promulgator of 
extraordinary laws, it is claimed that their reliance on ‘wisdom’ is one sanctioned by 
the gods. Therefore, from within the formal and ideological constraints of the 
political, the Absolute is propounded as the ultimate legal authority. Humanity must 
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profess that the phantasm of the law, that omnipotent, eternally absent authority, is the 
Almighty Himself. But how can we account for this fantastic vision of the law? 
 
The Inner Courts of the Soul 
 
William Blackstone, writing at the start of the eighteenth century, speaks of a divine 
social contract between subject and sovereign signed by God himself as: “all subjects  
are equally bounden to their allegiance”, as if “they had taken the oath; because it is 
written by the finger of the law in their hearts.”146 The law here comes before the law, 
in both the figural and temporal sense; in the political theory of contract, a contract is 
needed on which to base the contract and so on ad infinitum. The law is therefore 
without origin (other than prohibition), and without a political foundation. Therefore,  
a relation to the law is a relation which, whether interrupted or continued, is 
paradoxical, in that it involves guilt without fault, 'rapport sans rapport’. In the comic  
dramas under examination what is being explored is the moral dilemma, perhaps the 
paradox of guilt tout court, incurred by merely existing in the face of the Absolute, the 
unrepresentable, the absent God, ‘the law which is not law’.147  
The question of ‘why have you forsaken us, oh Lord?’ is one which flies from 
the lips of many of Shakespeare’s characters. Measure for Measure persistently 
subverts the comic promises of immortality, encouraging instead a suspicion that we  
are each tragically betrayed by the supposedly benevolent biological and political 
systems to which God has abandoned His human offspring. In this sense, perhaps the 
play is a result of the plague year 1603 not only in its emphasis on the replenishment 
of the population but also in its portrayal of a city abandoned by its benevolent but 
exasperated Lord to an agency of deadly retribution. God has seemingly and 
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mysteriously absconded, leaving his children in a pointless (or at least inscrutable) 
universe, and in the cold hands of Avenging Angels like Lord Angelo. 
The ‘holy terror’ of the Law as the unrepresentable, has both a fearful and an 
alluring quality, which both seduces and violates the subject. However, the Law is 
supposed to be just, that is, impartial, indifferent, free from desire. But, the Law is not 
the opposite of desire, it is, as Freud knew, the taboo from which desire is generated. 
Terry Eagleton outlines the paradoxical desire of the law to dictate our desires, to 
prohibit what we desire and desire what we prohibit:  
[I]t is only through the Law that we can have access to the desire which it 
prohibits, since the prohibition is the first we learn of it. ‘If it had not been for 
the law’, writes St Paul to the Romans, ‘I should not have known sin. I should 
not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, “You shall not 
covet.” (Romans 7:7)148 
 
But covet we do, which makes reducing Voltaire’s famous dictum about God to its  
lowest common denominator all the easier: for if concupiscence did not exist, it would 
be necessary to invent it. Indeed, the faculty of reason which weighs, measures and 
controls desire and experimentation works against stagnation in search of evolution 
and expansion. For example, even the misogynistic Benedick, in Much Ado About 
Nothing is brought to a position where he can justify his love for Beatrice with the 
excuse that “the world must be peopled” (II.iii.232-3), but against this form of 
potentially promiscuous reasoning the laws that govern human cohabitation act as a 
form of constraint, in an attempt to prevent the capitulation to the forces of inhumane 
lust.  
As Malhereux in The Dutch Courtesan observes “so in nature those actions 
that are most prohibited are most desired” (The Dutch Courtesan, III.i.43-4). This is a 
theocratic premise invariably used to incite repression and to distinguish between 
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legally sanctioned expressions of love and the promiscuity of unrestrained lust. 
Marston’s use of Montaigne’s observation that those who “could live with the smoke 
of roast meat might live at a cheap rate” (II.i.104-5) mocks the legislation that outlaws 
physical desire. In the comedies the drive towards procreation is indefatigable and as 
we have already discussed, this drive is possibly connected to the cultural trauma 
following the 1603 plague, one of the worst to hit London in the entire Elizabethan 
and Jacobean period.149 The spectacle of people given over to moral degeneracy may 
have had a cathartic effect. Rehearsing vice, the theatre could also stage its 
punishment and exorcise it. Certainly an apocalyptic sense of unfettered vice 
dominates plays like Measure for Measure (1603), The Dutch Courtesan (1605), A 
Trick to Catch the Old One (1608), The Devil’s Law-Case (1619) and, of course, The 
Malcontent (1605) where the ‘horn mad’ courtiers of this play sneak from bed-
chamber to bed-chamber. 
Therefore, the overarching message of comedy, whether romantic or satiric, is 
that desires need to be controlled rather than annihilated. In setting themselves high 
above others, the virtuous and the pompous refuse to enter into the communal 
requirements of any human society, with plays such as Shakespeare’s Measure for 
Measure and Marston’s The Dutch Courtesan revealing their epithymetic function by 
summoning men of a certain “professed abstinence” (The Dutch Courtesan, I.i.110) to 
the open courtroom of the city streets and stews to make virtues go forth and prove 
themselves.150 The exposition of man’s ‘natural’ lusts reveals that the ‘wise’ victims 
of comic intrigue are desperate and despairing passionate men who display the 
destructiveness of sexual repression at work. Malheureux in The Dutch Courtesan, in  
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essence, transgresses the ‘law’ of the nascent capitalist society by attempting to 
conflate the dichotomy between abject and symbolic, pure and impure: his desire for 
the courtesan Francischina is, within the bounds of the play, impure, yet still he ‘must  
enjoy’ her. Malheureux thus nearly threatens to show the distinction between pure and 
impure – a distinction which underpins the whole discourse of sexuality in Jacobean 
society – as simply social construction. Thus, Malheureux’s final disposal of 
Francischina indicates his return to the presumed natural order of his society. The 
Dutch Courtesan, in other words, participates in re-coding, or to borrow an image 
from Thomas Nashe, in ‘utterly’ squashing, any disruptive, threatening forces. 
 
At the Entrance to the Hall of Mirrors 
 
The literary fascination with the law as phantasmatic has only been surpassed by the 
ordinary citizen’s realisation of the inaccessibility of the legal system and of the need 
for mediation, which, it can be argued, comedy is able to provide. But as Jacques 
Derrida has argued, it becomes necessary to think of a “certain historicity of law and a 
certain historicity of literature”151 if we wish to reveal the lack of presence the Law 
(of both legalism and literary categorisation) possesses. The absence of a definable 
historical origin has forced the law to create “legitimate fictions on which it bases the 
truth of its justice”.152 Just as invisible boundaries have sprung up between countries 
and communities, so this has led to the emergence of the frontier as a theme for 
political thinking. Indeed, it is understood that frontiers of any description are non-
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natural inscriptions, but that they are also from nature, or against nature, “drawn 
against a nature on the other side”,153 a nature that has been repressed or prohibited. 
To think of the law originating as prohibition provides a connection to the 
concept of repression, which Freud ‘invented’ as an answer to the question of the 
origin of moral law, in the form of a meta-narrative. As Derrida reminds us, Freud 
made the connection between law and political foundation when he derived society  
and morality (the forbidding of murder and incest) from horror and repentance at the 
primeval murder of the father. But in this narrative of the history of law as 
prohibition, a short-circuit may be detected. If the murder inaugurates morality, how  
is the moral desire for repentance, which in Freud’s explanation drives men to self-
repression, to be accounted for? It appears as if the need to legislate has always been  
prior to the law, or ‘before the law’ in Derridean parlance. But how could this self-
repressive mechanism have been activated: accidentally? As Prince Hal seems to 
imply, where both the law and comedy are concerned, “nothing pleaseth but rare  
accidents”. (1 Henry IV, I.ii.180) Indeed, the story which Freud uses to found morality 
turns out to be a fiction, which is needed in order to ground what is, in the final 
analysis a fantastic and improbable narrative. The phantasmatic origin of Freud’s law 
explains why the Law is essentially inaccessible. Producing a double-bind by 
constantly promising itself, announcing itself and yet only ever able to offer itself 
accessible in the most approximate terms, the Law, Derrida argues, is the product of 
its own ambiguity. It is formed, paradoxically, from both an inaccessibility and an 
incitement to approach. The very shape of the relation between negotiation and 
interruption, which enjoins and forbids, seems dubiously folded back on itself, a 
relation between relation and non-relation, that renders the law dissymetric and 
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unstable. The chiasmic invagination of this proposition illicits doubt, evokes a 
phantasmatic figure of the Law which is described by Derrida as that which cannot be 
seen or touched, only deciphered. 
The Law is not to be seen or touched, but deciphered. Therefore, the Law is 
always ‘open to interpretation’. Thus, one of the primary anxieties over the Law has 
always been hermeneutical: who is authorised to interpret and determine the Law? 
The important fact for jurists to establish, then, is that the Law is not an infinitely 
flexible system open to any ingenious interpretation but rather, it is a complex store of 
memories. Yet, still feared, by laypersons and lawyers alike is that the Law introduces 
uncertainties by exceeding its own confines. C.L. Barber may have included that 
fantastic fiction, The Merchant of Venice in his thorough analysis of festive comedy, 
but admits that although there is a festive emphasis, in the Saturnalian hounding of the 
scapegoat figure, this play is rather more of a “kind of history” than a comic 
“gambold”.154 As has been discussed earlier, Shylock embodies the destructive force 
of abstract legality in a nascent capitalist society where the ritual expulsion of his 
destabilising presence is required to make the body politic whole again. Therefore, we 
could infer that the inclusive tendency of comedy more often than not reconciles or 
converts rather than repudiates. However, the scapegoat ritual may expel some 
irreconcilable character, but exposure and disgrace make for pathos or even tragedy 
which forces The Merchant of Venice to skirt the comic balance. To return to 
Derrida’s advice, that we should think of this kind of history- this history of 
storytelling- as a certain historicity of Law, seems to lead us along a labyrinthine  
route of law-tricks and dissembled words towards a hybrid and perverted law. 
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Shakespeare’s vast body of work encourages the contemplation of societal 
contradiction, but in representing these issues in the form of comedy the audience is 
presented with an array of potential solutions to seemingly insurmountable and 
immovable dilemmas, even if only in wish fulfilment, of apparently inescapable class 
or gender assignments. This is possible as comedy operates across a pattern of 
tension, release, clarification and finally celebration that exemplifies how joy is not 
only inextricably linked, but even dependent on terror. It indulges in fantasies of 
defiance and liberation and, of course, the consequent punishment which reinforces 
the notion that these comic pleasures, do indeed, lie in the contemplation of a certain 
anxiety in others. 
 In the tragedies this manipulation of anxieties focuses on the audience’s 
inability to intervene and stop the murderous chain of lies and misunderstandings. 
This places the audience in direct contact with the psychologically shattering 
inevitability of death, as each individual is isolated within their own tragic vision of 
events. In the comedies, however, we are offered the ‘safe haven’ of the typical happy 
ending where pent up anxienties are released by a reconciliation of previously 
unhopeful elements. The phenomenology of desire in Shakespeare’s works serves to 
illuminate the quest for personal identity, but the human impact of the comedies 
themselves, centre upon our acceptance, and even celebration of our one-ness with 
ourselves and our community, which the reconciliations and marriages at the closure 
of comedies is supposed to represent. Nevertheless, comedy also contains irreverent, 
playful, subversive and grotesque elements that relate to the rituals and myths of 
‘popular’ rather than ‘high’ culture. In this respect comedy could be defined as the 
overturning of the tragic through the ruthless interrogation of widely held cultural 
norms. 
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 In The Merchant of Venice the audience is reminded of the political and racial 
prejudices of the early modern Europeans, who, as conspirators in anti-semitic acts, 
demonstrated the threat felt from the destabilising effects of the Jewish diaspora.  
Shakespeare’s choice of the character of Shylock the Jew demonstrates, somewhat 
subversively, that this man’s cultural identity has been largely constructed by the 
Christians of Venetian society. Upon hearing his heart-rending speech upon 
discovering his daughter’s betrayal of him155 it becomes increasingly difficult to jeer 
at this embodiment of an Elizabethan bogey-man, reconstructed, as he is, from rumour 
and racial antipathies. This humanising of what has been dehumanised in myth 
disrupts the image of a devilish Jew intent on tricking a benevolent Christian into 
human sacrifice. 
 Shakespeare achieves the paradoxical presentation of a dramatic figure who is 
at once a consummate and implacable monster and distressingly human. We witness 
Bassanio, the hopeful lover eager to marry money meeting with a Jewish creditor who 
converses with him in the curt, but not impolite manner of a professional banker. 
Shylock simply reiterates the sum requested; he is a business man and there is no 
reason for him to express eagerness for this bond, particularly as he has been 
humiliated by Bassanio’s friend Antonio, and sees no reason to accommodate either 
of them. As Shylock himself says: 
  
 
Fair sir, you spit on me on Wednesday last, 
 You spurn’d me such a day; another time 
 You call’d me dog; and for these courtesies 
 I’ll lend you thus such monies? 
      (I.iii.121-4) 
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One can imagine the response of a jeering, Elizabethan audience, teeming with 
prejudices and anticipating the scornful treatment of this ‘villain’. Thus, Antonio 
reflects their sentiment: 
 I am like to call thee so again, 
 To spit on thee again, to spurn thee too. 
      (125-6) 
 
It is a certainty that with each malicious rebuke, the audience would unite in the spirit 
of theatrical fantasy, and would have cheered loudly in approval as the Christian 
asserted his superiority over the infidel “stranger cur”. 
 Shylock’s previous soliloquy aside (36-47) is a sort of diploma piece for the 
qualifications demanded by the role that has been brought into play. And, through his 
uttering of incoherent and furious revilings, which urge confused religious, racial and 
commercial rivalry, popular prejudices are activated by the veiled, but potent, self-
destructiveness of his promptings to revenge. However, just as the expression of the 
universal phenomenon of prejudice against Shylock’s “accursed tribe” is presented 
through his individual characteristics, Antonio’s arrogance, high mindedness and self-
righteousness are also mocked. Indeed, here we have Antonio, the representative 
Christian, proposing to borrow money at interest, an act of usury that was traditionally 
condemned by Christian doctrine and law. The occasion seems to suggest itself to 
Shylock as a proper one for trying to get Antonio to see the moral problems of 
money-lending from the Jew’s point of view: 
 Methoughts you said you neither lend nor borrow 
 Upon advantage. 
     (130-2) 
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This would appear to be Shylock’s bid for some semblance of mutual understanding, 
but, Antonio is, in fact, determining the circumstances which will thrust a bond on 
Shylock: 
 Lend it rather to your enemy, 
 Who if he break thou may’st with better face 
 Exact the penalty. 
     (130-2) 
 
The penalty for default beggars belief but is agreed to and imposed by both parties. 
Shylock has already ruminated over the possible misadventure of borrowing on the 
strength of absent vessels, but, Antonio’s overwhelming desire to make a financial 
gift to his friend Bassanio has removed all caution from his purposes.  
So, when Shylock presents a revolting bond to Antonio as a “merry sport”, it 
may be a poor sort of joke, but nonetheless, the veiled threat of circumcision, of 
taking “a pound of man’s fair flesh” (160) would have had an uproarious effect on the 
Elizabethan ‘pit’. The unnerving implications of the Judaic ritual of circumcision 
were bound up with theological, racial, genealogical and sexual concerns. And indeed, 
many textual sources of the time refer to the association between this rite with 
ritualistic and surreptitious murder. Therefore, Shylock’s offer to take a pound of 
Antonio’s flesh would have probably been interpreted by an early modern audience as 
an occluded threat of castration. Moreover, this bond would perhaps also imply that 
Antonio’s forfeiture would entail a conversion to Judaism itself as circumcision was 
believed to ‘turn a man Jew’.                                                                                     
Although Shylock does not specify the location of his intended incision it is 
interesting to note that not only does the word “flesh” carry the philological meaning 
of ‘penis’ but that the euphemism itself is invoked by Shylock’s suggestion to “cut 
off” rather then ‘cut out’, that part of the body which “pleaseth” him. It is not until the 
 110 
court-room scene in Act IV that Shylock reads from the bond that the location is 
“Nearest his heart” (IV.i.249) which again is a possible euphemism for the 
unmentionable genitals; a troubling thought for any man threatened with such a cut. 
Not surprisingly, popular writers took advantage of the punning opportunities made 
available by this double entendre, particularly, Shakespeare himself. The comedies are 
replete with bad jokes about male genitalia and as we shall discover in chapter 5 this 
genital obsession is a totemic principle in comedy, where pleasure and anxiety 
converge. During the trial scene Antonio speaks of himself as “a tainted wether” (237) 
best suited to suffer the extraction of Shylock’s cut. Additionally Gratiano’s tasteless 
joke about “mar[ring] the young clerk’s pen” (V.i.237) offers another instance from 
the play of men’s castration anxieties.                                                                
 Throughout the play Antonio and Shylock fiercely insist on their differences 
from each other. To the last, they seek ways of preserving that difference through 
symbolic acts which would convert their adversary into their own kind. Although, 
paradoxically, these symbolic acts of a threatened circumcision and Shylock’s 
figurative reversal of his Judaism through baptism, erase, rather than preserve the 
boundaries that distinguish the merchant from the Jew. This play of oppositions 
reconstructs those diametrically opposed roles of self and other and switches them 
back and forth in the liminal zone of the court-room. In chapter 4 the ritual of the 
scapegoat victim, who is necessitated by this movement, will be further analysed, but 
in the closing moments of the trial in The Merchant of Venice the law of comedy 
discloses itself as being as dangerous as the law of Venice, if not juridical law itself. 
Shakespeare’s desire to allay such fears produces a fantasy ending of legally enforced 
conversion which consummates the Elizabethan demand for social cohesion. Through 
the spectacle of coercion scapegoats are sacrificed for the common good and young 
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lovers are converted into legally sanctioned promulgators of a new future. However, 
the labyrinthian route which this comedy follows functions on a crucially symbolic 
level which associates juridical law with incoherence and injustice. 
Historically, the labyrinth has been associated with both intricate artistry and 
deception. The domus daedali served as an emblem throughout the Middle Ages of 
human error, or as a figure for a world occupied by hideous Minotaurs, Vice or Envy. 
An artifice like the labyrinth Minos had built to hide the shame of his cuckoldry, 
warns us of the monstrosity produced by an artifice that allows the expression of  
unnatural desire and presents the labyrinth as a space that always threatens to 
conceive the illegitimate. The labyrinth represents some form of perversion of 
technology or artifice channelled to the worst possible ends. It is unsurprising then, 
that legal language is often represented in Jacobean drama as mere obscurantism and 
cant, at times rather more like alchemical jargon than serious professional discourse. 
Witgood’s observation that one is easily “swallowed in the quicksands of law- 
quillets” or split “upon the piles of praemunire” (A Trick to Catch the Old  
One, I.i.10-11) alludes to the belief that the Law is a linguistic quagmire in which 
both the guilty and guiltless alike could be caught. 
 
Living On (Happily Ever After) in the Comic U-topia 
  
Having a vested interest in the aleatory nature of life is common to nearly every comic 
character, but the dispossessed Duke Altofront in The Malcontent (1605) transmits a 
turbulent excitement as he divines the hidden anxieties of a jealous and illegitimate 
court, through the comic contingencies of his double-dealings. In this “bitter play” 
which is “neither satire nor moral, but the mean passage of a history” (Induction, 50-
2) Marston is brilliantly mocking the familiar gambits and rhetoric of the Elizabethan 
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and Jacobean stage – dukes disguised as hermits, magical elixirs, ‘empoisonings’, 
death’s-head maskers and so on. Much of the humour moves so quickly that it is 
easily lost “What news from limbo?” (II.v.141) quips Malevole to a knifed corpse as 
it suddenly resurrects. Indeed, much of the dark humour that can be found in these 
Jacobean ‘city’ comedies relies on the opportunities afforded by, not only 
incongruous surprises but disguise.  
The fantastic reversals of situation to be found in, not only The Malcontent, 
but also in all of the other comedies with which we are concerned rely heavily upon 
concealed identity and intent, as with Witgood and his Courtesan, who devise a ‘jest’ 
to unpack the pockets of his covetous uncle. Their trick to catch the old miser by the 
deception of an illusory bond of wedlock becomes a trial not only of wits but also of 
wants, as desires are kept ever out of reach by the inadequacy of means. In The 
Devil’s Law Case the scheming Romelio devises evermore fascinating and despicable 
routes to increase his family’s wealth, beneath either the guise of a brotherly 
matchmaker ready and willing to commodify his only sister, or as a Jewish physician, 
who would rather kill than cure his unfortunate patient. Meanwhile the disguised 
judge, whose surveillance of his wayward son has allowed him a privileged insight 
into the accusations laid against him, reveals himself as a special witness capable of 
passing sentence on a pack of vengeful deceivers. 
Helen Gardner may intuit that while a tragic plot must have inescapable logic, 
comic plots consist of “changes, chances, and surprises” and that comedy itself is “an 
image of life triumphing over chance”.156 Those characters who people the comedies 
however, seem to depend upon chance triumphing over life, as the fine art of state-
craft attempts to delimit and constrain the subjectivity of desire through prohibition 
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and repression. Malevole, Isabella and her brother Claudio, Witgood and his 
Courtesan, even Freevill and Malheureux, all place their faith in the aleatory nature of 
chance, and although they all pursue different forms of revenge and/or justice, all 
depend to a large extent on the contingent. In the various comedies before us, the 
point has been repeatedly made that the acting and cataloguing of vice are a necessary 
prelude to the edifying spectacle of reform and correction. That we are vulnerable to 
chance, that we should be on our guard against the unpredictable, is augmented by our 
relationship to the Law.  
Terry Eagleton describes the “vast, self-regulating organism” of the Law, as 
“impenetrable as a jellyfish”, always open to interpretation, and therefore always 
beyond our control; he further defines the figure of the Law as “vengeful and 
vindictive”.157 Nonetheless, this is undoubtedly a tragic configuration of the justice of 
the Law. The randomness and contingency, the irruption of the aleatory into the  
quotidian universe, is what tragic essentialism finds abhorrent. Indeed, the comic u- 
topia, that ‘non-place’ free of the constraints of the everyday world, detached from the 
old or dominant order and outside of time, that ludicrous context marked by the lack 
of conventional rationality, morality and/or work, in which the comic character is not 
threatened is, thus, the very opposite of the tragic deadlock and clenched resolution 
that Eagleton propounds as so expiatory. Such a u-topia takes many forms. It might be 
the traditional, festive end of comedy, that bliss beyond time in which the inclusivity  
of community is celebrated, where marriages promise the births of a new world, 
peopled with hope and happiness, or the carnival atmosphere of a city comedy 
preparing the ground for a mock trial of the law itself, enacted by those crafty, 
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compliant, inextinguishable forms of life which get their way by yielding, by adapting 
to the intransigent. 
The tension or narrowing of the conceptual space inherent between the genres 
of comedy and tragedy, when faced with a summons by the literary law of genre is 
always already strained. The constraint upon these two seemingly obverse forms, 
emanates from the sameness, that each would deny the other. For if it is true that the 
glorification of the Law is the province of tragedy, then it is equally true that the 
double-bind of comedy is that once it has defined its u-topian perspective, it is no 
longer a u-topia: so defined, it is placed within the oppositional order of the dominant 
society, and is thus incorporated into that society. Jonathan Dollimore, in fact, has 
argued of Measure for Measure that the raison d’etre for its emphasis on rampant vice 
and diseased sexuality is to justify the rigorous application of the Law as a 
corrective.158 And while we could wholeheartedly agree that comedy realistically  
represents a trial of social codes and conventions it is more critical to remind  
ourselves of comedy’s deconstructive project: a process whereby castration and 
mimesis,159 transgression and affirmation,160 the double reading (writing/bind/science) 
of deconstruction (and comedy) may be either conservative or revolutionary, 
depending upon how it is deployed.161 Or, put another way, the teleological thrust of 
comedy, despite whatever political or ethical stance it takes, “leaves the world as it 
was” though “our grasp of why it is and was” has changed.162 And yet occasionally, 
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one can perceive the subversive potential of an art form which refuses to sublimate 
itself.  
Indeed, just as one could argue that Derrida wants philosophy to live on, one 
could maintain that comedy desires to perpetuate a tenable position for the Law. For if 
the philosophy of Law were to reach its goal, its telos (its conclusive thesis), the 
desire of philosophy and its telos would disappear, become paralyzed, immobilized, 
die.163 Hence comic deconstruction strives to keep the discussion going, living on, 
open;164 that is the ethics of discussion in this comic utopia. As a result, we can see 
comedy at the end of philosophy in the sense that philosophy attains its goals in 
comedy: to go on, to survive and continue in a world which is hostile to it. 
Nevertheless it is far from clear that we should rejoice in this prospect, for there is 
much despair in comedy, a despair that comes from the recognition that the repetitive, 
obsessive, foolish behaviour depicted in comedy will continue indefinitely. 
Since the comedies likewise often enact this arbitrariness, they interrupt 
something that will go on ever after (happily or not). The Taming of the Shrew, at first 
glance, seems to end happily, but Kate’s submission is suspect (and is usually  
played so that we are not convinced that she has submitted); we are left with the 
sneaking suspicion that the agon of this marriage (and all marriages) will go on 
indefinitely. As we have already discussed, the Machiavellian intrigues and enforced  
marriages of Measure for Measure inevitably seem mere dictatorship as Duke 
Vincentio’s pseudo-divine edict appears as so arbitrary and despotic.  
We must acknowledge that “repetition overdone or not going anywhere”165  
belongs to both philosophy (or any other dominant order) and comedy, and that the  
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interminable deferral of serious business, in theatrical or excessive rhetoric, at bottom,  
comes to nothing. But in admitting the void of uncertainty that the aporetic creation  
and ruination of meaning offers us we not only profess that nothing has been 
accomplished or learned, but we also concede that we must begin again. Or as Derrida 
states, we are always beginning; the arche-originary ‘yes’ with which we ‘begin’ and 
‘end’ can only be a fiction, hearsay.166 We are given over to affirming an endless  
recitation of ourselves that never actually takes place. This corresponds easily to the 
teleological thrust of the comic form and its potential to rehearse the numerous causes 
for différend where this rehearsal involves an unmediated display. 
 
Repetition and Reproduction 
 
That tragically misguided men are counterpoised by tragically vendible women is the 
culmination of much comedy. Romelio in The Devil’s Law-case, commodifies his 
sister Jolenta, and when her two suitors seemingly kill each other in a duel, Romelio 
sees “the advancement of our house”, “out of the death of these two noble men”. 
(III.iii.24 & 23) In a similar vein the villain of The Malcontent, the conspiratorial 
Mendoza, declares that there is: 
No band of nature so strong, 
No law of friendship so sacred, 
But I’ll profane, burst, violate, 
‘Fore I’ll endure disgrace, contempt and poverty. 
    (II.i.15-18) 
 
Both characters are men of seemingly “worthy parts…blasted / By insolent 
vainglory”, (The Devil’s Law-case, I.i.121-2) as both are determined in their efforts to  
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further their own accoutrements. With the consummate ease of a Machiavell,  
Mendoza plots his immanent seizure of power through a political marriage of 
convenience. His trait of proposing to women who are already married becomes 
increasingly disturbing, as he banishes the murderously complicit Aurelia and 
attempts to dispose of the virtuously despondent Maria. Contentiously, we could also 
argue that one of the main reasons for Shylock entering into a “losing suit” (IV.i.62) 
in the Venetian court-room, is after the ‘theft’ of a daughter that he guards as 
jealously as his ducats.  
Throughout all of these comedies, women are related to currency. Portia, the 
“golden fleece” which “many Jason’s come in quest” of (I.i.170 & 171) has all the 
appearance of a highly confident, wealthy heiress. In fact, when confronted with a 
prospective husband her confidence is revealed as a distortion of her actual position as 
her activities are curbed by the will of a dead father. This appearance of control is the 
first thing she relinquishes to Bassanio describing herself as an “unlessoned girl, 
unschooled, unpractised” before him, calling him “her Lord, her governor, her king”, 
declaring that “Myself and what is mine to you and yours/ Is now converted” 
(III.ii.161 & 167 & 168-9). But in committing herself to Bassanio, she undergoes an 
important conversion: Portia transfers the will of her dead father to her new husband, 
along with complete mastery over her. In Measure for Measure domestic bliss is 
exposed as a euphemism for the domestication of the human animal, not only in the 
‘harnessing’ of women to a life of male servitude, but also in the channelling of 
masculine sexuality and desire. It is not only bawds (as Elbow supposes) who “buy 
and sell men and women like beasts”, (III.ii.2) throughout the comedies, but also 
marriage itself which displays traits similar to a corrective institute. As Lucio 
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declares, his enforced marriage to the prostitute mother of his child is worse than 
“pressing to death, whipping, and hanging”, (V.i.518-9) which will, of course, closely 
follow his nuptials. Indeed, as Tysefew quips in The Dutch Courtesan, “marriage and 
hanging are spun both in one hour”. (V.iii.150) 
When Witgood tells his Courtesan, in A Trick to Catch the Old One, “Fate has 
so cast / it that all my means I must derive from thee”, (I.i.48) he opens up a rollicking 
city comedy in which, as “The wedding dinner cools. / Who seem most crafty prove 
oft times fools”. (V.ii.192-3) The disregard for probability may invariably be 
demonstrated as a structural principle in comedy but the plots with which the 
playwrights of the late Elizabethan and early Jacobean stage present us could usefully 
be termed as le comique significatif,167 comedies with some sense of utility about 
them, serving as moral critiques and correctives to the dominant order in play. The 
element of improbability may also be discerned in some of the repentance speeches 
which conclude many of the comedies. For example, the use of the jingling 
octosyllabic couplet (i.e. at the end of A Trick to Catch the Old One) conveys the 
impression that such ironical declarations should not be taken too seriously.168 That 
reform is the expected return for the inclusivity of forgiveness and tolerance is offered  
up time and again as a basic premise of the comic form. So too Shakespeare, 
throughout his comedies, conflates subjection and subjecthood to underscore the 
certitude that the dominant society is caught in obsessive, repetitive behaviour that 
accomplishes at most very little, at worst nothing. A long, familiar list of tyrannical 
and ineffectual law-givers and rulers subject the subjects of their realms to baffling 
and transient legislations. Shakespeare’s representation of the search for a more 
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benign form of legalism provisionally offers hopeful outcomes for ‘ordinary’ people 
that can be dismissed as mere compromise.  
Nevertheless, the provisionality of comic resolution, more than purveying 
meaninglessly happy endings, cautiously implies some criticism of a society that 
acknowledges and permits the existence of surrogate-fathers, pimps and temporary 
law-makers. In short, comic conclusions provide impostors with an opportunity to 
reveal the extent to which they have any real power. Therefore, when Webster’s 
newly appointed judge Ariosto announces, “That these so comical events be blasted / 
With no severity of sentence” (The Devil’s Law Case, V.vi.63-4) one becomes aware 
just how much the arbitrariness of laws leads to the arbitrariness of ends in the 
comedies.  
Quite how these capricious and spectacular denouements occur should be of 
the utmost importance to us as they accomplish a movement “from a society  
controlled by habit, ritual bondage, arbitrary law and the old characters to a society 
controlled by youth and pragmatic freedom”.169 However, the inclusivity of these 
finales as outlined by critics such as Northrop Frye, requires closer scrutiny as those 
characters who served as obstacles to the hero’s desire are forever excluded, and the 
archetypal use of marriage as a harmonious resolution is always qualified.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As Measure for Measure accentuates, a ‘blessed’ betrothal may become as much a 
‘ritual death’ as a banishment, for betrothal and banishment both share a sameness, a 
disturbing realisation that for the ceremonial figure of the bride (which will be 
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scrutinised in the next chapter) and the ritual figure of the scapegoat (which will have 
to wait until the fourth chapter for a full explication), they have become synonymous; 
both have become ‘dead in law’. William Blackstone, describes the “very being or 
legal existence of the woman” as “suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband”.170 Husband and wife become 
one person in law, and as such, a woman can only be sued as a “feme sole” if her 
husband has “abjured the realm, or is banished: for then he is dead in law”.171 One is 
banished from the aegis of their sovereign while the other sacrifices the self. 
Subjectivity is cast adrift, names change or are simply rendered meaningless, and both 
undergo a form of trial. The scapegoat is subjected to a mock trial, a ritualistic hearing 
where it is inevitably found necessary to expel a certain evil from the society, whereas 
the ceremonial trial of couples who ‘bear witness before God’ becomes another 
instance where we bear witness to acts of social exclusion and inclusion, respectively.  
 The prized method of ‘play’ which dramatic representations of ritualistic  
hearings allow, lays the cornerstone for an edifice that will be simultaneously erected  
and – as is the penchant of comic deconstruction – demolished, all within the 
teasingly obfuscating language of comedy. In ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ Derrida shows – 
quite playfully - how writing acts as a pharmakon, threatening to blur the distinctions 
between good and evil, body and soul, visible and invisible:  
This double participation, once again, does not mix together two previously 
separate elements; it refers back to a same that is not the identical, to the 
common element or medium of any possible dissociation172 
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This notion can be transposed into a working theory of comedy to the extent that 
comedy/writing confuses or plays with, renders ambiguous ideas that could 
supposedly be transmitted through clear speech. But rather than condemning these 
characteristics, we should embrace them by celebrating comedy’s anarchistic 
tendencies. 
The pharmakon is acting, then, not only as a bridge between two supposedly 
opposite elements, but also as a subversive device which erases the distinction 
between the two elements it bridges and assumes both their identities simultaneously: 
The pharmakon is the movement, the locus, and the play: (the production of) 
difference. It is the difference of difference. It holds in reserve, in its undecided 
shadow and vigil, the opposites and the differends (italics mine) that the process 
of discrimination will come to carve out. Contradictions and pairs of opposites 
are lifted from the bottom of this diacritical, differing, deferring, reserve. 
Already inhabited by difference, this reserve, even though it ‘precedes’ the 
opposition between different effects, even though it preexists differences as 
effects, does not have the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorium. It 
is from this fund that dialectics draws its philosophemes.173 
 
Derrida’s pharmakon, like its Greek paleonym, translates as ‘medicine’, but this can 
either name ‘poison’ or ‘remedy’. Dialect constitutes the counter-poison of the 
pharmakon which also embodies a host of other roles, such as that of scapegoat, 
imitation, magic – the literary presence of ambivalence, playfulness, transcience,  
facsimiles, and paradox. Derrida embraces the pharmakon for these very faculties, for 
it is essentially the pharmakon that facilitates his method of deconstruction, in that 
this Derridean lexeme represents the breakdown of binary oppositions or 
“coincidentia oppositorium”. Since comedy and deconstruction are primarily 
concerned with just this sort of play, this turning of “the world on its strange and 
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invisible pivot”174 the pharmakon “produces a play of appearances which enable it to 
pass for truth”.175 
Comedy may take its cue from its utopian perspective, it may administer the 
quintessential pharmakon – the laughter of comic relief – which is both deadly to the 
old order, and therapeutic in providing a new socially inclusive perspective. But the 
generically problematic endings remind us that the law of genre is continually being 
undermined in some way, and that the artificiality of ends emanates from an 
artificiality of vows. The rigidity of oaths ‘made in heaven’ are undermined by the 
realisation in comedies such as Love’s Labour Lost that promises are no sooner made 
than broken. We may ‘lose our oaths to find ourselves’ but oaths are not to be taken 
lightly, for they represent in the private world a form of customary jurisprudence 
which gestures towards the legality of contracts and other binding agreements. The 
security that contract and oath-swearing affords may seem deceptive, but in this sense, 
the law seeks to offer reassurances. The oath is uttered almost as an initiatory spell 
“one that penetrates and carries away the inner courts of the soul”.176 
However, if as Iris Murdoch once said “that anything that consoles is fake”177 
we are left in an unutterably despondent position. Our late modernity, or postmodern 
despair harbours a suspicion of ‘happy’ endings, believing that the bloody conclusions 
of tragedy are somehow more cathartic for the agnostic soul. Comedy’s artificiality of 
vows, oaths, contracts and ends speaks of a hope and redemption so reminiscent of a 
Christian ethos as to be scorned by many post-modern commentators. The selfish gene 
of tragedy is contemptuous of the infectious germ of comedy’s communitarian vision, 
and although both genres desire to re-establish ideological normality, the reintegration 
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of the ‘surviving’ individual is paramount to comedy’s purpose. Therefore, the desire 
for the annihilation of the self does not rest easy with attempts to delimit and qualify 
individual existence within the comic u-topia.  
Perhaps what forces comic endings beyond the grasp of taxonomic regulation  
is installed within John Fletcher’s definition of tragicomedy: “It wants deaths, which 
is enough to make it no tragedy, yet brings some near it, which is enough to make it 
no comedy”.178 If the audience’s expectation of comic interludes and farcical 
denouements is perpetually thwarted then the expected dianoetic laughter is replaced 
by a sort of thrusting snort of aggression. It becomes increasingly difficult to  
laugh in the face of despair which appears on more than one occasion in the comedies. 
Philip McGuire summarises Measure for Measure “as a play that opens with the law 
being invoked to punish fornication by death and that closes with the law being 
utilized to punish fornication by marriage”.179 This observation, returns us briefly to 
the cause for différend where women, scapegoats and prisoners of the law all deny the 
sublimity of the belle mort in favour of the ritual death of betrothal or banishment. 
The incision which this observation makes into the textual body under inspection 
allows a form of scrutiny into the very generic make-up of comedy, wherein the 
archetypal use of marriage as a comic resolution is opened up as the ‘merciful’ signal 
to the end of the dispute, the cessation of the différend. 
The utopian original position of humanity is a lost origin, it is a simulacrum of  
an absent society, where, in a hypothetical state of nature, an environment of complete 
equality and sameness is inhabited. Much romantic comedy strives to retrieve this lost 
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originary state by offering a representation of an uncontroversial common perspective 
on the social world, relieved of the contingencies that exacerbate hostilities by  
convergences of opinion and the exposition of essential understandings which 
promise a possible and unproblematic resolution. There is an originary premise that 
prefers the conception of justice as the representation of a genuine reconciliation of  
interests: if the discursive policing in comedy is to be legitimate, it is therefore 
essential that it is potentially identifiable from everyone’s point of view. But, whereas, 
in some comedies a universal consensus on justice seems to prevail, and good 
triumphs easily over wickedness, there are other, some would say ‘problematic’,  
comedies where social interaction cannot be experienced as the easy exchange of 
meanings between equal partners, where the position of the other, is incapable of 
being subsumed into the one who speaks, and where the one who speaks in turn 
occupies many different places at once. If we look closely at the more satirically-
minded comedy which succeeded and eventually supplanted the romantic variant, we 
can extrapolate the vision of a comedy which attempts to anchor and organise the 
dissensus, fragmentation and contingency characteristic of the social and political 
world. 
The tightrope which comedy walks is that fine line which divides recognising 
the rules and transgressing them; violating the Law but carefully embracing its 
symbolism. Comedy has mastered playing the Law at its own game, by deceiving it, 
by lying that it loves every aspect of its many personalities, whilst flirting, some may 
say irresponsibly, with anarchy. The tautness of its double-bind with the Law, as it 
reiterates a desire to incite and prohibit, is always already inscribed in Comedy. The 
Comic is always already before the Law and yet beyond it. Thus, we continually find 
comedy at the border, on the edge, at the limit, manning the barricades against the 
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violent interiorisation of the Law. The Law may always be a law of repetition, and 
repetition may always be a submission to a law as the Law always imposes itself with 
force and violence, but the Comic interminably reiterates a desire to overturn the Law 
and reinstate rebelliousness.  
As the next chapter will explore more fully, the rebelliousness of comedy 
emanates from the position of the subaltern and is most frequently embodied in 
female characters. This present chapter has dealt with the concept of Law as 
prohibition and in referring to the need to control ‘unruly’ desires, particularly 
masculine appetites; comic resolutions invariably resort to the institution of marriage 
as an iconic emblem of equilibrium restored. However, it can be argued that the 
harmonious tableux which furnish the closing scenes of early modern comedy sanitise 
the violent oppression imposed upon a society which subscribes to patriarchal values 
by distancing the audience from the historical specificity of marriage during this 
period. 
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Chapter 3 
Hymeneal Comedy 
 
 
 
 
 
Comedy’s relationship to the Law, the Law that imposes boundaries upon both genre 
and gender, exploits what Derrida calls the “between”, the “antre”, or the “hymen”.180 
Comedy demands that rules are broken, that boundaries are transgressed, that a path is 
beaten between apathy and anxiety; but more than this comedy demands that hymens 
do not remain intact.181 Anticipating marriage or the act of consummation, comedy 
precipitates transformation and reconciliation. Like the hymen, rules can be broken 
secretly, silently, and although no difference is immediately observed things are never 
quite the same, something is simultaneously lost and gained. Tyranny and love, 
subjection and independence are interwoven throughout the comedies and by 
guarding the opening of understanding the hymen represents the phallogocentric 
boundaries of Western metaphysics.  
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Throughout the comic drama of the Renaissance rituals surrounding 
matrimony are pivotal in providing an arena for conflict over status, gender relations, 
property, religious belief and individual autonomy versus community control. As we 
have already discussed in the previous chapter, the theatrical representation of the 
discourse of conjugal coupling in comedy carries with it certain sexual-political 
implications as the idealising language of Platonic love is juxtaposed with an 
examination of physical appetites. For although Tudor and Stuart marriage was 
primarily viewed as a means for the transfer of property, issues of inheritance, and 
kinship bonds, matrimony was also indicative of an underlying sexual desire.  
In designating the space between desire and fulfilment the hymen becomes the 
aperture through which the merging of two separate subjects into a singular monad of 
being can be viewed as anything but accidental. Catherine Belsey argues that desire is 
actually anterior to the unconscious,182 which in Kristevan terms positions love as an 
‘outlaw’.183 In this sense marriage can be denounced as a sly calculation aiming at the 
highest authority, an economy or strategy of mastery designed to contain the excesses 
of the human animal. However, as desire is forever predicated on lack, marriage can 
be identified as the symbolic coda which resounds within the alienated human soul. 
The notion of ‘lost’ souls rampaging around the earth in search of their ‘soul’ mates is 
regulated by the symbolic order of Western metaphysics where the plenitude of 
wholeness is guaranteed by the re-conjoining of souls that were once separated but 
have been eventually drawn back together by divine forces.  
For the Renaissance reformers, moral politics was no mere secondary 
consideration, but rather a centrifugal means of attaining social power and control.  
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The institution of marriage, was necessarily overt, public, and ceremonious, and was  
at the centre of the system of values which occupied a position at the conjunction of 
the spiritual and the material. It regulates the transmission of wealth from one 
generation to another and it also regulates the sexual activity. But it is also concerned 
with procreation and as a sacrament it belongs to the realm of what is numinous and 
sacred.184 But more than this, marriage was reified as a site of spiritual purification 
where one Christian soul complemented and completed what the other lacked. 
Matrimony thus locked men and women together not only materially and biologically 
but spiritually. As such, the idea of marriage as ‘confinement’, as the crucible for 
acceptable sexual and gender relations, is revealed as the result of permanent 
historical effort, as the consequence of historical processes of construction that 
interminably reinforce ideology. Illuminated thus the alleged moral dis-order of the 
Reformation period is interpreted not simply as an absence of order, as ‘immorality’, 
but rather as an interested ascription within the framework of major processes of re-
ordering, of re-inscribing dominant discourses. The secular authorities established 
new claims to power by shifting marriage increasingly out of the area of competence 
of kin groups and into the sphere of the Church, while at the same time massively 
extending the control over the legality of marriage. Add to this the municipal 
campaign against prostitutes and the regulation of all female sexuality and the 
pervasiveness of purity discourses becomes apparent. Therefore the surge of purity 
discourse on new modes of ecclesiastical control and state development reveal once 
more that the questions of purity raised by hymeneal comedy always relate to 
questions of power. 
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Hymen and Limen 
 
Following on from Foucault, Giorgio Agamben’s introduction of the term ‘bio’ in 
place of the term ‘legal’ implies that empires create their identities through an 
extended control over bodies.185 The complexities of power relations throughout the 
Renaissance emanate from the sovereign power associated with the old feudal 
hierarchical system vying with an emergent form of capitalism. How the early modern 
subject was governed and subject to self-governance can be usefully compared to this 
notion of the ‘bio-political’ where different types of sexual identification and practice 
were consistent with the political agendas of a pre-industrialist society, as well as  
being characteristic of its inherent contradictions.186 As such, sexual matrices of 
behaviour and subjectivity become entrenched through processes of normalisation, 
which support and reproduce systemic bio-political power.187 Through the historical 
displacements represented by drama, comedy represents an early modern world where 
power was inscribed indelibly upon the female body, with particular emphasis laid 
upon the woman’s hymen as a membrane “tainted with vice and yet sacred”,188 “a 
tissue on which so many bodily metaphors are written”.189  
The Greek hymen means “membrana”, although in the Greek anatomy this 
term was never associated with feminine virginity. This correlation was later 
developed by Christian scholars in search of a physiological mark that would ensure 
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the symbolic purity and ‘vendibility’ of woman that was unique to her. As a symbol 
of transformation and ‘exchange’ assurances had to be provided as to a woman’s 
chastity and subsequent ‘viability’ on the marriage market. Thus, the conjugal 
‘breaking’ of the hymen enacted ritualistically the transmutation or metamorphosis of 
two bodies into one. As can be gauged from this gloss, the hymen is a notoriously 
unstable and ambiguous concept, with an anxious and uncertain history. In French, 
this word, whose meaning is balanced, much more than its English counterpart, 
between the two opposed terms of “marriage” and “maidenhead”, has been exhumed 
by Derrida as an encryption which can neither allude to the consummation of a 
marriage nor “the veil of virginity”.190 The fragility of this lexeme is employed by 
Derrida in much the same way as he employs pharmakon and différance to function  
as loci of double meaning: both as separating membrane and fusion in marriage. 
These small undecidables are treated not as foci, but as junction points, from which 
meaning can pivot in lateral relation to what surrounds them, sending out and being 
subject to ripples of insecurity in the larger framework of the text. In this sense, the 
hymen is developed as an indicator of both proximity and discontinuity, and as such 
can be used to enhance and to suggest the possibility of phallogocentricism in the 
conclusions of Renaissance comedy whilst also simultaneously offering the resistance 
of an alternative view to contemporary debates. 
 Arguably, it is the specific position of the stage in Elizabethan and Jacobean 
London – one of ambiguity and ambivalence – that allows for Renaissance 
playwrights to dramatise the contradictions of their culture. Paradoxically, the 
hegemonic ideology of heterosexual marriage is both promoted and disfigured by the 
very liminality of the theatre, standing as it does at the very “antre” of the City proper. 
                                                           
190 ibid., p.114 
 131 
In his study The Place of the Stage, Steven Mullaney argues that the liberties – the 
social and material space existing beyond the walls of London city and where the 
theatres were located – served as a “transitional zone” or: 
a culturally maintained domain of ideological ambivalence and contradiction, 
where established authority reached and manifested, in spectacular form, the 
limits of its power to control and contain what exceeded it.191 
 
The drama thus performed on the early modern public stage, was firmly situated 
within a marginal space which allowed for the theatre’s privileged ability to stage the 
“incontinent hopes and fears”192 of a society immersed in a fierce debate over the 
emergent reform of marriage, and hence morality. Precisely, then, because of its 
vantage point outside the jurisdiction of the City, on the “threshold” or “limen” of 
society, Renaissance comedy is able to show these ideological fissures which emerge 
and exist wherever cultural change is experienced. For as the conditions of society 
shift, the ideas about ‘reality’ – that naturalised ideology which predisposes and 
organises our relation to the world – no longer hold true and anxiety and crisis 
become immanent. 
 Matrimony in Renaissance comedy must be analysed as a response to specific 
contradictions within the beginnings of a hegemony in the domestic sphere of the late 
Elizabethan City of London. In both romantic comedy and its more satirical progeny 
city comedy, there are always two contradictory aspects of conjugality in operation: 
commerce and celebration. Both the restraint and the license of the early modern 
market-place confront each other dramatically as comedy rotates upon the axis of a 
festive iconography where the politics of marriage centres on the construction of the 
exchange value of woman and the festive elements associated with her body. In the 
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many instances of female cross-dressing in comedy women disguise the very thing 
they are substantively valued for, their femininity. Viola, Rosalind, Julia, Jessica and 
in different ways, Portia, all participate in a dangerous form of comic license where 
they not only symbolically invert gender assignments but interrogate the ‘value’ of 
woman both economically and psychologically. 
 
Equality and Equilibrium 
 
The sexual politics of Elizabethan romance are demarcated by time: the earlier the 
comedy, the more evident the challenge to the limits of sexual equality and the 
subsequent reaffirming of those limits. For example, in The Comedy of Errors (1594) 
good wives are “bridled” (II.i.14) while Kate, in The Taming of the Shrew (1594) is 
symbolically muzzled during her transformation into an obedient wife. A change of 
interests can be detected from The Two Gentlemen of Verona (1595) onwards as it 
tentatively presents a cross-dressed heroine who precedes the transvestite plot-devices 
of later comedies and the plethora of dramatic representations of the many early 
modern anxieties which surrounded betrothal contracts and ‘spousals’. As legally 
binding contractual agreements, the abrogation of betrothals could ruin a woman’s 
reputation, a factor which Katherine the ‘shrew’ is made painfully aware of as she 
awaits her bride-groom at the altar. She would be considered as “damaged goods” and 
therefore unmarriageable193 if Petruchio were to abandon his promise to her father, a 
terrifying prospect for an early modern woman as the status conferred upon her in 
marriage was definitive. This fear is enacted in the later comedy Much Ado About 
Nothing where Hero is abandoned at the alter because she is thought to have given up 
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her virginity.  Her ‘part’ is played by the waiting woman Margaret, in a charade 
designed to enforce Leonato’s rejection of her.  
Apprehension and disquiet accompany each of the betrothals in the  
comedies, which increases as the focus on virtuous and constant women is scrutinised 
in relation to the promiscuous and immature men that they are contracted to. The 
ambiguity of psycho-sexual roles is worked through by a long line of cross-dressed 
and disguised heroines who find that “It is the lesser blot, modesty finds,/ Women to 
change their shapes than men their minds.” (TGoV, V.iv.110-11) And this in a time 
when the statutes on clothing were viewed as sacred and the switching of apparel 
between the genders was perceived as a sign of moral degeneration.194 United in a coy 
and clever form of subversion, the cross-dressed heroines of these comedies display a 
shared awareness that to alter their apparel is to alter the gender biased perception of 
early modern woman; and as a boy-player enacted these impersonations the 
ambivalent humour of gender construction is further underscored.  
In making men (and women) believe they are “accomplished with what they 
lack” the double-cross cross-dressers in the comedies enter a dangerous game of 
subterfuge as they represent neither the proper male nor the proper female, slipping 
through the net of Renaissance reasoning. The possibility of disturbing dislocations to  
the gender system were no doubt exacerbated by the all-male mode of theatrical 
production as the sight of boys dressed as women triggered unruly desires in both 
sexes, which Jean Howard quite rightly identifies as “one of the most overtly 
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stigmatized practices enumerated in the anti-theatrical tracts”.195 But cross-dressing as 
disguise allows access to secrets, to untold confidences, to moments of revelation and 
in the exposure of the fragility of the dividing line between masculine and feminine 
behaviour comedy ridicules the performativity of the gender system. Both As You Like 
It (1600) and Twelfth Night (1600) are exemplary instances of the theatrical nature of 
gender assignments. The early modern theatre may stage various attempts to channel 
sexual energies into the acceptable, legitimate institution of marriage but in exploiting  
transvestite actors to negotiate this position heterosexual union is forever placed in  
contradistinction to the homoerotic subtext of the comedy. 
The inversion of gender roles may be doubled by the dramatic constraint of the 
all-male mode of production but much of the humour evoked in hymeneal comedy is 
concerned with this doubling, with this sense of ambiguity and liminality. The multi-
layered inversion of cross-dressing boys-as-girls-as-boys traverses the boundary 
between reality and drama with such alacrity that the notion of identity itself is 
disrupted to display a difference within subjectivity which is neither masculine nor 
feminine, but at the limen between the genders. Marriage may remove a woman from 
the circuit of exchange but in disguising her femininity, the cross-dressed comic 
‘woman’ is licensed to parody and exaggerate the cultural construction of subjectivity. 
Her self-conscious ‘masquerade’ of masculinity reveals the contradictory nature of 
patriarchy and attempts to redefine, in limited ways, the position of gender within this 
ideology. These transvestite female characters change their roles in order to defend an 
aspiration towards marital equality where faith in one’s own constant soul offers only 
a partial representation of the notion of self awareness as an indicator of one’s 
inalienable ‘humanity’. Therefore, woman in disguise may be permitted a brief 
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glimpse of man’s fickle attitude to love and monogamy but their unmasking or 
unveiling is invariably accompanied by a redefinition of gender roles, particularly in 
light of contemporary developments in Renaissance philosophy and ethics. 
As one of the many contradictions of Protestant marriage theory, the elevation 
of the wife to her husband’s equal, undermined starkly hierarchical theories of gender 
and opened up space for ideas of negotiation, mutuality, and contract between men 
and women, some of which we may observe being worked through in Shakespeare’s 
romantic comedies. Renaissance Humanism may have regarded the education of 
women as an adornment to beauty and manners, but as the hic mulier controversy of 
1620 attests,196 there was an increasingly assertive female audience, who were 
demanding and gradually “getting more freedom”.197 The freedom of movement 
afforded by cross-dressing in the comedies allows female characters to oversee 
courtship without the restrictions of early modern gender expectations but it does so 
according to neo-Platonic idealisations wherein the male ‘beloved’ is deified. 
Nevertheless, the main thrust of hymeneal comedy, as a dramatic form which 
anticipates a union of opposites or the reconciliation of differences, promotes the 
discourse of a Platonic metaphysics which privileges the unstable subjectivity of the 
hymen over the monologic authority of the phallus. 
  
The Medicine of Marriage 
 
The idealised woman, the perfect woman, the object of neo-Platonic reverence aspired 
to being loved platonically, not for her ability to make children or to extinguish a 
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masculine need, but for her intellectual capabilities. Indeed, due to the unearthing of 
classical aesthetics woman became a symbol, a Muse, who was depicted as a slender 
and androgynous figure. Conversely, the dialectical dualism of neo-Platonism that pits 
spirit against flesh, body against soul, mind against matter is arguably a particularly 
pernicious and destructive philosophical position, a reinforcement of the dichotomous 
struggle within the human, between body and soul, between emotion and reason, 
between masculine ‘spirit’ and feminine ‘matter’ and their interminable dialectic. 
During the Renaissance, however, this was not merely a trend or a concept, it was a 
revolutionary movement that enveloped society, and, as a representation of a return to 
speculative dialectics, neo-Platonism was indeed instrumental in the scientific 
reappraisal of dogmas such as the intellectual inferiority of women to men. 
 Neo-Platonism may have validated a growing concept of individualism but 
this would have been impossible without the doctrinal shift from the community of 
faith to individual salvation propagated throughout the Reformation by improved 
standards of literacy and access to literature. Nevertheless, the debates which 
surrounded marriage from this period demonstrate the early modern concern with the 
importance of community before self, family before the individual, as the 
consequences of individualism were perceived as potentially tragic. The solipsism of 
‘inverted’ neo-Platonism may have glorified nature and therefore woman but this was 
through a hedonistic lens which downgraded love in marriage and celebrated the 
‘unconfined’ passion of adultery. Marriage was presumed to belong to the world of 
grace, which was identified with the Platonic world of spirit and rationality. Adultery 
on the other hand, belonged to the world of nature. The wife was thus a low creature, 
and the illicit lover a queen of love.198 The tension that exists between these two 
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philosophical constructions is ripe for comic exploitation as ambiguity and 
contradiction are the well-spring of humour. Thus, the comic potential of the Platonic 
doctrine of love as an artificial philosophy is burlesqued as the lovers’ idealisation 
eventually gives way to the sexual relationship which reinstates conjugal relations and 
the husband’s ‘government’. 
 Rosalind in As You Like It, Viola in Twelfth Night, and Portia in The Merchant 
of Venice scoff at the ‘puny’ lies told by love-sick men but give themselves in 
marriage swiftly. Rational love, as a counter to passionate love is provided by Julia’s 
servant Lucetta in The Two Gentlemen of Verona, who understands the concepts of 
love and marriage from the bottom of the social ladder. She is fully aware of the 
practical nature of marriage as a social necessity, a site of financial security, and as a 
religious sanctification of sexual relations. From her status position passionate love is 
a fantasy for characters in romances, since marriage is an arranged business 
transaction in which the woman’s desires are forgotten. “O they love least, that let me 
know their/ love” (I.ii.33-4) is Lucetta’s revelation that if man were “But constant, he 
were perfect” (V.iv.113) and that the abstract language of neo-Platonism encourages 
foolishness and self-delusion.  
 The neo-Platonism of Love’s Labour Lost (1595) is also considered as 
detrimental to the social order. The men of Navarre must learn the lesson that spiritual 
abstraction is forever tempered with physical necessity. In seeking introspection and 
waging ‘war’ against “the huge army of the world’s desires” (I.i.10) a comedy is set in 
motion that appeals to the body and in particularly to sexuality. This comic movement 
is, as Greenblatt states: “the heart of its theatrical magic; ‘great creating nature’ – the 
principle by which the world is and must be peopled”,199 although the depiction of 
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philosophical study as a naïve and artificial doctrine activates the hymeneal urge to 
cure those devoted to chastity. Again it is left to the ‘ladies’ to ‘purge’ their lovers of 
both their puritanical affectations and their subsequent choleric affections by setting 
them extended tasks to prove their fidelity, maintaining that their entire psychological 
and ethical character will be changed. This is, of course, one of the mechanisms of 
hymeneal comedy in action as young, inexperienced males are re-educated as to their 
proper place within society as part of a loving and procreative couple. Uniting the 
lover’s spiritual affection with corporeal desires allows equilibrium to be restored, 
although there is little hope of consummation in a comedy which flouts generic 
convention by refusing to "end like an old play”. (V.iii.873) In Love’s Labour Lost the 
remedy may have been provided, but it will take time to work through the body, both 
social and political. It is worth noting that the ending is the masque of winter and 
spring, where the aleations of the abiding rhythms of nature stand against the neo-
platonic aspirations of the king and his lords. This dramatic comedy may not end like 
an “old play” but it certainly echoes the fescennine rituals of old comedy where the 
cyclical movement of nature is celebrated.200 
Suggesting that physical reproduction is inferior to spiritual and intellectual 
propagation still privileges the homoerotic love of a male over a female. 
Unsurprisingly then, when a woman assumes the role of the male beloved in the 
discourse of Platonic love there is an attempt to elide or deface her real corporeal 
presence, and in so doing, provides her with the same rarefied status as the male 
Platonic lover. The apology offered by Renaissance reformers for the homocentricity 
of Platonic love redefined the relationship between lover and beloved as chaste rather 
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than carnal,201 thereby extending to heterosexual love a new paradigm in which the 
female beloved incites spiritual desire rather than the fleshly disorder with which she 
is traditionally associated. In Love’s Labours Lost the reference to woman as “a child 
of our Grandmother Eve” (I.i.260) recalls both a pre-lapsarian innocence and the 
corporeal temptations of mankind’s fall from grace, but this invocation of woman as 
the source of all human suffering was an ideology in recession. Previously entrenched 
feminine virtues such as taciturnity and modesty were replaced by the more 
‘masculine’ attributes of wit, learning and “allurement”.202  
These traits may be embodied by the cross-dressed heroines of the comedies 
but the ‘holiday humour’ of hymeneal mirth permits aristocratic ladies such as Olivia 
in Twelfth Night to parody the consequent elevation of women through Platonic  
discourses without reverting to disguise. As the intensity of her suitor’s love is 
expressed through professions of loyalty and servitude to a confident and 
commanding mistress, Olivia demands that she rule her husband in a comic world 
where such hierarchical inversions are temporarily permitted. The cross-dressed 
heroine Viola, however, emphasises that such unruly desires must either be eschewed 
or sublimated in order for souls and minds to unite with an affection that is based on 
mutual admiration, friendship and equality. Whether or not Viola and Orsino find 
wedded bliss is immaterial, since within the comic teleology of the drama the civil 
solution of marriage effects a double remedy, offering a cure for the love-sick male 
patient, who is emasculated by his "unnatural" veneration of the female beloved. The 
woman must also be remedied so as to curtail the sexual-political disorder inherent in 
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her protracted inversion of the traditional gender hierarchy. In this respect, the 
subversion of Platonic ideals through comic depictions of lovesickness can be read as 
an attempt to restore order, clarifying the extent to which what is viewed as natural in 
love is revealed as a linguistic and cultural construction. The rhetorical and ethical 
contrivances of neo-Platonism promote an essentially self-regarding love which as 
Malcolm Evans states “celebrates the transcendent Petrarchan lady as a bestower of 
superhuman powers while cowering in the shadow of the physical, mortal woman 
perceived as ‘pitch that defiles’ (LLL, IV.iii.3)”.203 This metaphysical position is 
deconstructed by comedy as one of the wider philosophical issues which reinscribe 
moral and ethical constraints upon the gendered body. 
 
Transformations 
 
Although the philosophy of neo-Platonism was originally constructed around 
homoerotic relations, its vocabulary of hierarchy and subservience was easily applied 
to the heterosexual mode of love and marriage advanced by the early modern Church. 
This appropriation effected a change in the traditional gender hierarchy, granting the 
female beloved a new metaphysical and theological significance that enabled her to 
occupy a dominant position in her (unmarried) relationship with a male suitor. 
Importantly, the need to avoid sexual intercourse before marriage imbued neo-
Platonism with a Christian imperative that permitted an extended period of courtship  
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where many women were allowed to enjoy a certain amount of control over their 
suitors. 
That comedy is supposed to end in marriage, or anticipates a future  
union, reminds us that the comedies are typically concerned with the vagaries of  
courtship where some of life’s major dichotomies are played out. At once unmarried  
and betrothed, chaste and desirous, settled and unsettled, driven mad by love and 
offered salvation from a mad world, wooers enter a transformative state which at 
some point must be resolved. Submerging itself in a lover’s world of confusion and 
uncertainty where nuptial vows are broken and betrothals are forgotten, comedy 
enters the hymen between not only gender distinctions but also the classificatory 
boundaries of genre. It is always at those points where lovers are dishonest or 
husbands too brutal that comedy seeks resolution. The arbitrary conventions of comic 
closure are habitually used to resolve the problems resuscitated by carnival license 
and in exploiting unifying social ceremonies such as a marriage, or a banquet, are 
typically deployed to mask the dissonance inherent in the intractable materials with 
which the comedy frequently deals.   
David Cressy defines marriage as a point in the human lifecycle where social, 
religious, ritual and festive ‘concomitants’ intersect at “the passage from one state to 
another”.204 Locating the liminality of matrimony’s transformative processes at the 
margins of society proper Cressy remarks that “in myriad ways, marriage signified a 
passage into adulthood, a mark of social maturity”,205 affecting the couple’s social, 
sexual, and economic status within the wider community. The rite of passage that 
constitutes nuptial vows is also accompanied by the celebration of the rights of the  
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body, as the events which surround the legal declaration of holy union adheres to a 
tradition of festivity and license which anticipates conjugal union. Dramatic 
representations of wedding practices as “festive” disclose a profound ambivalence 
that marks ritual celebrations as transitional states that are structurally dangerous. In  
moving from one status to another subjectivities fluctuate wildly as “the whole 
repertoire of ideas concerning pollution and purification are used to mark…the power 
of ritual to remake”206 a man and woman as husband and wife. 
 Assigned new privileges in life, the married couple entered the realm of  
‘domestic authority’ where they could issue instructions and make decisions, unlike 
dependent persons who were expected to follow orders.207 The solemnity of marriage 
rites gave way to nuptial festivities, either in the form of a celebratory meal or a feast 
which could last up to several days with “no want of good cheer, no lack of 
melody”.208 As Cressy states however, this depiction of “harmony, hospitality, and 
largesse” could be little more than a nostalgic literary construction in the “stressed 
economy of the late Elizabethan era”,209 and in the comedy of this period we find few 
examples of it. In The Taming of the Shrew, Petruchio takes the sexual and 
scatological license of wedding feasts to the very limit employing carnivalesque 
taming rituals that shame his bride into submission. His blasphemous antics at the 
church service shame everyone in attendance resulting in a shocked wedding 
ceremony of silent guests. In this sense, the festive element is employed as the means 
for containment that usually characterises carnival. However, there is a neat pastiche 
of early modern wedding practice in this comic scene whereby the threat of untamed  
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ritual is exposed as ever-present and immanent. 
With the marriage ceremony now solemnised at church, Renaissance wedding-
parties had to travel and the procession became an integral part of European marriage 
customs. But the evolution of popular and ecclesiastical thought on what made a 
marriage valid and legally binding ran concurrently with notions of propriety,  
therefore, the sexually charged atmosphere of marriage festivities became of genuine 
concern to Puritan reformers. As Cressy intimates “Eating, drinking, dancing, music, 
jesting, and sexual innuendo remained standard accompaniments to the rituals of holy 
matrimony, despite godly disapproval of these ‘unmannerly and froward  
customs’.” 210 The noise and rowdiness of the procession to the church displeased 
some211 and in the Puritan Admonition to Parliament in 1572, the following complaint 
is recorded: 
Women, contrary to the rule of the Apostle, come, and are suffered to come, 
bare-headed, with the bagpipes and fiddlers before them, to disturb the 
congregation, and that they must come in at the great door of the church else 
all is marred (with divers other heathenish toys in sundry countries, as carrying 
of wheat-sheaves on their heads and casting of corn, with a number of 
suchlike, whereby they make rather a May-game of marriage than a holy 
institution of God).212 
 
Just as proselytising clerics viewed this type of ceremony as blasphemous Petruchio’s 
actions in church should be viewed similarly. He demonstrates his iconoclasm by 
reducing the pronouncements of the priest to simple statements that are inferior to his 
own patriarchal authority, shouting “ay, by gogs wouns” (III.ii.159) and violently 
abusing the priest when Katherine is asked if she will marry him. 
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 Katherine’s ‘bridal dinner’ fares no better as Petruchio removes her right to 
“feast, revel and domineer”, (223) to be “obeyed” on this her wedding day. Asserting 
his new position as lord and master, Petruchio carefully details her new position as his 
wife: she is now his sole property, a femme couverte whose legal personality is 
completely subsumed in that of her husband. According to Catherine Belsey this legal 
status is conferred upon a married woman who has surrendered her property and her 
autonomy to her husband, but this kind of covering alludes to not only a form of 
social mastery but a form of sexual domination as well. “Among animals, to cover is 
to inseminate”213 and in the hymeneal tradition, the consummation of a marriage was 
also an indication of the husband’s mastery over his wife. The process of ‘holy union’  
is summarised by Gremio in The Taming of the Shrew who wishes that someone 
would take on Kate and “woo her, wed her and bed her” (143) as the vows of 
marriage were considered worthless without sexual consummation. 
 It is through the transformative power of hymeneal rites that dramatic comedy 
celebrates the rights of the body, particularly the ‘bawdy’ body. Hymen, the Greco- 
Roman god of marriage, the overseer of hymeneal or marriage rites had become 
considered by Renaissance scholars as a personification of bridal defloration and is 
summoned at the close of several comedies if not by name, then in spirit. In As You 
Like It he appears in person to “bar confusion” (V.iv.127) and “make conclusion”, 
(128) but as the “rustic revelry” (178) strikes up, the “true delights” (198) of the 
marriage-bed are instinctively anticipated. 
In keeping with the epithalamic tradition the generic conventions of comedy 
are shaped and reshaped by tensions about marriage and the process of celebration. A 
social ceremony such as a wedding is not value-neutral; it is freighted with all manner 
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of anthropological resonances and is clearly so seen by Katherine Eisaman Maus, who 
argues that: 
The wedding, at which the lover’s alliance is made permanent and potentially 
fertile, is an appropriate ritual for a comic conclusion – once this primary 
relationship is assured by marriage, social regeneration seems to follow as a 
matter of course.214 
 
Similarly, in a discussion on Roman New Comedy, which references authorities as 
diverse as Freud and Claude Levi-Strauss, David Konstan shows how the dynamics of 
romance comedy flow from the social tensions in the society to which they relate.215 
 Attempts variously to repress, reinterpret, and resolve the dangers and fears 
associated with marriage is central to the praxis of hymeneal comedy. Curiously, from  
The Two Gentlemen of Verona on, representations of women vocalising their desires, 
in fact, actively pursuing their desires, increases. Late Elizabethan and early Stuart 
comedy delights in depictions of women who are as capable of obtaining sexual 
gratification as men. “If the cat will after kind,/ So be sure will Rosalinde” (AYLI, 
III.ii.109-10) portrays an almost predatory activity in cross-dressed heroines, but  
women like Rosalind do not commit fornication; they demand the theological sanction 
of sex through conjugal rites. Mariana in Measure for Measure and Helena in All’s 
Well That Ends Well both willingly insist and gain their conjugal rights through the 
deception and subterfuge of bed-tricks, laying bare their bodies to recalcitrant and 
unwitting bridegrooms. Both of these characters undermine the key ingredient in 
matrimonial contracting by ignoring the free and unforced consent of both parties, but 
then, the drastic measure of the substitution of one woman’s body for another under 
the cover of darkness calls attention to the drastic position of women who lived with 
the indignity of an unconsummated marriage. 
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 Dympna Callaghan questions the relationship between real marriages and 
May license through her analysis of gendered play in both festive and literary  
inversions. She argues that 
female desire is not clearly affirmed in this inverted world, just as in actual 
social sites of symbolic inversion, such as carnivals, women were as likely to 
be abused as given sexual license.216 
 
This ambiguity is reiterated across the dominant strain of Elizabethan and Jacobean 
comedy, where the bawdy body, the becoming body that “rounds apace” (The 
Winter’s Tale, II.i.15) is both celebrated and distrusted. Unlike ritual proper, or 
carnival, Shakespearean comedy invariably presents a virtuous and tenacious 
depiction of women who assert themselves as autonomous subjects, exercising the 
freedom of will that ultimately determines the security and future happiness of the 
comic community. They become stock figures in which atonement is embodied. This 
carnivalesque appropriation of the feminine body demonstrates the responsibilities 
imposed upon the female gender as custodian of not just male sexual behaviour, but 
also of the harmony of the entire social order: inscribed as simultaneously chaste and 
immoral, as imperfect, unfinished, and in need of constant surveillance. 
Sexual desire is depicted as the force that establishes the gender hierarchy, 
demanding that women’s behaviour be both shameful and modest, that she fulfil the 
duties due to her husband. Within this libidinous economy there is little wonder that 
there is so much confusion over notions of chastity and the acceptability of sexual 
activity. Even from within the sexually licensed confines of the marriage bed, a 
woman still had to retain her dignity in that, she was expected to curtail both her 
husband’s and her own desires: fundamentally, a married woman was as vulnerable to 
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accusations of whoredom as an unmarried woman who sold her body to paying 
customers.217 This issue is taken up at the beginning of The Winter’s Tale where 
Hermione’s account of married sex, augmented with Leontes’ revelations of 
courtship, culminate in scandalous accusation and pathological male jealousy. 
 
Purity and Danger 
 
The dialectical distinction between the virtuous/vicious woman was promoted 
throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries by the authors of domestic 
treatises and sermons on social conduct. William Gouge signed the “Epistle 
Dedicatory” of his Of Domesticall Duties (1626) as “The Watch-man of your soules”, 
and ostensibly, the content of all eight treatises, reinforces the link between public and 
communal activities in their preoccupation with “household government”. The 
reliance on marriage manuals or guides to running a household, in the sense of 
ordering, controlling and ruling a stratified community anticipates the intensely 
though covertly political discourse of hymeneal comedies. Literature that broaches the 
domestic invariably implies that wives need ‘correction’ on account of their unruly 
desires, and as Heather Dubrow has argued: 
The very act of writing a manual or delivering a sermon on marriage gestures 
towards the principal strategy: the act implies that wedlock is an institution 
that can indeed be regulated, controlled, and ordered by someone who assumes 
the authority to do so.218 
 
Attempts to control the emotional, physical and psychological demands of women 
appear to be of more concern than the control of masculine desires, but this of course 
pertains to that Renaissance obsession with the corruptibility of the womb, and the 
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ease with which adultery could be concealed and bastardy engendered. These 
educational treatises, pamphlets on manners, spiritual tracts, and sermons produce 
much more than guidelines for the smooth running of home and state, as Lisa Jardine 
notes: “all conspire to try to turn the wishful thinking of the male community into a 
propaganda reality”.219 Throughout Renaissance literature, the concept of virginity 
and/or chastity, distinctive as the meaning of these two terms are, appear to be 
continually blurred together and are developed across a number of different 
discourses. 
 Protestant reformers such as Luther, succeeded in establishing a polemical 
discourse about the immorality of their age as an accurate description of reality. In so 
doing, they instigated as absolute their own dividing line between marriage and illicit 
sexuality. At the same time, they created a yardstick that has largely been adopted by 
historians to assess behaviour in the areas of marriage and sexuality, and that 
implicitly remains alive and well in the concept of social discipline. The history of the 
social control and disciplining of gender relations, marriage and sexuality thus traces 
not just a history of conventions, attitudes, behaviours and their transformations, but 
also moves through the more abstract principles of perceptions and standards of 
definition.  
Mary Douglas has drawn our attention to the important function of notions of 
purity as integral to the construction of social boundaries and taboos,220 as social order 
is established with their help and maintained by means of their permanent 
reformulation. Accordingly, talk about pure undefiled sexuality within marriage and 
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its strict separation from all possible forms of illegitimate, ‘indecent’ and thus, impure 
sexuality outside marriage assumed an important function in reform debates about a  
new social order and its realisation. As Douglas has shown, the purity principle has 
played a key role in conflicts between the centre and the periphery of society in 
various historical configurations. During the Renaissance such conflicts were often 
fought out as struggles between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. 
 Specifically, a discussion of marriage must analyse the administration of 
citizens’ lives through the regulation of sexual conduct, and a study of comedy’s 
many experiments with matrimonial material would flounder without surveying the 
paradoxical historicity of a civic institution which is indicative of both sexual desire 
and purity. As becomes apparent, the legal history of marriage is part of a cultural  
history of gender, displaying the extent to which the private and domestic are caught 
up between the public and the political. It is these intersections of ideology that reveal 
to what extent culture is reliant upon gender and vice versa. Thus, Michel Foucault’s 
claim that sexuality is not a natural given, that it has a history, leads us to question the 
veracity of the cynical materialist view of love that marriage is the handmaiden of 
lust. For Foucault, sexuality: 
is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that 
is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of 
bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the 
formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, 
are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of 
knowledge and power.221 
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Foucault further underscores that the sexualising of subjects (bodies oriented to a  
‘proper’ sexuality that is acceptable to hegemony) occurs through the body’s  
“integration into systems of efficient and economic controls”.222 These systems of  
control are what he calls “technologies of sexuality”, those ideological, economic, and  
institutional structures which inform and support a specific subjectivity or sense of  
identity. Teresa de Lauretis extends Foucault’s theory on the grounds that he ignores 
the construction of “difference” for male and female subjects, and so she argues that 
the “technologies of gender” must also be analysed.223 Thus we see that early modern 
comedy reminds us of the connection between stage cross-dressing and the 
problematising of gender roles in late Elizabethan and early Jacobean society. As this 
following section will explore, nowhere is this issue more evident than in the debate 
concerning the difference between a ‘wife’ and a ‘prostitute’ than Marston’s The 
Dutch Courtesan. 
 
Courtesans and Courtship:  
Learning the Difference Between Love and Lust 
 
Marston’s The Dutch Courtesan (1605), is a play crucially concerned with the 
difference “betwixt” courtesans and wives. As Coppelia Kahn remarks, The Dutch 
Courtesan illustrates the Jacobean obsession with “polarization” because, along with 
other city comedies, the “action and metaphorical structure pivot on either fixing or 
crossing the boundary between the chaste wife and the lustful whore”.224 The inverted 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
222 ibid, p.139 
223 Teresa de Laurentis, Technologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film, and Fiction, (Bloomington, 
1989), p.88 
224 Coppelia Kahn, ‘Whores and Wives in Jacobean Drama’, In another Country: Feminist Perspectives 
on Renaissance Drama, eds. Dorothea Kehler and Susan Baker, (Metuchen and London, 1991), p.252 
 151 
neoplatonism of the young bachelor Freevill produces a cynicism towards the ‘sport’ 
of lovemaking where “Since, then beauty, love and woman are good, how can the 
love of a woman’s beauty be bad?”. (I.i.50) Marston’s material ideas are reflected in 
current society, or at least in the philosophical writings of Montaigne where: 
Wedlocke hath for his share hounour, justice, profit and constancie: a plaine, 
and more generall delight. Love melts in onely pleasure, and truly it hath it 
more ticklish; more lively, more quaint, and more sharpe…there must be a 
kinde of stinging, tingling and smarting.225 
 
Whether or not Marston used Montaigne as his source, there is a remarkable similarity 
in the philosopher’s distinction between wedlock and love and Freevill’s own 
“bifurcated philosophy” towards women. Freevill claims that lust is a “lively sin,” 
which absolves his “sometimes inconstancy” through the belief that a courtesan 
“sell[s] but only flesh” whilst simultaneously procuring a ‘chaste’ marriage partner 
that will secure his “health and name”. (I.ii.104; II.i.142)  Freevill’s desire for the 
more socially acceptable Beatrice also includes his desire for higher economic 
standing and increased status. His use of the Petrarchan love-sonnet may serve to 
mask the material foundations of marriage; rather than recognising, as Beatrice’s 
sister Crispinella and her suitor Tysefew do, that marriage is both a venal and an 
economic transaction, he exploits a neo-Platonic rhetorical stance that transcends the 
material plane. His unwillingness to recognise his betrothal to Beatrice as both an 
economic and social arrangement by focusing on the idealisation and glorification of 
her body deflects attention away from the place of sex within the nascent capitalist 
culture he inhabits. 
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  Freevill’s cynical acceptance of the courtesan Francischina at the beginning of 
the play - which precedes his violent rejection of her - is initiated by a subtle satire on 
the Puritanical self-righteousness which stalked the Liberties of London. Freevill’s  
friend Malheureux accompanies him to the courtesan’s house to “make her loathe the. 
shame she’s in” and to cement his own sense of probity since “the sight of vice  
augments the hate of sin”. (I.i.171) Marston arguably casts Malheureux as a stock 
figure, a moral absolutist, in order to mock the Puritan doctrines against both 
excessive sex and the theatre, for the theatre and lascivious sexual behaviour were 
explicitly linked in the Puritan perception of the Liberties. Philip Stubbes, in The 
Anatomie of Abuses (1583) writes an especially heated attack on the theatres in which 
the two are connected: 
Do they not induce whoredome and unclennes? Nay, are they not rather plaine 
devourers of maydenly virginities and chastitie? For proofe wherof, but marke 
the flocking and runing to Theatres and curtens, daylie and hourely, night and 
daye, tyme and tyde to see Playes and Enterludes, where such wanton 
gestures, such bawdie speeches: such laughing and fleering: such kissing and 
bussing: such clipping and culling: Such winckinge and glancinge of wanton 
eyes, and the like used…If you will learn to become a bawde, uncleane, and to 
devirginat Mayds, to deflour honest Wyves…If you will learn to rebel against 
Princes, to comit treasons, to consume treasurs, to practise ydlenes, to sing and 
talk of bawdie love and venery…If you will learn to play the whore-maister, 
the glutton, Drunkard, or incestuous person [then go to the theatre].226 
 
Likewise in The Schoole of Abuse, Gosson writes that women who “lack customers all 
the week…flock to the theatres, and there keep a general market of bawdry”.227 It is in 
this vein of thought – this language – that Marston’s character Malheureux speaks: he 
directs very similar complaints against the “common house of lascivious 
entertainment” where “warmth and wine and youth” (I.i.56 & 57) tempt men into the 
“head sins”. (I.i.70) 
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 Ironically, this man of “professed abstinence”, (I.ii.109) is afflicted by blood 
humors and is “caught” by the beauty of “an arrant strumpet”. (II.i.130) Freevill, now 
planning to marry Beatrice, the modest and virtuous daughter of a landed nobleman, 
“resign[s]” his courtesan “freely” (II.i.98) but cautions Malheureux that prostitutes 
“sell but only flesh, no jot affection”. (II.i.137) Thus, while Freevill, according to both 
his abandoned mistress and her bawd, is “a fool, an unthrift, a true whoremaster…a 
constant drab-keeper”, (II.ii.35-7) he always appears to maintain his reason, and he 
never forgets that Francischina is in the business of “fleshly entertainment”. (I.i.106) 
Malheureux however, is unable to tell the difference between love and lust; he rails 
against the “tyrannous respects” of man which “fetters” his new-found passion, 
“calling that sin in us which in all things else/ Is nature’s highest virtue”. (II.i.77-8) 
Thus the Puritan zeal of Malheureux disappears and in its place an equally monologic 
voice appears, this time vocalising a desire for unrepressed lust in place of purity.  
 In fact, Malheureux’s passion so overwhelms him that he accedes to 
Francischina’s wish for revenge and agrees to kill Freevill: “Let me be vicious, so I 
may be loved./ Passion I am thy slave”. (II.ii.110) By this point in the play 
Malheureux is totally controlled by his passion, his body and the “inborn heat” 
(II.i.73) of his desire. Freevill however represents the ‘well-rounded’ Renaissance 
gentleman, ready to renounce his mistress in favour of an honest and ‘undefiled’ 
future wife. He now theatrically declares that “until my soul showed me the 
imperfection of my body, and placed my affection on a lawful love” (I.i.90-1) he was 
devoid of reason. Thus, while Freevill can fantasise that his passions are controlled by 
his reason, Malheureux maintains that “There is no God in blood, no reason in 
desire”. (IV.ii.13) Malheureux then, swings from virulent misogyny – “I shall hate the 
whole sex to see her” (I.i.147) – to collapsing the very distinctions between 
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“sanctified” love and “bestial” lust that philosophers like Montaigne preached, saying 
“No love’s without some lust, no life without some love”. (I.ii.143) Significantly, 
both Malheureux’s collapsing of love and lust together and Freevill’s comment about 
his soul teaching him the imperfection of his body invoke the classical distinctions 
between lust/love, body/soul. In postmodern terms it is these abject/symbolic 
distinctions which inform the technologies of sexuality by what is widely regarded as 
either acceptable or inadmissable in society.  
Even by the late middle-ages, influences of Aristotle’s division between 
masculine spirit and feminine flesh are echoed in the Church’s condemnation of the 
body: “To restore the image betrayed by Adam, one sought to subjugate the Flesh 
again to the authority of Reason”.228 Of course, the iconized principles underlying the 
pure/abject dichotomy were drawn from Socratic rather than Christian texts where 
two kinds of love are defined by Pausanias in the Symposium. Richard Burgess cites 
the poet Desportes’ understanding of this dichotomous desire as: 
Love is inseparable from Aphrodite, and if there were only one Aphrodite 
there would be only one Love; but there are two goddesses and there must be 
two Loves…The elder one is the daughter of Uranus, the younger, who is the 
daughter of Zeus and Dione – her we call common; and the Love who is her 
fellow-worker is rightly named common, and the other Love is called 
heavenly.229 
 
The higher love diffuses itself throughout the multiple forms of the natural world and 
instils a desire to return to the perfect unity of the One, out of which humanity has 
emanated. As we begin to struggle towards this goal, however, our natural 
imperfections, resulting from our birth from the lower stuff of being, perverts our 
purer love to the lower Venus giving rise to all our earthly and fleshly desires – a 
classic/medieval version of libido. It was always the express aim of neo-Platonism to 
                                                           
228 Robert Millar, Ed., Chaucer: Sources and Backgrounds, (New York, 1977), p.400 
229 Richard Burgess, Platonism in Desportes, (Chapel Hill, 1954), p.73 
 155 
use esoteric philosophy to learn to seek the higher Venus and reunion with the One, 
and elements of this process were adapted to Christianity by the early Fathers with the 
higher Venus surviving deeply submerged within the Virgin mother of Christ.230 
 In The Dutch Courtesan the separation between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ bodily  
strata can be clearly seen in the distinction between the whore (Francischina) and the 
virgin (Beatrice). Kahn argues that the aim of such oppositions is to split off woman’s 
body from her soul: “A whore is all body, all lust, without soul; a wife or virgin, all 
soul without body or lust.” 231 Hence, the logical flippancy of Freevill’s jest attending 
to the upkeep of brothels: “Ever since my intention of marriage, I do pray for their 
continuance…lest my house be made one”. (I.i.59-60 & 62) Thus, splitting “woman’s 
body from her soul” allows for the possibility of an idealised woman: the etymology 
of Beatrice, "she who is blessed",232 contrives that only she can be the lawful love of 
the play when divested of all (feminine) materiality. In essence, Beatrice has to 
transcend her own body in order to escape the spirit/male and matter/female dictum 
whereby the unfinished “becoming” body is displaced onto the female body. Or as De 
Lauretis states, “as in all patriarchal representations of gender in Western culture, 
sexuality is located in Woman, but, like desire and meaning, it is the property and 
prerogative of men”.233 In other words, men control definitions of desire: women who 
express their desires are whores, are abject; only a woman without “body or lust” 
eludes the position of whore/woman. Beatrice thus serves as the example of the 
“natural” and legitimate femininity – one who exists to be glorified – while 
Francischina is “unnatural” and a “money-creature”. (I.i.90) In this sense The Dutch 
Courtesan exposes, just as Foucault explains, that sexuality is a “historical construct”, 
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a “complex political technology”, based on the “formation of special knowledges”234 
including the belief that “Woman corrupted is the worst of devils” (II.ii.197) and that 
love informed by the soul can be purified through recourse to the higher Venus. 
 Because Freevill gives up Francischina for the holy union of matrimony, he 
operates through the early modern technologies of sexuality that define woman as 
either abject or pure and then misrecognises this difference as natural and innate. In 
this sense, Freevill serves as an agent of re-coding because he, more so than any other 
character, depends upon elaborate constructions which conceal the materialist 
underpinnings of his society. For as Jean Howard has observed, in order to “produce 
and reproduce class and gender difference within a social order dependent on these 
differences to justify inequalities of power and privilege”,235 his reality depends upon 
a carefully maintained distinction between pure and impure woman. 
 
Tranvestism and Androgyny 
 
“As is typical of comedy”, Jean Howard reminds us, “marriages and reaffirmations of 
marriage signal the channelling of desire into socially acceptable forms”.236 Although 
this statement is inarguable, the majority of Shakespeare’s comedies promote the idea 
that “docile and chaste wives are not to be taken for granted”,237 perhaps not even not 
to be desired. The ever-dutiful daughter Bianca in The Taming of the Shrew eschews 
parental consent and marries a man she barely knows while Helena in All’s Well that 
Ends Well (1603) is “the shadow of a wife” (V.iii.307) in more ways than one as she  
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disguises herself to stalk her errant husband. Even Hermione in The Winter’s Tale 
(1610), the “sweet’st companion that e’er man/ Bred his hopes out of” (V.i.1I-12) 
‘quietly’ defies her husband’s irrational and murderous actions. As Stephen Orgel 
rather laconically puts it: “Marriage is a dangerous condition in Shakespeare”.238 
Throughout the Renaissance, comedy depends more on the characterisation of wives 
than it does the actions of prostitutes which validates another of Orgel’s sentences that 
“the patriarchal structure is always in place, always threatened”.239 
Shakespeare’s comic heroines may disturb the gender hierarchy only to assist  
in the restitution of the husband’s government, but the topsy-turvy world which they 
inhabit does not always serve to keep women in their place. Comic and festive 
inversion can undermine as well as reinforce a general assent to the necessity of 
entrusting power to patriarchy.240 Middleton and Dekker’s presentation of gender 
inversion and female transvestism in The Roaring Girl (1611) is important to any 
discussion of marriage as the virtuous virago of this comedy is powerfully connected 
to matrimony: both as a woman who receives proposals of marriage and as the 
mouthpiece for the proposals of others.  
Although the historical Mary Frith never married, her dramatic representation, 
Moll Cutpurse, explains why someone such as herself, so presumably marriageable 
and alluring to men, would avoid marriage. She correctly identifies the reality of the 
institution of marriage as being predicated upon female subordination and effectively 
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excludes herself from this system of phallogocentric exchange. Patriarchs such as 
Lord Nolan hear only the “sound of doomsday” in Moll’s dismissal of marriage, as 
she goes on to state how entirely unsuited to her lifestyle such a contract appears 
unless: “Honesty and truth unslandered,/ Woman manned, but never pandered” (V.ii) 
becomes the norm. This is the ironic bequest of a woman who uses her male apparel 
to take on the role of defender of womankind and forceful subverter of gender 
stereotypes, in a declaration that maintains that her subjection to wifehood will only 
occur if all the world’s wrongs are righted. In fact, The Roaring Girl toys with the 
realisation that in this world, acting like a man is clearly better than acting like a 
woman, which is curiously advocated as a potentially beneficial route to a 
complementary marriage of minds. 
 While this text privileges marriage as the central fact of middle-class life and 
the necessary means for the aristocracy to reproduce itself and pass on its wealth,  
marriage per se is not depicted as an untroubled or attractive institution, and it does  
not accommodate sexual desire easily. The main impact of Moll Cutpurse, is that she 
stands out-with the marriage fold, refusing to be herded into a submissive position. 
Her critique of the institution of matrimony is one which undermines the premise of 
female subordination, forcefully asserting that for a woman, marriage means a loss of 
control and freedom. Thus, Moll contests the sovereignty of the husband with her 
radical declaration that: “marriage is but a chopping and changing, where a maiden 
loses one head and has a worse i’th’place”. (II.ii.43-4) There is however, an 
inconsistency in Moll’s representation of female subjectivity which works through a 
nexus of contradictions sign-posting a number of complex social tensions. 
 The tension that this text exposes is that which narrows the passage between 
Moll’s condemnation of marriage and her threats to beat rancorous women. (II.i.215-
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21) Howard asserts that “If Moll’s ‘corrections’ worked, women would again be 
docile and men manly, and happy marriages would be assured”.241 However Moll’s 
ideological discourses produce only conservative propositions, of marriage as the 
locale where women lose their maidenhead, their voice, their independence, and 
marriage as a site of containment for unruly women. Moll’s contradictory appraisal of 
the ‘happy’ state of matrimony and its tragic suppression of women bends the text out 
of shape at several points as the threat of censorship no doubt plays upon the 
dramatist’s mind. On the one hand Moll’s transvestite exploits may seem to be 
devoted to unmasking the pretensions of male upstarts but this is forever invested in 
confirming the values of a benign form of patriarchy. 
Moll instructs by example how a man should behave and takes obvious delight 
in teaching unruly males how to treat women. In castigating Laxton for thinking “each 
woman thy fond flexible whore” (III.i.71) she completes the discourse of radical  
reform with another of her striking declarations: “I scorn to prostitute myself to a 
man/ I that can prostitute a man to me”. (III.i.109-10) The impact of Moll’s threat to 
the patriarchal constraints upon female sexuality are fairly obvious, as women who 
claimed an autonomous sexual subjectivity were automatically branded as whores. 
Nonetheless, there appears to be no evidence of Moll’s sexual activity, other than a 
great deal of bawdy humour, as when Trapdoor suggests they “wap” and “niggle” 
under the “ruffman’s” (i.e., copulate under the hedge) much to the amusement of the 
assembled gathering, Moll included. But as Howard points out: “For Moll there seems 
to be no way, outside of dream and solitary pricksong, to gratify eros without 
enduring an unendurable subordination and exploitation”.242 
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 Howard’s formulation of Moll’s “solitary pricksong”, the auto-eroticism of 
playing by herself upon the genital emblem of the viol, contains an interesting 
exposition on Moll’s defiance of patriarchal, phallus-oriented sexuality. However, the 
insistent linkage of Moll with this particular instrument and her mastery of it 
functions not just on the physical level of erotic gratification. Moll’s intellectual 
capabilities are also demonstrated here. According to Lawrence J. Ross stringed 
instruments were symbolic or conducive to virtue and order as wind instruments were 
to error.243 “Being Apollo’s attribute”, writes the musicologist Curt Sachs, “the lyre 
expressed the so-called Apollonian side of Greek life, wise moderation, harmonious 
control and mental equilibrium, while the pipes stood for the Dionysian side, for 
inebriation and ecstasy”.244 The viol-de-gamba however, shaped like a dismembered 
female body, although usually associated with cultivated serious music, was often 
mentioned in comic situations, where it connoted an affected ass. The viol may have 
been played by gentlemen, merchants and other men of virtue, but such wastrels as Sir 
Andrew Aguecheek was a player “o’th Viol-de-gamboys” in Twelfth Night (I.iii.25-6) 
and Onesiphorous Hoard in A Trick to Catch the Old One (1605) describes his niece’s 
attributes rather unfairly as “The voice between her lips/ And the viol between her 
legs/ She’ll be fit for a consort very speedily”.245 Perhaps more trenchantly, the 
dramatic representation of a powerful woman straddling this beautiful, feminine, 
Renaissance instrument would have visually unsettled her audience. Although her 
performance in this scene is observed only by one staged spectator her mastery of the 
instrument is but another manifestation of her transgression of gender roles and 
                                                           
243 Lawrence J. Ross, ‘Shakespeare’s “Dull Clown” and Symbolic music’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 
17:2, (Spring, 1966), pp.107 ff 
244 Curt Sachs, The History of Musical Instruments, (New York, 1940), p.129 
245 (I.i ) See also Middleton’s Your Five Gallants (1607) for a similarly bawdy treatment of female viol 
players in Goldstone’s description of courtesans “with their viols betwixt their legs, and play the  
sweetest strokes; ‘twould e’en filch you soul almost out of your bosom.” (II.i) 
 161 
augments the symbolic display of the manner in which her presence in the public 
sphere plays upon the thoughts of a sexually inquisitive audience, especially women. 
Indeed, Moll’s interminable questioning of the efficacy of married love as the basis of 
civil society lays her character bare to a range of accusations and intimidation as she 
declares that she likes to ‘lie a both sides o’ the bed’. Her solitude is questionable, 
particularly in a period when the only conceivable and socially acceptable outlet for 
sexual activity was in conjugal coupling. 
 In refusing to submit not only to men, but to her own physical nature, Moll 
associates independence with physical denial: 
 She that has wit, and spirit, 
 May scorne to live beholding to her body for meate, 
 Or for apparell like your common dame, 
 That makes shame get her cloathes, to cover shame.  
(III.i.133-6) 
 
Moll expresses the traditional dichotomy between body and spirit, rejecting altogether 
the world of desire where identity is governed by “apparell” and where marriage is  
not the union of opposites but the handmaiden of lust: 
 Base is that minde, that kneels unto her body. 
 As if a husband stood in awe on’s wife, 
 My spirit shall be Mistresse of this house, 
 As long as I have time in’t.  
(137-40) 
 
This cynical materialist view of love is nevertheless undermined by Moll’s awareness 
that marriage is regulated as a container for human sexuality.  
 The idea that being a harlot constitutes masculine behaviour is no doubt 
paradoxical, but it displays acutely how anxieties about women’s sexuality, in this or 
any other period, are a projection of male sexual fantasies. Indeed, in The Dutch 
Courtesan Freevill explicitly addresses this bifurcated construction when he tells 
Malheureux that “only men give to loose [behaviour] because they are men, therefore 
 162 
manly”. (I.i.122) Take for example the scenario afforded by Mary Fitzallard’s attempt 
to accomplish a match with Sebastian Wengrave, by disguising herself as a boy in 
Moll’s company: 
 MOLL: How strange this shows, one man to kiss another. 
 SEBASTIAN: I’d kiss such men to choose, Moll; 
  Methinks a woman’s lip tastes well in a doublet. 
      (IV.i.45-7) 
 
As Sebastian admits that he has discovered a new layer to his sexuality, a bawdy 
denouement occurs with his request to be serenaded by Moll. Sebastian appeals to 
Moll to amuse herself in some way while he enjoys the “drink” that “tastes better/ In 
an outlandish cup”. (53-4) At the slightest mention of duelling, said in jest by 
Sebastian, Moll declares that she “should draw first, and prove the quicker man” (78) 
which causes Sebastian to lay bare the double-entendre that “there shall be no weapon 
at this meeting”. (79) To appease her a viol-de-gambo is offered up to “end [her] 
quarrel singing”, (82) but Moll shows that she is as capable of innuendo as any man  
claiming that “it shall ne’er/ Be said I came into a gentleman’s chamber/ And let his 
instrument hang by the wall”. (90-1) Sebastian’s parry to this riposte: “…it had been a 
shame/ For that gentleman then that would have let it hung still,/ And ne’er offered it 
thee”. (92-4) 
 It is so perfectly obvious from the common figurative use of language that the 
fighting instinct and the sexual instinct are fundamentally allied. The warlike 
metaphors of A Midsummer’s Night Dream (1596) are a case in point, where Theseus 
turns to his future wife and gushes: “I wooed thee with my sword,/ And won thy love 
doing thee injuries”. (I.i.17-8) In the bawdy bedchamber scene the euphemism of a 
man’s threatening weapon is replaced by the more playful euphemism of a musical 
instrument and denotes the pleasures of the body beyond the threatened violence of a 
potential defloration. 
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 The chivalric code may have ruled the arts of both love and war but as Claudio 
in Much Ado About Nothing demonstrates, when military conduct is applied to matters 
of the heart tragic consequences are inevitable. Moll’s comic inversion of chivalric 
honour in her duel with the cad Laxton may be juxtaposed alongside Viola/Cesario’s 
ineffectual duelling in Twelfth Night. Moll teaches Laxton a valuable lesson: she 
rejects his advances, lectures him on behalf of “fallen women”, and eventually fights 
and wounds him. She not only talks like a man, she can wield a sword as effectively 
as any gentleman. Conversely, Viola/Cesario may “speak masterly” (Twelfth Night, 
II.iv.23) in her young male apparel but her mastery of language is employed more 
usually to resolve conflict. This young woman may know how to “speak to [men] in 
many sorts of music” (I.i.57) but unlike her twin brother she can no more answer with 
her fists than grow hair upon her chin. But Viola and Moll switch roles by the close of 
their respective plays. Viola cannot reclaim her femininity until her “woman’s weeds” 
are returned to her, she remains locked in the transvestite economy of comedy, 
whereas Moll scrubs up well for her finale, clothed respectably as a wench once more, 
no longer threatening in her relation to the symbolic order.  
The women of these comedies impersonate the rhetorical sophistry of 
educated men but are expected to return to their previous gender position by the close 
of the play. This initially appears to strengthen the notion of comedy’s didactic 
function as the concern with genealogy, with the idiom of survival, with living on 
(happily ever after), and it explicates conflict resolution as the preferable route to a 
new future. However, accepting comic conclusions as anything other than provisional 
is invariably problematic as previously dynamic and transgressive characters are 
submerged within the expected propriety of their gender. It would appear that these 
figures lose everything: the triumph of their parodic masquerade could be dismissed if 
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we view cross-dressing as not so much a political act as a psychological haven where 
fantasies of egalitarianism can be enacted, before returning women to their assigned 
gender positions. A recurring question arises in relation to these clumsy conclusions: 
do they point to the imperfect state of matrimony itself? Is it better to marry than to 
burn? Or, does comedy support the established order by defending marriage, the laws 
of inheritance, convention and a settled state of affairs? 
 
Conclusion 
 
Contemporary debates about the status of women and wives, and questions that 
interrogate the issue of women teaching men how to view women are crucial to our 
understanding of the early modern theatre’s comic agenda. Inverting the concept of 
woman as property and reinforcing the notion of married equality through the lens of 
Renaissance Humanism may not liberate the female gender entirely but does serve to 
illuminate the conflation of sex and money as the basis of a nascent capitalist society. 
In The Merchant of Venice the casket which Jessica throws to Lorenzo is an 
odd counterpoint to the three caskets that Bassanio must choose from to win the 
“golden fleece” (I.i.170) that is his future wife. The moral of these caskets emphasises 
the danger of judging by external appearances but in liberating this casket of jewels 
from her father’s house, Jessica finds that love and wealth are uncomfortably 
intertwined. In contrast to Lorenzo’s conviction (II.vi.28) Jessica’s terrible doubts are 
made manifest in her continual questioning “Who are you? Tell me, for more 
certainty”. (26-7) As she struggles with the magnitude of her decision to elope with 
Lorenzo she questions the man below in the darkness, suddenly unsure of his 
intentions. Her awareness of the inherent uncertainty of one mind regarding the 
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contents of another is heightened by her having to don a disguise which reinforces her 
fear that appearance is all we really have to go on. She has, after all, disguised the one 
thing she is valued for, her femininity. 
There is here a complex inter-working of the theme of love-is-blind along with 
the assumption of apparel as substantive of identity as the men surrounding Jessica 
“hold a candle to [her] shames”. (40) The shame she feels at her “exchange” (35) may 
be concealed beneath “the lovely garnish of a boy” (45) but surely Cupid’s blushes 
are reserved for the need she feels to “gild” herself with ducats. (49-50) The complex 
polysemy of this word is important to an understanding of the reason both for 
Jessica’s doubts and the constitution of early modern female subjectivity. Firstly she 
will cover (gold-plate) herself in wealth so that her external appearance will be all the 
more attractive, as she suspects that her new-found love is enticed by her coating of 
wealth. The word ‘gild’ also suggests ‘guilt’ which is appropriate to the sensations she 
must be experiencing as she is not only committing the crime of theft against her 
father, she is also defying his paternal authority by eloping. Also, if we take ‘gild’ as 
‘geld’, we observe a young person who looks like a boy but who lacks the prime 
signifier of masculinity: the penis.  
When Jessica makes this remark, Gratiano appears to respond by swearing an 
oath by his “hood”. (51) This can be read as ‘manhood’ but may also refer to the 
foreskin as a mark of uncircumcised Christian manhood. This notion of small, almost 
insignificant pieces of flesh which legitimate subjectivity, are referred to by numerous 
cross-dressed heroines who realise the fragility of the hymen they have transgressed at 
moments when the logic of the phallus is unremittingly aggressive. In referring to 
their ‘lack’ of maleness cross-dressing heroines acknowledge the danger they are 
placing their virginity in by leaving the imagined safety of the feminine realm of the 
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domestic. They set course for law courts and battlefields, towards the aggressive 
masculine realm which is fraught with mortal danger.Women disguising the one thing 
they are substantively valued for, in exchanging the outward appearance of femininity 
for the outward appearance of youthful masculinity, may toy with a strong homoerotic 
subtext but in the blurring of gender boundaries we are confronted with the fact that 
much of our judgement on the roles ascribed to men and women are tied to 
preconceived notions rather than to subjective needs and motives. 
The essentialising rhetoric of gender polarisation becomes increasingly 
dangerous in The Merchant of Venice as Shylock attempts to recoup the losses made 
from both a broken bond and a ‘stolen’ daughter in a pound of human flesh. Indeed, 
comedy explores the theme of sex and money and the marketing of flesh, not just in 
prostitution but in marriage, as the evil which underlies early modern morality. In 
court, Shylock speaks of the necessity of freeing all slaves if flesh may not be owned, 
or the necessity of granting him the terms of his bond if it may. What the court 
attempts (and achieves) is a temporising hypocrisy for the purposes of this bond; flesh 
is not marketable, yet for slaves and women it will remain so. 
Natalie Zemon Davis traces the relation between husband and wife in 
Renaissance Europe as “especially useful for expressing the relation of all 
subordinates to their superiors”. She describes how: “in the little world of the family, 
with its conspicuous tension between intimacy and power, the larger matters of 
political and social order could find ready symbolisation”.246 As the case of Portia 
exemplifies “a lady richly left” (MoV, I.i.161) was still subject to the “will of a dead 
father”. (I.ii.25) As an emblem of wealth and status, a rich heiress was a valuable 
token in the libidinal economy of early modern patriarchy and from this perspective 
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love is merely a supplement to the financial security offered by a marriage 
transaction.   
Even in romance comedy where love is the theme, romantic relationships are  
explored from a social perspective. Tragedy may address the inner passions of lovers 
but comedy examines the institutions of courtship and marriage and their relationship 
to the social contract. For example, a tragic tale of love like Romeo and Juliet focuses 
on inner emotional desire, whereas comedies such as The Taming of the Shrew 
emphasise the economic aspects of marriage – specifically how economic 
considerations determine who marries whom. In this early Shakespearean comedy, the 
ageing merchant Baptista auctions his daughters off in “a desperate mart” (II.i.320) 
where the “greatest dower” (336) shall secure the youngest after the elder, less 
saleable girl has been ‘brokered’. Baptista’s daughters are denied the “disguise of 
love” (TGoV, V.iv.109) which so many of Shakespeare’s comic heroines are 
permitted. There are no cross-dressed escapades between clandestine lovers,247 
although “counterfeit supposes” (V.i.118) buy Bianca enough time to defy her father 
and marry Lucentio clandestinely.  
The irony of Petruchio’s test of wifely obedience in the final act insists that 
there is no escape from the socially defined role of woman unless it is through the 
temporary release afforded by subterfuge. It is all the more thrilling then that 
Katherina and Bianca may be denied the license of a festive disguise but still reveal an 
aptitude for the slight deceptions practised by those wilfully compliant daughters and 
wives that wait in the wings. As such, Katherine and Bianca can be celebrated as 
emblems of a submerged form of female anarchy: when they swear obedience we can 
                                                           
247 Although in the Induction Sly is made to believe that the page is his ‘wife’ there is nowhere a more 
protracted cross-dressing anywhere else in the Shakespeare canon. But my contention rests with the 
denial of cross-dressing possibilites to female characters subsumed by patriarchal forces. 
 
 168 
never be sure that they are speaking truthfully. There are however, numerous 
instances of male characters’ attempts to circumvent social expectations in both The 
Taming of the Shrew and other plays. In fact, a primary source of excitement in 
comedy stems from its permeable social boundaries, criss-crossed continually by 
those men who employ a disguise or a clever lie, particularly those suitors who plot an 
encounter with their beloved, where they will “have leave and leisure to make love to 
her,/ And unsuspected court her by herself”. (The Taming of the Shrew, I.ii.134-5)  
In the guise of educators these potential husbands will woo with “books of 
love” and compete like “adversaries of law”, (I.ii.274) but as Bianca proves, the  
object of their desire will gracefully receive their attentions while singling out the 
suitor she herself prefers. Portia mocks the Petrarchan wooer as a teller of “quaint 
lies” (MoV, III.ii.69) who would boast that women “fell sick and died” (71) when 
denied his love. Rosalind mocks the “quotidian of love” (AYLI, III.ii.357) that causes 
lovers to pine away as she knows along with every other comic heroine the true 
danger of desire. In this respect, the women in comedy are love’s tutors. They are the 
educators with a vested interest in a utopia that has yet to arrive, a utopia where 
woman’s desire is not the by-product of masculine fantasy.  
According to Catherine Belsey, the Renaissance view of sexual desire, or more 
historically ‘passion’, was of an intangible danger that would turn “women to 
whores”; “it renders men effeminate, incapable of manly pursuits; it threatens identity 
arousing fears that subjectivity itself is unstable”.248 Therefore, comedy presents a 
vision of marriage as a remedy, of both sexual and ideological deviations. Philosophy 
may seem foreign to concupiscence but perceptions of sexuality are underpinned by 
philosophical opinion as hedonism and stoicism wrestle interminably in the field of 
                                                           
248 Catherine Belsey. ‘Love in Venice’, Shakespeare Survey 44, ed. Stanley Wells, (Cambridge and 
New York, 1992), p.44 
 169 
ethics. Comedy attempts to teach the Humanist doctrine of marriage that the joining 
of minds is as important as the joining of bodies.  
 Byron’s claim that “comedy ends in marriage” leads us along as misleading a 
route as C.L.Barber’s distinction of comedy as “dramatic epithalamium”. Comedies 
rarely end either in a marriage or with the noisy lustrations of the marriage bed. 
Comedy appeals more to the genre of the prothalamion, as it turns upon the 
anticipation of marriage and all its attendant blessings, and although this trope is 
indeed epithalamic, the focus of comedy is forever on the reconciliation of opposites, 
on the drawing together of antagonistic elements in the hope of a new and prosperous 
future. As ever, marriage is about compromise and negotiation, from the start of the 
process to its completion. Tensions of identity and opposition are central to this 
relationship and as such it is subject to the same dichotomous pressures as any other 
hierarchical system. In the comedies of the early modern theatre men and women are 
represented who must negotiate a compromise between love and market forces, 
between pleasure and profit, heart and mind, ruler and subject. If we then agree that in 
the hands of cross-dressed comic heroines Renaissance Humanism was a tool for 
domesticating men does this negate the growing repressiveness of marriage? No, but 
in the fantastical denouements of comedy a utopian vision is made manifest. In this 
mythical and transitory place comedy propagates a hymeneal mirth that celebrates 
living on (possibly in the ‘happily ever after’) in a revitalised world where the 
stagnant ideologies of the old order are examined in the hope that they will be 
dispelled. 
 Now that we have examined the fears and anxieties of the patriarchal order as 
they are embodied within notions of sexuality and gender our focus must shift towards 
the strategies employed by dramatic comedy to interrogate these assumptions. This 
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chapter has been central to the argument that comedy mimics the dialectic of history 
by presenting antithetical positions in an attempt to reconcile them, and the tool for 
this management of crisis has been identified as marital union. This project is not 
unproblematic as marriage during this period was undergoing extensive changes with 
Humanist ideals dismantling notions of gender identity. Again, the antithesis between 
the gender divisions of male and female were being gradually eroded. The position of 
dramatic comedy in this movement leads the thesis towards an examination of 
marriage as a sacrificial ceremony where men and women renounce their individuality 
for the good of the community. The next chapter will examine the rite of the 
pharmakos as a dramatic re-enactment of individual sacrifice and the variety of ways 
it has been represented upon the early modern stage. 
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Chapter 4 
The Pharmakos 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
“Like the plague, theatre is a crisis 
 resolved either by death or cure.” 
    (Antonin Artaud)249 
 
 
Shakespeare’s comedies outline the pharmakos as defined by Frye as the 
“scapegoat”250 but also as expanded upon by Derrida to mean both remedy and 
poison. It is therefore appropriate to present an image of early modern society with its 
fears, anxieties and contingent desires displayed in theatrical spectacles which bear a 
stunning resemblance to purgatory rituals. This will lead us towards Artaud’s 
conflation of theatre and plague, as possessing a curious ‘viral’ quality which induces 
praise in the formation of “a superior disease because [there] is an absolute crisis after 
which there is nothing left except death or drastic purification”.251 This distinction 
will be elucidated as an obvious but crucial analogue to the dramatic genres of 
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comedy and tragedy themselves with their distinct methods of expurgating crisis and 
the construction of theatre as an institution capable of delivering restorative, if not 
propagandist, images.  
 
Tracing the Pharmakos 
 
Comedy sets in motion a narrative process in which diverse languages, logics, 
discourses and codes are, at one point or another, revealed to the audience as 
fictions.252 Essentially illusory in its depiction of life and constantly capable of 
disrupting the expected order, dramatic comedy may succeed in mimicking the role of 
ritual and its ability to avert crisis. We have already observed in the last two chapters 
the ritual of legal inference and marriage as harmonising ritual, that comes together in 
the representation of comedy. But it must also be noted that comedy is, inevitably, a 
chimerical universe where stereotypes of persecution or stereotypical crimes exist. It 
is noteworthy that comedy works in stereotypes, and none are more strenuously 
conveyed than that of the scapegoat. René Girard refers to the “scapegoat 
mechanism”253 as a systemic hatred inherent in and essential to the continuation of 
humanity, that is controlled to reconstitute the workings of force and hegemony. Thus, 
the mythology of persecution in the comedies is no simple ideation but a full system 
of representation where the mentality of the mob, carried on the tide of popular 
opinion, triggers the necessary mechanism of association without revealing that the 
entire process is fuelled by degraded superstition and naivety.  
Girard, locates the scapegoat in the recognition, or as he states, the “mis- 
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recognition”, of difference, as the system of differentiation used to threaten the  
relationship between the collective and the ‘victim’. His identification of the 
scapegoat as a ‘foreign body’, which troubles the centre with its presumed exteriority 
resides in the acknowledgement that “Difference that exists outside the system is 
terrifying because it reveals the truth of the system, its relativity, its fragility and its 
morality”.254 In apprehending the comic scapegoat as a dangerous supplement, it thus 
becomes necessary to anatomise comedy as an aesthetic form in which certain 
characters repeatedly “do the work of victimage or sacrifice”255 for societal accord. 
Naomi Conn Liebler evokes this analogy in relation to the hero of tragedy who draws 
“all the ambiguity and crisis present in the community”256 towards themselves in an 
attempt to avert some form of communal annihilation. This essentially prophylactic 
formula replicates, within the generic conventions of theatrical mimesis, what can 
only be termed as the pharmacological influence of the scapegoat or pharmakos: a 
figure of immense ambiguity in comic drama, as both the source of laughter and the 
cause for concern.  
If we take Girard’s conception of “persecution texts” as historical artefacts 
where the “face of the victim shows through the mask” as there are always ideological 
fissures or “cracks” in the perspective of the narrator (who is possibly also the 
persecutor), then in comic texts the mask is always still intact as “it covers the whole 
face so well that we have no idea it is a mask”.257 This is because the pharmakon of 
theatre, in mimicking ritual, is utilised as a combat zone between disorder and its  
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other, introducing characters brought to life upon the stage to simulate a certain type 
of enchanted reality where:  
Death, masks, make-up, all are part of the festival that subverts the order of the 
city, its smooth regulation by the dialectician and the science of being…258  
 
But behind the masks worn by the parasite or alazon of Tudor and Stuart comedy, we 
find the very persecutions that constitute the scapegoat mechanism, albeit containing 
certain mythic distortions or ‘comic’ transfigurations.  
In Derridean terms, the ritualistic component of comic drama is referred to as 
the rite of the pharmakos, a dramatically significant ritual which exploits ever 
increasing levels of mockery to purify the comic community of excessive or aberrant 
behaviour. The re-establishment of order is provisionally sought by both myth and 
comedy, but as the pharmakos in myth has its original counterpart in long forgotten 
classical antiquity, the existence of real victims behind the almost mythological comic 
texts of the Renaissance become compounded with dramatic simulacra who are 
regarded as little more than works of imagination. What has become imperceptibly 
submerged here is the fact that the pharmakon of theatre is “the locus, the support, 
and the executor” 259 in the creation of the pharmakos or scapegoat. It is the very 
instrument of remembrance that serves to underscore the nature of theatrical 
interpretations of ritual purification in a prophylaxis against the resurgence of 
infractions of the law and their spread throughout the immediate community.  
In both Tudor and Stuart comedy representative scapegoats are anatomised 
and dissected by the gaze of the audience and the tools of the critic as individuals 
destined to re-enact their pharmakographic roles by repeating symbolic versions of 
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ritualistic Dionysiac sacrifice. They are humiliated and torn to shreds, misrecognised 
and then reallocated subject positions as ‘untouchable’, impure and dangerously 
supplementary, by communities who have no other choice but to exorcise them. The 
theatrical tradition has advised us that we must not pity them, because they are 
mimetic simulacra, representatives of societal aberrations, braggarts, swaggarers, 
pomposity personified and mercy devalued. And as their ‘swinish’ appetites, moral 
and sexual deviations, and murderous vengefulness are all dissected in the theatrical 
pharmakon that is the process of communal remembrance, one’s expectation for 
conflict resolution will interminably be troubled by these non-assimilable foreign 
bodies at the very core of comedy. 
To nominate the location of the core of comedy is to presume that an adequate 
definition of the whole exists, a presumption taken to extremes by many of the 
structural accounts of a notoriously unstable and quixotic genre. It is nonetheless 
irrefutable that in its drive to delimit excessive or transgressive behaviour, comedy 
revolves around the parasitic, the alien or the dangerously supplementary, perpetually 
interrogating the presumed purity of the social interior. The impossibility of this 
plenitude reveals the scapegoat/parasite as a necessary complement, inhabiting a 
space within the comic community which in some instances may appear as sinister but 
invariably functions symbiotically.  
 
The Sacral Parasite 
 
The whole trajectory of the scapegoat’s career, self-expansive and self-destructive, 
continually transgressing the proprietary boundaries that distinguish the self from the 
other, the subject from the object, the speaker from the hearer, the mind from the 
body, a knave from a gull, marks this figure as possessing a subjectivity in transition. 
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As Victor Turner has argued, the instability of the transitory is viewed as dangerous 
and polluting to many societies. In his The Ritual Process: Structure and  
Anti-Structure, Turner describes the ritualistic role of “liminal personae” or “threshold 
people” who are necessarily multivalent and ambiguous. These “entities” represent 
the transitional, the ineluctably non-definable. Turner perceives them “as though they 
are being reduced or ground down to a uniform condition to be fashioned anew”260 in 
“a symbolic milieu that represented both a grave and a womb”.261 The structural 
dichotomy of liminality in diachronic transitions is evident in a number of 
Shakespearean comic texts: the “hoodwinking” of Parolles (All’s Well That Ends 
Well), and Malvolio (Twelfth Night); the trial of carnival with Falstaff as its surrogate 
in both The Henriad and the Merry Wives of Windsor; and the trial of Shylock in The 
Merchant of Venice. All reassert the dialectic which foregrounds the construction of 
culture and the tension inherent in the diametric universe of comedy. 
Fellow anthropologist Mary Douglas shares Turner’s assumption on the 
prevalent notion of “purity and danger” in the ritual process arguing that: 
that which cannot be classified in terms of traditional criteria of classification, 
or falls between classificatory boundaries, is almost everywhere regarded as 
“polluting” and “dangerous.”262 
 
Turner, however, views the liminality of the neophyte in purgatorial rituals as 
traversing “the passage from lower to higher status through a limbo of 
statuslessness”.263  His focus upon the ritual powers of the weak, reinforces the 
anthropological perspective that the very continuity of a group depends on various 
forms of ritual separation. The need to extinguish the contaminating effects of the 
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liminal are represented as the primary requirement for communally significant events 
to proceed, such as marriage after the rite of passage in courtship, or the expected  
parturition after conjugal union. 
 This goes a little way towards explaining the pervasiveness of particular 
themes in comedy relating to sex and marriage and the reason why they hold such a 
central position in this thesis. The regulation of desire and the drive towards 
procreation is contained by images of sexual continence with the cross-dressed wooer 
adhering closely to Turner’s definition of the pharmakeus as “the undifferentiated 
character of liminality is reflected by the discontinuance of sexual relations and the 
absence of marked sexual polarity”.264 Ambiguity and paradox signal social and 
political danger because “liminality, ambiguity, indeterminacy are all antithetic to the 
human desire for systems and structures”.265 This surfaces in a need to re-order 
society, to purify it of entropy, and as aberrations most commonly appear as sexual or 
libidinal, unruly appetitive desires must be hounded out. Hence, from the “sick 
desires” (AWEW, IV.ii.34) which poison Bertram’s mind against the worthy Helena, 
or the “very midsummer madness” (TN, III.iv.53) of Malvolio’s erotic fantasies 
concerning his employer (who sees from the outset that he is “sick of self-love”, 
[I.v.85]) to the symbolic castration and “dishorning” of Shylock and Falstaff, the 
scapegoat mechanism in comedy can be recognised as a sacrificial crisis which 
demands that “Ill-weav’d ambition” (IHIV, V.iv.87) is “shrunk” by the rite of the 
pharmakos. The ideological imperative of this form of comedy is contained in Henry 
IV’s exclamation: “we are all diseas’d/ And with our surfeiting and wanton hours/ 
Have brought ourselves into a burning fever”, (2 Henry IV, IV.i.54-6) a stance both 
profound and paradoxical in its connection to the value and idleness of theatrical 
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entertainment. This last but crucial point underscores the now familiar concept that 
the scapegoat may be from the outside but is also from within, a centripetal force to be 
reckoned with. 
 
Prophylaxis and Purgation 
 
The “sacrificial crisis” as defined by Girard, is a crisis of distinctions, a crisis 
affecting, or infecting the cultural order. The crisis that demands the rite of the 
pharmakos has been caused by the disappearance of presumably natural distinctions 
which have brought into focus the dissolution of regulations pertaining to the 
individual’s proper place in society. Thus, it is not only the dissipation of certain 
social mores but the dissolution of metaphysical plenitudes which can instigate a 
sacrificial crisis.266 After citing Girard’s discussion of the tragic protagonist as a 
pharmakos, with special attention paid to his claim that scapegoating requires an 
artificial or assigned differentiation (signalled by marginalisation, misrecognition, and 
demonisation) in order to permit the community to exact its violent penalties, Naomi 
Conn Liebler concedes that: 
It may or may not be in the nature of human communities to enact violent 
sacrifices of their designated doubles, but it is unarguably the practice of 
human communities to organize themselves hierarchically, and therefore 
politically.267  
 
And it is, indeed, politic to clear away the old order along with its advocates, before 
the community can begin to attempt to recuperate its losses and embark on a process 
of healing. For within both ritual proper and theatrical ritual, boundaries are inscribed 
recurrently, limits are constantly redrawn.  
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This is however not to say that theatre is synonymous with ritual. As Brecht 
wrote in his Little Organon for the Theatre “Theatre may be said to be derived from 
ritual, but that is only to say that it becomes theatre once the two have separated”.268 It 
would appear then that we have all but lost sight of drama as little more than a vehicle 
for moral instruction, but it has its origins in magical or religious rituals. We should 
recall how comedy sets out in adversity, or takes its departure from the realm of the 
tragic. This permits us to rediscover a festive perspective, a ritualistic imperative 
located in the capacity of the comic to reconstitute those socio-politically important 
rituals that have been avoided or breached by the tragic. The violation of social codes 
produces disastrous results, and in displaying the dual constitutive liminalities of 
drama, tragic and comic theatre enacted the early modern community’s material  
need for a remedial process of suturing or reconstituting both the moral and legal 
constitution. In this sense representational catharsis was, and to a large extent is, 
always being organised through communally significant events that function to 
redress or purify what has been contaminated.  
In citing Barbara Myerhoff’s analysis of rituals as “containers that shape and 
reveal the contours of a culture’s collective values”,269 Liebler contends that theatrical 
performance contains a ritual element which functions liminally or just below the 
surface of consciousness:   
Ritual in performance does not merely remind its audience/ participants of its 
significance as a purely intellectual or moral exercise; as a functioning 
component of the performance it transforms its agents and its auditors during 
the course of the performance in which it occurs, just as it would in a formal 
liturgical setting such as a Mass. 270  
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This conflation of ritual action with sacred ritual is a compelling one, as early modern 
city workers were invariably only able to attend the theatre on a Sunday. Indeed,  
theatre owners such as Philip Henslowe were careful to obey the ban on “interludes 
and plays on the Sabbath”, closing their doors on the only afternoon when the London 
citizenry were regularly free, but should have been preoccupied with more godly  
activities. As Leah S. Marcus points out, “Some of the most avid play scourgers 
condemned drama on account of its heathen origins and its association with Roman 
fertility rituals”,271 further underscoring how drama inhabited the early modern 
imagination so provocatively. 
In this sense, the secular and the sacred were being merged, but as Liebler 
affirms: 
Ritual action is not always sacred ritual; that is, it need not have specifically 
religious validity. It is a form of mimesis that belongs to all members of a 
community, not only to a priestly or ruling constituency, and is not only 
reserved for authorised occasions. Such action entails the mnemonic of 
something sacred, something upon which survival depends, whether spiritual, 
physical or communal.272  
 
As the early modern theatre attempted to legitimise its practices and disassociate itself 
from “the pantaloon, whore and zany” of street theatre,273 with its grossly over-
determined didacticism, the subversive elements of artisanal culture demanded 
holiday diversions. The inception of carnival in popular early modern culture was 
never a single, unitary discourse, but a symbolic system over which continuous 
struggle to wrest its meaning was waged by competing ideologies. Time and again we 
find comedy located on the threshold of revolutionary upheaval advocating curatives. 
This veritable pharmakon attempted to administer a cure to social foibles and provide 
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access to an authorised discourse by means of an aesthetic that was capable of 
producing ideologically acceptable endings, for a populace that both feared and 
desired social change. All this was enacted beneath the watchful gaze of a political 
order that was at times hegemonic but that also had access to a very a powerful and 
violent state apparatus. Within this context the pharmakon provides a cure but also in 
accordance with the logic Derrida articulates it demystifies the conditions under 
which that cure might be provided and hence offers a brief glimpse of an alternative. 
 
Mightier Than the Sword: Satirical Scalpels and Comic Scythes 
 
Bakhtin’s concept of ‘heteroglossia’ encapsulates the humour, common speech and 
vulgarity of the carnivalesque as “a rich cacophony of spontaneous, generative and 
profane linguistic performances”,274 what Chris Jenks refers to as “dialogics at its 
peak!”275 However, Bakhtin’s work on theatre as the popular expression of the people, 
with the power to subtly subvert ‘official’ authority, no longer serves to explain Tudor 
and Stuart comedy, since by the end of the sixteenth century, the stage had become a 
formalised “spectacle”, a money-making enterprise, not an expression of the folk-
culture. Despite its marginal, liminal status comedy is a commodity, written for an 
audience’s entertainment and thus greatly dependent on the audience’s taste and 
desire for enjoyment. Nevertheless, Bakhtin’s awareness of the element of violence in 
carnival and its filial relationship with comedy has been largely ignored by traditional 
literary criticism. The pharmakos in comedy is a carnivalesque figure dramatically 
constructed to fulfil society’s need for a scapegoat. 
The structuralist methodology from the middle of the last century may have  
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identified how integral the ritual aspect of drama is to a fuller understanding of the  
comic genre, but critics such as C.L. Barber’s sentimental depiction of comedy as a 
“civilised equivalent of the primitive rite”276 possesses a disturbing tendency for re-
evaluating potential aberrations and purging them from the social corpus, which  
enjoins the violence of scapegoating as somehow unimpeachable. This exemplifies  
how the structuralist project of turning festive disorder back towards an affirmation of  
metaphysical absolutes forestalls the competing interests of social groups. ‘Truth’, 
‘honour’, and ‘love’, are curiously intertwined with ‘vengeance’, and the volley of 
expletives and general abuse which rain down upon those ostracised pariahs of the 
comedies are mitigated by a humanistic piety which smiles benevolently at the re-
nomination of what are after all only “froth and scum”. (MWW, I.i.148)  
As Malcolm Evans pointedly states, proto-structuralists such as Barber and 
Northrop Frye inscribe “moral and aesthetic certainties as a meta-mythology which 
occupies a historical void”.277 The comedies may have been traditionally denounced 
as imaginary explorations of social equality, returning any sense of momentary 
solidarity as exactly that, fleeting. But, the scapegoat figures of these plays, exploited 
and scarred by victimisation, abusively referred to as the “cankers of a calm world”, 
(1 Henry IV, IV.ii.29) refuse to be continually marginalised or simply rendered 
innocuous. As Evans observes, 
This is not the froth to be blown off the top of the text but froth that sits at the 
bottom, problematizing any comic ‘spirit’ or essential meaning that the 
theological mode of criticism in quest of the Shakespearean logos might wish 
to recover…278 
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The scapegoat as the sediment that lies at the bottom of any comic text reconstitutes 
the notion that this non-essential addition to the comedy is in actuality what gives the 
drama form - a body - onto which what is grafted is not an animal soul but the original 
human condition, that of being out of joint, of abyss and excess.  
The act of violent imposition in which the comic scapegoat is imbricated, 
indicates the fundamental fantasy whereby comedy provides the co-ordinates for a 
presumably contingent situation into which the pharmakos becomes disoriented by a 
set of ever shifting social codes. Involvement in this world of comic hubris relies on 
audience and actors accepting the violence of the accidental, but the problem lies in 
the act of authentically choosing one’s way either on the individual or the collective 
level. For example, the figures of Shylock and Malvolio are shattered by their reversal 
of fortune as resolute individuals, while braggarts such as Falstaff and Parolles are 
‘swept along’ towards rehabilitation and reinstatement within the collective. Frye may 
claim that “[t]he tendency of comedy is to include as many people as possible in its 
final society: the blocking characters are more often reconciled or converted than 
simply repudiated”,279 but there have only been these two options made available, 
both under the threat of extermination or expulsion. However, the choice of 
anonymity or synonymity, singularity versus collectivity, dispersed as it is throughout 
the comedies as the choice to freely assume one’s imposed destiny, has less to do with 
alternative possibilities than the theological problematic of the existence of free-will 
in a deterministic universe, as the unbearable tension experienced through images of 
coercion and conformity illustrate. 
In 1962, Hugh Dalziel Duncan wrote: 
In great comedy, unconscious, hidden and suppressed conflict is brought to 
light. And if the dream is the guardian of sleep, comedy is the guardian of 
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reason in society because it makes possible confrontations of social 
disrelationships.280 
 
It may be true that comedy rejects mystery by vocalising the unspeakable in an effort 
to establish rational discourse, but in attacking the hierarchy by ridiculing those who 
place societal principles “beyond reason”281 comedy merely allows us a way to 
negotiate reason. There is no guarantee that meaning will not wander, a political 
position from one stance to another, a prejudice from one principle to another. We  
must not forget the early modern period was a time of intense surveillance and 
censorship - one which enacted that Foucauldian ‘government of shadows’- a place 
where the colloquialism ‘to stick one’s neck out’ bore the most mortal of 
connotations.  
Nevertheless comedy always appears to make allowances for multiple 
“reasons” or “truths” to coexist, which provides a possible rationale for the 
continuation of the comic scapegoat who is not killed, but reprieved. For critics such 
as Duncan comedy differs from tragedy in that it is deemed unnecessary to kill the 
clown “for he can mend his ways”,282 he can be rehabilitated, and his sacrifice is only 
symbolic after all. This stance goes on to ally itself to the notion that the end result of 
comic purification is open, rational discourse which yields enlightenment, by 
attempting to reduce social differences, not by eliminating them, but by bringing them 
to light in laughter, and thus making open communication possible.283 This analysis is 
a common one where comedy, instead of accepting rigid social laws, keeps 
“convictions about social means and ends open to reason”.284  
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“In comic absolution, we are forgiven our sins because they surely will not 
threaten the group once they become ‘understandable’ through open and free 
discussion”.285 This perspective on the interrelationship between the comic scapegoat 
and society proposes an idealistic form of didacticism during the process of comic 
purification: “If that the injuries be justly weigh’d/ That have on both sides pass’d”. 
(TN, V.i.354-5) But as we have the “balance here to weigh the flesh” (MV, IV.i.250-1) 
of the sacrificial victim, it becomes apparent that the weight of the world, in the sins 
of the community, have been placed upon them and it will be difficult to “entreat 
[them] to a peace”. (TN, V.i.366) After all, they have lost everything, they have been 
expelled from their own comic universe. 
As Artaud states “there can be no spectacle without an element of cruelty as 
the basis of every show”,286 which reminds us of comedy’s ability to undermine and 
destabilise existing structures, particularly through an important process of de-
mythification. This last point requires particular scrutiny as human culture is 
predisposed to the permanent concealment of its origins in collective violence, and 
comedy works under the auspices of carnival to seek out a suitable scapegoat, to bring 
them to the forefront of the collective imagination. Liebler has identified this 
pharmakos as “a victim of a very special kind,”287 and although we should avoid the 
“interpretive trap” of blaming the victim, it is irrefutable that the pharmakos has 
somehow worked towards this ambivalent position, doubling itself with the 
community, somehow ‘othering’ social order by railing against widely accepted 
beliefs. The search is over before it has begun, the victim was chosen at the very 
moment of the carnival’s inception. In fact, the scapegoat is very often the catalyst for  
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carnival, with their excessiveness, their transgressiveness, promoting their subject 
location as anomalous, polluting; a necessary sacrifice for the vindication of society. 
It is this shift from ‘poison’ to ‘cure’ and back again that accounts for the ambivalent 
status of the comic scapegoat. The figure is both a source of social critique and a 
projection of commercial anxieties; it generates a satiric perspective that serves to 
demystify social mores, even as it reaffirms a moral hierarchy, while at the same time 
it becomes the focus of violent outrage, as it is either expelled (as in tragedy) or 
folded back into the social order with the agency of the comic scythe of laughter. 
 
Theatrical Ritual (theatre as pharmakon) 
 
Artaud’s belief that theatre should “make us think” independently of social constraints 
anticipates that dramatic art will “lead the mind to assume deeply effective attitudes 
from its own point of view”.288 His desire to restore theatre to a religious, 
metaphysical position “to reconcile it with the universe”289 may demand that we 
differentiate art from aesthetics in order that we can “turn away from present-day 
theatre’s human, psychological meaning and rediscover a religious, mystical meaning 
our theatre has forgotten”.290 But it is not theatre which suffers from amnesia. Theatre 
functions as a mnemonic of the past as much as a window on our future. His analogy 
of theatre as a “plague”, a delirium-inducing virus “as beneficial as the plague”,291 
reflects a philosophical tradition traceable from Plato to Nietzsche that personifies 
                                                           
288 Artaud, op.cit., p.51 
289 ibid. 
290 ibid., p.35 
291 ibid., p.22 
 187 
dramatic art as “that sorceress expert in healing” capable of turning humanity’s “fits 
of nausea into imaginations with which it is possible to live”.292  
The anxious pleasures of desire occupy much Jacobean city comedy and the 
pre-emptive comedy of Shakespeare. In these satirical and comical plays, the trace of 
the pharmakos ritual, reveals one of the central concerns of the “complaint genre” as 
plays which satirically (conservatively) redress moral lack in society. This desire to 
repress disruptive forces, seen especially in Jacobean tracts such as Hic Mulier (1620)  
or Swetnam’s Araignment against lewde, idle, froward and unconstant women 
(1615), rests upon the formulation that all the “ills attendant” upon the body politic 
are “excess, abuses, or even subversions of the system”293 rather than inherent to the 
system. For a society based upon social status and on the maintenance of rank and 
degree, people acting other than in accordance with the demands of their natural state 
upset the normal and divinely ordained order of the universe. Obviously, as many  
critics have shown, the theatre did indeed threaten to erase or blur gender and class 
distinctions by its practice of using boys and male commoners to play women and 
kings; but Stubbes also insisted that in portraying wicked deeds, the theatre offered an 
immoral example for the audience to emulate. The concern that the theatre would 
infect the city with all manner of unwanted and unlicensed behaviour promoted the 
idea that theatrical entertainment was morally and politically subversive. 
 The theatre, of course, had its proponents as well as its critics. Thomas Nashe, 
in Pierce Penilesse (1592),294 suggests that the purpose of theatre is to contain 
“mutinies at home” by throwing the otherwise idle citizens “bones to gnaw upon”, in 
order that the state will not be troubled with “intermeddle[ers]”. In other words, the 
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stage is a necessary diversion to keep people from worse mischief, such as “felony or 
treason”. Thus while Stubbes and his like condemned the theatre for its content, 
accusing it of spreading corruption and immorality,295 Nashe saw dramatic art as “the 
sour pills of reprehension, wrapped in sweet words”.296  
In practising imitation dramatic poets of the Renaissance were accused of  
corrupting minds, of encouraging transgressive behaviour across the social hierarchy. 
Within the liminal space of the theatre, an institutional force which disregarded 
physical boundaries as much as it appeared to corrupt societal ones, this perspective 
on the technique of imitation, and the production of the simulacrum is described by 
Derrida as having “always been in Plato’s eyes manifestly magical, 
thaumaturgical.”297 So it would seem that this magical art of imitation contains a 
pharmaceutical force, an element that confuses the senses, like a drug, or a virus. The 
antidote has always been the episteme, an awareness of reality, an ontological 
counter-poison used to oppose the delirium-inducing effects of this dramatic art. Thus 
Derrida compounds the “chain of signification” from pharmakon, through the 
ceremony of the pharmakos to the figure of the pharmakeus, as the “wizard, 
magician, or poisoner” capable of instigating the ritual of purification demanded by 
some specific breaching of social codes. Pharmakon may mean to colour or to paint 
but its etymology is also applicable to the drugs of sorcerers and doctors.298  
Derrida’s depiction of the rite of the pharmakos as a way of purging entropy 
from society reinforces the pharmacological imperative of art, which is both socially  
                                                           
295 Associating all revels with the contagion of rebellion, the authorities were instinctively sure that 
riotous “apprentices and servants drew their infection” from the playhouses where the people also 
caught the plague; but as Thomas Nashe insisted, this analogy was a kind of category error, which 
miscalculated the new theatres’ social role. 
296 Nashe, op. cit., p.14 
297Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’,  p.136 
298 ibid., p.137 
 189 
disruptive and ameliorative via the process of theatrical mimesis. The illusory aspect 
of art, its desire to imitate what is essentially real leads us along a labyrinthian route 
where “concealed doorways that shine like mirrors”299 promise an epistemic clarity 
which can never be truly apprehended, because in its “silence” dramatic literature 
denatures the very thing it imitates. Mimicking voice, miming reality, drama is mute 
to interrogation: propelling the audience into a realm of rhetoric and metaphor. 
Thankfully, the ontological nihilism of this perspective is rescued by the Derridean  
admission that although the pharmakon may have a narcoticising effect, an uncanny 
ability to estrange one from reality, there is an antidote. This counter-poison is not 
only to be found in the “knowledge of the real nature of things”,300 although an 
awareness of the ‘actual’ does purge the mind of delusion; the communal process of 
remembrance or anamnesiac dialectics negotiates previously charted but seldom 
traversed ethical and moral regions.  
The prodigal plot of The Henriad administers a prophylactic for societal and 
moral deviance in Prince Hal’s strategy to distance and decontaminate himself from 
the dubious legitimacy of his father’s accession. The image of an afflicted social body  
with “rank diseases” that “grow, / And with what danger, near the heart” of a 
corrupted kingdom (2 Henry IV, III.i.39-40) demands a ritual of purification to restore 
equilibrium. Warwick opens the pharmakon of anamnesiac dialectics as one would a 
medicinal cabinet saying: “It is but as a body yet distempered; / Which to his former 
strength may be restored / With good advice and little medicine”. (2 Henry IV, 41-3)  
As such, a recognition of the difference between reality and mimesis becomes  
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a tautologous device where one pharmaceutical force is employed to counter another.  
This expulsion and sacrifice is: 
the cure by logos, exorcism, and catharsis [which] will thus eliminate the 
excess [of the dangerous supplement]. But this elimination, being therapeutic 
in nature, must call upon the very thing it is expelling, the very surplus it is 
putting out. The pharmaceutical operation must therefore exclude itself from 
itself.301   
 
The pharmaceutical separation of dialectics, of philosophy must thus be used to 
counteract the pharmakon of the dangerous supplement. It is down to the pharmakeus  
of dramatic mimesis to permit access to the pharmacy of stored memories which 
provide the only real remedial deliverance from humanity’s “intestinal organisation of 
self-complacency”.302  
This paradoxical figure offers the theatre audience the good remedy of 
remembrance in the form of anamnesiac dialectics. In the pharmakon of theatre the 
playwright may be instantly recognisable as the pharmakeus, as actors are moulded 
into human representations. There is always one of ‘his’ creations however, who  
mimics the technique of sleight-of-hand, like a distended surrogate illusionist. This 
figure wears the mask of the initiate, setting in motion the rite of the pharmakos, able 
to set “the dish o’ poison” (TN, II.v.104) for the sacrificial victim, to “stand for  
sacrifice” (MoV ) when all hope of compromise seems lost, to administer “sweet 
physic” (AWEW ) to the diseased body politic, or indeed, to “turn diseases to 
commodities” (2 Henry IV, I.iii.233) in times of social unrest. 
Liebler invokes the similarity between the dramatic genres of comedy and 
tragedy as essentially “festive” forms because they are dialectical genres which 
“celebrate” by “reconstructing, re-membering what is lost”.303 Above all, in the words 
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of Artaud, the demand that theatre should be “as beneficial as the plague impelling us 
to see ourselves as we are, making the masks fall and divulging our world’s lies, 
aimlessness, meanness, and even two-facedness”304 registers the benefits of the 
charmed space of the stage as possessing an invaluable remedial function.  
This “good remedy”, which is beneficial to the entire community,  
reveals itself as the “Socratic irony”305 of self-knowledge and self-mastery, dependent 
upon the expulsion of what is revealed as a supplement: the surrogate made 
pharmakos or scapegoat by the people, for the people, as the symbol of their excess. 
Pushed to the outside the supplement is railed against as “inessential yet harmful to 
the essence, a surplus that ought never to have come to be added to the untouched 
plenitude of the inside”,306 and it is to the ideological imperative of this 
“pharmakographic aggression”, that we now turn. 
 
Dissecting Deviance 
 
According to Jonathan Sawday, the human body as the microcosmic terrain of God 
the creator’s macrocosmic universe represented more than a pious platitude within the 
early modern imagination: 
The defeat of sickness and the establishment of political order were two sides 
of the same coin. A state in rebellion was a body in sickness. The diseased 
body was an image of rebellion. These images were not merely metaphors, but 
statements of a self-evident truth which structured the individual’s experience 
of illness and health.307 
 
In both the commercial theatre and the anatomical theatre a drama of life and death 
was being enacted, whereby the “urge to particularize” led to the perception of 
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Renaissance culture as a “culture of dissection”.308 The unrivalled fascination with the 
body as an ever present source of tropes, metaphors, similes and figurative twists 
invests much comedy with the language of partition and by association within a 
punitive framework of public dissection as penal punishment. This may have resulted 
in certain similarities becoming manifest in both modes of performance although  
the anatomisation of living bodies upon the stage and the testing of their pained 
reactions more often resembles a perverted sort of psycho-dynamic vivisection. 
In the literary sphere, dissection and anatomisation have come to be associated 
with satire, with the intrusive, and often destructive impulse of comedy to make 
incision into phallogocentric structures, overwhelming the narrative process. Probing  
the machinations of power, either to render them impotent or to cauterise those  
ignominious flows of energy generated by ignorance and fear, the scalpel of satire 
may often slice into the social body with scientific precision. And yet, in what 
Sawday refers to as the “macabre theatre of punishment”309 that was the “theatricum 
anatomicorum”, the spectacle of penal dissection was rooted in the fascination with 
theatrical performance as a mode of production where knowledge could be easily 
transferred from one domain to another. Contrapuntally, in the accumulative force of  
the rite of the pharmakos (enacted as it was upon the comic stage) we witness an 
intrinsic violence (the fundamental violence of a dismemberment) which tears the 
natural continuity of experience apart, and although the interrogative aggression of 
comedy begins by reaffirming metaphysical certainties there is invariably the resultant 
symbolic anatomization of the body politic. 
The wooden operating theatre of London’s St. Thomas’s Hospital survives as  
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the celebrated arena where the human body was cut and divided into diseased and 
healthy parts. The “Wooden O” of its neighbour, the Globe theatre, which must have 
resembled it in design so much, operated in analogous ways on the body politic to 
divide and control the visceral language of carnival, separating out productive revelry 
(or art) from the idleness and infection of rebellion. Aesthetically dramatic 
humiliation rituals were appropriated from the realm of rough justice and mob 
punishment and through theatrical spectacle became a way of celebrating what has 
been termed as the ceremony of the pharmakos. As has been already discussed, 
through the elaboration of stereotype which sustains comedy, a symbolic 
dismemberment occurs whereby a character is anatomised, dissected, and eventually 
offered up as a surrogate for society, as an individual scapegoat for the ‘sins’ of the 
collective. However, as the symbol of excess, it is imperative that we ascertain 
precisely how the scapegoat is constituted by the ritual of the pharmakos, constructed 
as that Kantian ‘diabolical evil’,310 plunged into the Hegelian ‘night of the world’311 
only to be immediately and vicariously recuperated by a ritualistic project which 
demands ‘domestication’, ‘gentrification’ and ‘normalization’ of whatever exceeds or 
transgresses social boundaries.  
There is, of course, a co-dependency enacted between the ‘monstrosity’ of the 
scapegoat, and the ‘beauty’, or the plenitude, of the communal order. The monstrous, 
or rather the uncanny rite of the pharmakos - as the source of that which Freud 
described as ‘unheimlich’,312 which for Descartes, was the remnant of a deviant 
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‘will’313 - is highly visible as the locus of the grotesque grounded in an abyssal 
decision to demonise, to perform an act of violent imposition wherein the originary 
violence at the foundation of society is momentarily exposed prior to its definitive 
occlusion. As the supplement at the source, the pharmakos has been added and 
attached like a literal parasite, feeding on the nourishment of the community, and as 
such: 
The purity of the inside can then only be restored if the charges are brought 
home against exteriority as supplement, inessential yet harmful to the essence, 
a surplus that ought never to have come to be added to the untouched 
plenitude of the inside. 314  
 
The ‘outside’ must therefore be put back in its place, it must be returned to that which 
it should never have ceased to be: “an accessory, an accident, an excess”.315 However, 
in the imitation of men and manners, the presumed ethics of comedy, the ethical law  
for being-in-the comic world reveals itself as empty as it is sublime, precisely as it 
pertains to such primordially repressed displays of humanity thrown into the mise en 
abîme, of what Hegel termed the ‘night of the world’.  
In Hegel’s brief description of the terrible power of imagination as negative, 
disruptive and discombobulatory, traces of Lacan’s psycho-dynamic ‘dismembered 
body’316 [le corps morcelé] can be perceived as the phantasmagorical, unreal, 
nightmarish universe into which the scapegoat finds itself thrown. Forced through 
iniquity towards a maddening loss of identity, the movement from natural to symbolic 
surroundings initiates a withdrawal-into-self, a withdrawal from the actual world. 
What Hegel determines madness as the closing of the soul into itself is exemplified by 
Shylock’s ‘contraction’ in his turning away from the violent synthetic imposition of 
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the new order of Belmont, in his silence at the iniquity of his conversion to 
Christianity. That Shylock was somehow predestined by the text to experience this 
‘infinite lack of being’ is also found at the core of Hegel’s concept of madness where 
this type of withdrawal from external reality is conceived as a ‘regression’ to the level 
of the ‘animal soul’ towards a spiritual abyss.  
 
Dis-membering the Past 
 
Poets and playwrights throughout history may have been denounced as “charlatans 
and thaumaturges,”317 as “species of the genus – pharmakeus,” both magicians and 
poisoners, as masters of illusion and equivocation, imitators and dissemblers. But the 
ambiguous goal of the pharmakon of theatre is ever to purify through symbol and 
analogy, through driving the pharmakos or scapegoat out as “the human symbol that 
concentrates our fears and hates”.318 Frye notes that “playing at human sacrifice seems 
to be an important theme of ironic comedy”319 but falls short of Girard’s formulation 
of humanity’s endemic need to victimise or identify scapegoats as a form of psychic 
cleansing. 
Historically, the dismembering and reunification of Dionysus is the cosmic 
myth of eternal renewal. And as culture is dismembered, the notion of a sacrificial 
crisis comes into being, bringing with it the dissipation of the psychological illusion 
of metaphysical certainty. Comic scapegoats are not hounded to their deaths; they 
may be violently expelled, or forcefully reintegrated but their reformation is generally 
assured by the comic form of what can now be explored as a mutation of the 
Dionysian ritual. 
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Jan Kott observes in The Eating of the Gods, or The Bacchae that, 
 
the significance of the scapegoat inheres less in its broad social symbolism 
than in the expression of a Dionysian divine frenzy, sparagmos (tearing flesh) 
and omophagia (eating raw flesh), in the human.320  
 
The sacral offering in the Dionysian myth, in all its narrative variations, culminates in 
a frenzied attack, a divine loss of (self) consciousness, where the assembled initiates 
become dehumanised, tearing the ritual victim to pieces (sparagmos), and consuming 
their raw flesh (omophagia). It may be generally assumed that comedy does not find it 
necessary to literally annihilate the parasitic, although it should be noted that in 
certain comedies, the scapegoat skirts the border between symbolic and actual 
execution.  
In The Henriad, the unrepentant Falstaff jests his way towards a  
rejection which will quite literally see him dead and buried, unaware that he is the 
object of the hunt. “Embowell’d! If thou embowel me to-day, I’ll give you leave to 
powder me and eat me tomorrow”, (1 Henry IV, V.iv.111-20) he blusters, determined 
to live another day, selectively defective in taking note of the number of times he is 
referred to as a deer, or a buck, targeted for extinction. Unfortunately for Falstaff, by 
the beginning of Henry V (II.i.85) the King does eventually kill him in banishing him 
from his affections, but not before he has “anatomized his company” (AWEW, 
IV.iii.32) as a mock-king, a scapegoat, and a pariah. Falstaff is handled with similar 
insensitivity in The Merry Wives of Windsor, where he stumbles blindly into yet 
another trap. 
The “public sport” (The Merry Wives of Windsor, IV.iv.14) which the merry  
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wives of Windsor improvise to exorcise Sir John is clearly based on, made up of, 
vestiges from ancient rituals whose original meanings have corroded with time. 
Falstaff is to come to Herne’s oak at night “disguised like Herne, with huge horns on 
his head”. (IV.iv.44) Children, dressed as fairies, will then “pinch him sound, and 
burn him with their tapers”. (IV.iv.61-2) Fairies had not, for Shakespeare, quite lost 
their association with the triple Hecate, but for the merry wives they have already 
declined into the gossamer creatures of children’s stories. The pinching may be a dim 
memory of the hunter god, torn apart by his hounds. It may also remind us of the 
pinching of Caliban by sprites in the later play The Tempest, or of the possibility of an  
ancient race, worshippers of the horned god321, who would have burned his effigy to 
death, not as an act of moral cleansing, but as a guarantee of his rebirth the following 
year rejuvenated and revitalised in order to resume his role as fertility god. This is the 
opposite of Mistress Page who, intending to “dishorn the spirit”, (IV.iv.64) expects a 
symbolic castration to result from these fictive pagan rites. 
These pagan rites are in evidence in The Merry Wives of Windsor, not in the 
woods near the Athens of antiquity, but in the Windsor Forest close to a community 
of solid bourgeois Elizabethan citizens. Within this shallow materialistic world, 
Falstaff comes to seem a representative, however degraded, of the pre-Christian 
horned god of the chase, Herne the Hunter. His association with this fertility god, 
positions him as a scapegoat to be persecuted by the sexually puritanical: “This is 
enough to be the decay of lust and late-walking through the realm”. (V.v.137-8) He 
invokes, at the climax, “omnipotent love”, “that in some respects makes a beast a 
                                                           
321 The horned god is a modern syncretic term used amongst Wiccan-influenced Neo-pagans, which 
unites numerous male nature gods out of such widely dispersed and historically unconnected 
mythologies as the Celtic Cernunnos, the Welsh Caerwiden, the English Herne the Hunter, the Hindu 
Pashupati, the Greek Pan and the satyrs. For a further insight into the evolution of the ‘horned god’ see 
Nigel Jackson, Masks of Misrule: The Horned God and His Cult in Europe, (London, 2001). 
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man; in some other, a man a beast”. (IV.v.5-6) He has indeed become a beast, “a 
Windsor stag, and the fattest, I think, t’th’forest”, (V.v.12-3) but simultaneously a god 
shape-shifting for love: “When gods have hot backs, what shall poor men do?” (10-
11) Nevertheless, however frank his sexuality (“My doe with the black scut”[16]), it is 
preferable to the puritanical violence in which Parson Evans schools the children: 
 Fie on sinful fantasy, 
 Fie on lust and luxury!… 
 Pinch him, and burn him, and turn him about, 
 Till candles and starlight and moonshine be out.  
(91-2 & 99-100) 
 
Had Evans the power of Prospero and real hobgoblins at his disposal, Falstaff would  
no doubt have been as tormented as Caliban. 
Falstaff, may momentarily represent the scapegoat genus in its entirety, like 
the green girdle in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, as precisely that which cannot 
be expelled from a full and balanced life. “Banish plump Jack and banish all the 
world”, he had said to Prince Hal, (1HIV, II.iv.462) in Shakespeare’s second 
tetralogy, but in The Merry Wives of Windsor, this being a comedy, he is not banished, 
and the union of Anne and Fenton under Herne’s oak vindicates him. He may have 
been cast in the role of a victim pinched and ridiculed by all around him but Falstaff’s 
rehabilitation is engendered by the comedy. The distinction between love and its 
lustful excess dissolves in laughter, and he is welcomed back into the community: 
  
Master Fenton, 
Heaven give you many, many merry days! 
Good husband, let us every one go home,  
And laugh this sport o’er by a country fire; 
Sir John and all.   
(V.v.226-30) 
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At this point, the comedy appears to induce a form of short-term memory loss, with 
the demand for a peaceful resolution disinfecting the previous actions of “this greasy 
knight”. (II.i.105)  
Falstaff has been seen by the whole community as a threat to the order on 
which it depends, as the embodiment of riot, vice, in particular the deadly sin of 
lechery, and in spite of the comic context, the words that are used of him – 
“corrupted”, “tainted”, “unclean” – are very strong. He is the old Adam (Henry V, 
I.i.29) to be castigated and cast out; he is, almost, the very devil himself, as he falls 
into the process of demonisation enacted by comedy. The demonic face of the 
scapegoat pushes out against the verbal denigration through excessive linguistic 
aggression and profanation. Re-nominated as “cur”, “fiend” and “inhuman wretch”, 
the scapegoat’s dehumanising metamorphosis is impelled through increasingly 
outlandish insults towards the termination of its ‘comic’ discourse of victimisation 
and the complete cessation of autonomous subjectivity. 
 
The Scapegoat’s Agony 
 
As the supplement at the source, the scapegoat acts as a conductor for the many 
switches in identity and subject positioning which abound in the comedies. The 
liminality of these figures permeates the entire comic infrastructure, destabilising each 
individual member of the community. Falstaff parallels Hal, as the mock King who 
would corrupt “the great body of our state”, (2 Henry IV, V.ii.136) in his role as “the 
tutor and the feeder of [our] riots”. (V.v.63) In a permanent state of carnival excess 
and civil misrule, Falstaff is also described in Henry V as “fruit of baser quality” 
(I.i.62) who “obscur’d” the Prince’s “contemplation / Under the veil of wildness”. 
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(63-4) This ‘doubling’ of the scapegoat with a social superior is reiterated in All’s 
Well That Ends Well where the unwilling manservant Parolles is accused of poisoning 
the mind of another “foolish idle boy”, (IV.iii.199) the willingly transgressive 
Bertram, Count of Rousillon. The inferior is scapegoated for the superior’s injustices, 
and although Parolles is undoubtedly “full of wickedness” (III.ii.85) in his duplicitous 
and dishonest dealings, there must be an involuntary pang of sympathy for him when 
he recognises his fate as “a man whom Fortune hath cruelly scratch’d”. (V.ii.28)  
The scapegoat of Twelfth Night, that ambivalent and anti-comic gull Malvolio 
fleetingly perceives life as “…Fortune; all is Fortune”, (II.v.22) but like Parolles, he 
falls into the “unclean fishpond of Fortune’s displeasure” and as he says, “is muddied 
withal”. (AWEW, V.ii.18-9) Malvolio, however, like the love-sick Duke whom he 
comically replicates, is pursued by his desires “like fell and cruel hounds” (I.i.22) to 
the point of such an excess of misplaced eroticism that his “appetite may sicken and 
die”. (I.i.2) This re-enactment of sparagmos in the comedies is also resurrected in one 
of the most infamous comedies of victimage, The Merchant of Venice, where the act 
of omophagia is averted by the symbolic castration of Shylock the Jew. Shylock may 
share with Beatrice from Much Ado About Nothing the desire to “eat [the] heart [of his 
enemy] in the marketplace”, (IV.i.303-4) and as such displays an ancient rite of 
vengeance in his demands. But the unnerving nomination of a pound of flesh “to be 
cut off and taken / In what part of your body pleaseth me” (MoV, I.iii.145-6) instils in 
this comedy a lingering terror of the bestial in man, of the pre-ontic carnivore. 
Shylock also acts as a displacement for the iniquities of the rather unscrupulous 
merchants of Venice but as an eternal outsider, his residency in the Jewish world of 
tragic aspect, reveals a legacy of displacement sewn into the very fabric of society.                                                               
 The illusion of benevolence projected by the Law dazzles Shylock, causing 
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him not only to slide between social positions in his role as the moneylender of 
Venice, but also forcing him to act out a generic slippage between a definition of 
either the comic or the tragic scapegoat. He convinces himself that the Christian laws 
of Venice will deliver him the penalty and forfeit of his bond, and yet becomes 
transposed into the role of a “tainted wether of the flock,” (IV.i.114) the “inhuman 
wretch” (4) who will “stand for sacrifice” (III.ii.57) in what the Venetian backslappers 
have commandeered as their “merry sport.” (I.iii.140) The anti-semitism of this play 
has a certain character; beginning with anodyne symptoms it is taken as a common 
cold only later to erupt as a deadly disease. In the court-room scene, venom and vitriol 
threaten to engulf those present until the farcically illegitimate prosecution enacts the 
de-legitimisation of Shylock who is standing in the dock as the representative of the 
whole tribe of Israel. The scapegoat mechanism may enact a purgatorial 
pharmacology but the endemic barbarity of its victim standing up for justice, only to 
be put down for sacrifice, is a difficult pill to swallow once the sugar coating of 
humour has been removed.322 
That carnivalesque language belies the immanence of death functions through 
what Frye has so smoothly categorised as the ‘comic process’;323 with the revellers in 
these comic rituals alluding to festivity, but indulging in crueller strains of correction 
the more definite the need to defer death becomes. We have already ascertained the 
abusive elements that characterise carnival, and nowhere is this more evident in 
Shylock’s trial of mercy devalued. The sense of excitement and the reversal of fortune 
which precedes it sees his enforced conversion resurrect him from the symbolic grave 
the Venetians would have laid him in. Unlike, Falstaff and Parolles, those “braggart 
soldiers” who scrabble about to save their skins by putting themselves at their 
                                                           
322 Of course, it is unlikely that an Elizabethan audience would have felt this way. 
323 Frye, op. cit., p.43 
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“Majesty’s command”, (AWEW, V.iii.248) knowing that they are “safest in shame”, 
(IV.iv.315) safest when nearer to laughter than slaughter, Shylock cannot find his 
bearings, he does not know which way to turn, other than inwards. His world has been 
turned completely upside down and now to receive mercy free and gratis devalues the 
statutes of Venice, just as Antonio had devalued the city’s “rate of usance”, (I.iii.40) 
and consequently Shylock’s position as a moneylender. No longer is the “wealthy 
Hebrew”, (I.iii.52) able to lend or borrow money “to supply the ripe wants” (58) of 
the Venetians. Money is power, and the ascendancy of such power must be retained 
by the ruling hierarchy, at whatever cost. However, the traditional corrective virtues 
of this travesty may reinforce hegemonic values, but as Shylock’s trial exemplifies, 
this remedy resembles more closely a virulent disease, a plague of dishonesty and 
misapprehension. 
Shylock is formulated as a grotesque abomination, a polluting anomaly, to be 
exorcised, lest the entire state be contaminated. It is left in the hands of the 
pharmakeus Portia to show that a “plea so tainted and corrupt” as Shylock’s can be 
safely reversed, with only the conditional “seasoning” of “a gracious voice”. The 
performance of the rite of the pharmakos “obscures the show of evil” (III.ii.74-6) that 
such a ritual of humiliation enacts. The pharmakeus becomes a conductor through 
whom the power of comedy is transmitted, but as Girard states, in the proper 
performance of ritual purification, the danger of a sort of “cosmic rebound” is great, 
as violence tends to strike “the very beings who sought the protection of sacrificial 
rites”.324 
In Twelfth Night Maria may “taunt” Malvolio “with the license of ink”, (TN, 
III.ii.39-40) and win the admiration of the revellers of Illyria with her “common 
                                                           
 
324Girard, op.cit., p.280 
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recreation” (II.iii.127) but she also loses control of the comedy over which she 
attempted to preside. Malvolio is not only mortified; metaphorically he is also 
mortally assaulted, killed and buried. He is gulled “into a nayword” as a direct rebuke 
to his aspirations of social-climbing, but as Maria gloats “I have dogg’d him, like his 
murderer”, (III.ii.71) an anamorphic distortion is introduced into the spectatorial and 
performative space. Visions of aesthetic oscillations between the comic and the tragic, 
the religious and the mimetic, the ritual and the dramatic are herein contained. We are 
left with memory traces of an originary violence, an unnerving foundational brutality, 
concealed imperceptibly beneath the aesthetics of form. 
 
 
The Pharmakeus 
 
Curiously, images of the cult of Dionysus are filled with women driven to madness 
and anger, and throughout the comedies, female characters appear to be instrumental 
in implementing the rite of the pharmakos. In keeping with the myth of Acteon, 
Bertram attempts to violate the goddess’s namesake, Diana, and is “crush’d with a 
plot”, (AWEW, IV.iii.302) namely a “bed-trick” wherein the object of his desires is 
substituted by the one who desires him. Although the initial dismemberment occurs 
when he “sees his company anatomiz’d”, (IV.iii.32) it is the pharmakeus of Helena 
who, like Portia devises a plot which interrogates “wicked meaning in a lawful deed”. 
(MoV, III.vii.43) This “poor physician’s daughter” (AWEW, II.iii.113) stands at the 
margins of the aristocracy, looking in at a world from which she is peremptorily 
excluded. She endeavours to prove to herself that “Our remedies oft in ourselves do 
lie” (I.i.201) and strives to procure herself a husband by her own wit and her 
knowledge of healing. But the husband she desires is Bertram, the arrogant and 
snobbish young Count, now the head of the household in which she grew up, a vain 
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young man who harbours a destructive class-consciousness whereby the “difference 
betwixt their two estates” (I.iii.104) forestalls his love for her. Because of this deeply 
ingrained bigotry in the one she chooses to love, Helena enters a dangerous and 
uncertain game of deceit and duplicity, striving to gain love and respect whilst 
rectifying the breech of social harmony evinced by the headstrong youth of this play. 
“To show the merit that did miss her love” (I.i.213) Helena transforms herself into a 
kind of pharmakeus, a “magician, wizard and poisoner”, helpful because she is 
paradoxically harmful, a force of order because she creates disorder.325  
Driven by grief, fuelled by self-immolation, she bears scant resemblance to 
Shakespeare’s inventory of inventive and quick-witted heroines, aligned more with 
the chaste Isabella, or the wronged queen Hermione. Her “ambitious love” (I.i.84) 
forces her into an undeniably “idolatrous fancy” (91) whereby she “sanctifies” her 
husband. Helena may, like Portia, “stand for sacrifice” but hers is the self-sacrifice of 
the utterly devoted and as such defines her femininity as a form of benign passivity. 
Her disquisition on servitude to “[her] master, [her] dear Lord” (I.iii.149) the Count 
Rousillon, reads like a nun’s abasement before God. “I his servant live, and will his 
vassal die” (150) entombs her subjectivity in religious Puritanism, sending her out on 
an improbable quest in the guise of a pilgrim.  
In taking full responsibility for her husband’s transgression she expels herself 
from society, longing for death in her imitation of it: 
 I will be gone. 
My being here it is that holds thee hence. 
Shall I stay here to do’t? No, no, although 
The air of paradise did fan the house, 
And angels offic’d all. I will be gone,  
That pitiful rumour may report my flight 
To consolate thine ear. Come night; end day. 
For with the dark, poor thief, I’ll steal away. 
                                                           
325 ibid., p.84 
 205 
   (III.iii.121-7) 
 
“And though I kill him not, I am the cause / His death was so effected”, (III.ii.114-5) 
denotes banishment as the subject’s death in law, rather than the military retreat of 
one of the “blowers up and underminers of virginity” (I.i.121 & 120) which she had 
earlier descried.  
Helena refuses to perceive Bertram’s self-imposed exile as a dream of vain-
glorious war, and reveals the impact of her belief that she has merely reinforced his 
conviction that “A young man married is a man that’s marr’d”. (II.iii.291) From 
marking her man to stalking him stealthily, Helena displays a myriad of ambivalent 
paradoxes, both in her presentation of chaste and obedient femininity and her many 
representations of unwavering tenacity. She treads a different path from the 
mischievous Maria, and yet, the similarities exist as the “gift of a grave” also becomes 
synonymous with the gift of a womb in a biological economy which conflates images 
of confinement at both the beginning and the end of life. Images of life and death and 
womb and tomb are so compounded that with the mention of either term, one cannot 
help summon the other into consciousness. As such, Bertram may hoodwink Parolles 
in the symbolic grave scene, but Helena equally hoodwinks him in the bed-trick 
scene.  
A woman’s wiles may enforce her will upon the men she wishes to control, 
but nowhere is this trope utilised to such devastating effects as in Twelfth Night.  
The cruelty at the core of one of Shakespeare’s most enduring romantic comedies 
begins when the housekeeper Maria sets about ‘exploding’ the pomposity of the 
overstuffed Malvolio. She is not only cajoled by Sir Toby as “thou most excellent 
devil of wit”, (II.v.184) but actively indulges him in her curious but obviously 
effective form of flirtation. She has every faith that her “physic will work”, (II.iii.161) 
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both in providing a humorous tonic for Sir Toby, who desires that she “possess” him 
(II.iii.130), and as a nasty purge for their nemesis, the puritanical steward. But like her 
dramatic creator, she is absent as her little “device” (II.iv.9) unfolds, re-appearing 
only to surmise if her ministrations have taken effect, with “does it work upon him?” 
(II.iv.175), concealing the supreme confidence she expressed at the outset of this 
“jest”. Her declaration that he is successfully “possess’d” (III.iv.9) seems driven on by 
an almost impish malice, if not demonic frenzy, as she accelerates the onset of an 
invented insanity, saying to others that he is surely “tainted in’s wits” (13) as he 
wholeheartedly embraces the carnival spirit that she has initiated.  
Maria’s role as the overseer of festivity, as its housekeeper so to speak, and as 
false matchmaker, makes her accusations all the more cruel and confrontational. 
“Why appear you with this ridiculous boldness before my lady?” (III.iv.36-7) she 
demands of the romantically misled Malvolio before elaborating on his presumed 
bedevilment. While, “Lo, how hollow the fiend speaks within him!”, (85) is 
announced with consummate glee even as the comedy starts to slide out of control 
towards his sadistic incarceration, where they will “have him in a dark room and 
bound”. (129) 
Imprisonment in darkness stands as a symbolic death in the Dionysiac schema 
and as such this sign of ritual, embedded as it is in metaphor, is made manifest as a 
visible theatrical sign. But just how can one account for the appearance of the 
scapegoat victim isolated as they are by the rest of the comic community as the 
malignant root of all vice? Fabian informs the Lady Olivia that where Malvolio was 
concerned, he and his confederates had merely intended to “pluck on laughter than 
revenge”, (V.i.353) although the “Sport royal” of Maria’s “revenge” in the second act 
(II.iii.161 & 143) ultimately takes the unfortunate steward beyond laughter to a 
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symbolic grave of “hideous darkness” (IV.ii.29) where “he must run mad”. (II.iv.174) 
By the close of the fourth act, even the overstuffed playboy, Sir Toby Belch concedes 
that they “cannot with any safety pursue this sport to the upshot” and that they would 
be “well rid of this knavery”. (IV.ii.65 & 63) As such, persecution for misdeeds 
cannot alone reprimand those assigned the position of scapegoat. Malvolio may be “a 
coward and a coistrel that will not drink” (I.iii.40-1) but to wish upon him the “gift of 
a grave” (I.iii.33) exemplifies to what extent the scapegoat is not only ‘othered’ by the 
rest of the community but somehow is complicit in its own ostracism. Feste’s 
enjoyment of his revenge on Malvolio demonstrates that he is returning a full measure 
of antipathy. The “whirligig of time” has indeed brought in its revenge upon this un-
comic gull. Malvolio may be uncomic but he is also puritanically anti-theatrical in the 
same way as Shylock deplores Venetian festivity. Therefore, to be both against festive 
entertainment and theatrical praxis positions certain dramatic figures as counter-
productive elements in any comedy, and as such, they experience the most vicious 
criticism. 
 
Princes and Pariahs 
 
Bearing in mind the crude simplification here: the dramatic life of the scapegoat is a 
parole in the Saussurean sense, a series of partially autonomous and unpredictable 
individual acts, transferred by society at large into a coherent system, or langue. As 
we have seen, the interest of traditional structuralists is in langue and not in parole: in 
the functions of elements as indicative of the workings of the system, not the 
individual utterances in their own, quirky right. Sign systems are seen as operating as 
a closed set. In the ‘creativity’ of Parolles’ deception in All’s Well That Ends Well, 
access is gained to a privileged, social position, not only by disguising himself 
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physically in “the scarfs and the bannerets” (II.iii.201) of costly apparel, but by 
fashioning his entire persona anew.  
Stephen Greenblatt argues, that the Renaissance was a period of intense self-
fashioning where “the ability and willingness to play a role, to transform oneself, if 
only for a brief period” was necessitated by “the acceptance of disguise, the ability to 
effect a divorce, in Ascham’s phrase, between the tongue and the heart”. He goes on 
to argue that “such role playing in turn depends upon the transformation of another’s 
reality into a manipulative fiction”,326 The equivocal instability of appearance and the 
ease with which another could be misled solely by external appearance renders 
disguise dangerously dubious. Comic scapegoats tend to be characters made entirely 
of false claims and obfuscations, and as their fictive status is redressed they invariably 
receive a humiliating dressing down. 
In hailing Helena mockingly as a “fair queen”, Parolles pinpoints the necessity 
for a temporary reversal of fortune and its contingent period of licensed misrule. The 
scapegoat must be assigned and anointed as the transitory and tragically deluded 
monarch erected for the duration of the play if the subversion of authority is to be 
enacted. Of course, any play which utilises carnivalesque conventions confronts the 
realisation that order and stability are constantly in flux and the position and status of 
nobility is subject to the ephemerality of all things mutable. The rituals of parody, 
deposition and desecration that Peter Burke has found in carnival327 appear in so much 
comedy that it becomes irrefutable that the carnival is not marginal but pre-eminent in 
the plays as metaphor and reality. In this sense, carnivalesque substitution and 
transitoriness, not order and hierarchy become the norm. A particularly good example 
                                                           
326 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning From More to Shakespeare, (Chicago and 
London, 1984), p.228 
327 Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe, (London, 1978), pp.179-187 
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of this premise can be found in the epilogue of All’s Well That Ends Well where the 
“king’s a beggar now the play is done” as the actor sheds his theatrical costume. 
What demands to be explored is whether the aesthetic renounces the political, 
regardless of what the fetishisers of the festive may say, even though there should 
already be a recognition that: “The festival must be a political act. And the act of 
political revolution is [always] theatrical”.328 Moreover, the comic form seemingly 
has an innate awareness that: “…for art to be ‘unpolitical’ means only that it allies 
itself with the ‘ruling’ group”329 and therefore systematically evades declaring its 
politics. Comedy therefore insists via circuitous routes, on the crucial role of the  
marginal in the constitution of the central, the dominant or the mainstream, by 
activating the marginal in a position which can enter into a more even handed contest 
or agon with the central or the dominant. Superficially frivolous, the carnival of  
transgression which comedy enacts becomes a transformative masquerade, where 
nothing is as it seems. And although it is never actually affirmed, the comedies do 
demonstrate Dostoyevsky’s famous maxim that a society is defined by its treatment of 
“outsiders”, of what it chooses to marginalise.330 This enunciation of the peripheral 
can be heard in the language of fool-speak, in the truths Lear’s Fool delivers and the 
rhetorical sophistry of Feste. But, moreover, in giving voice to those voiceless figures 
who have been othered by society; women, foreigners, and the socially inferior, are 
allowed to participate in a specifically transient form of democracy.  
 
                                                           
328 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’,  p.128 
329 Brecht, A Short Organon for the Theatre,, p.104 
330 Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground (1864), trans. Mirra Ginsburg, (New York: 
Bantam, 1992), is an exemplary instance of this concept of ‘outsider law’. 
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Expelling the Anomaly 
 
Comedy insistently brings about the need to reformulate and even to reconstitute the 
general way one relates to the marginal or liminal in thought and life. Vital in this 
latter respect is the rethinking of the role of margins, thresholds and the problem of 
liminality. Comedy indicates ways in which the marginal is not merely the realm of 
the borderline or parasitic case that may be bracketed or set aside in the definition of 
problems or institutions. It insists on us taking a closer look at the crucial role of the 
marginal in the construction of the central, the dominant or the mainstream, by 
emphasizing the importance of seemingly mixed modes and the manner in which pure 
types or essences are idealisations that achieve dominance through other than the 
purely ideal –that is, through rhetorical and institutional gestures. 
 Throughout comedy the hub of castigation is located in aberrant individuals  
who transgress widely accepted moral principles but in John Marston’s The Dutch  
Courtesan a fierce invective is levelled at the sexual ideology of Jacobean London, 
and the place of prostitutes at the margins of its society. In The City Staged: Jacobean 
Comedy, Theodore Leinward argues that “What made the prostitute a threat was her 
unwillingness to conform to contemporary measures of social and feminine order”.331 
Leinward’s analysis stops short, however, for he, like the citizens of London, 
misrecognises all courtesans as an external disruption: they are in this view, the  
producers of rather than the products of social disorder. Cocledemoy may say that 
prostitution is a trade “most honourable” because “divine virtues as virginity, 
modesty, and such rare gems” are sold by “wholesale” (I.ii.32-41) in the emerging 
                                                           
331 Theodore B. Leinwald, The City Staged: Jacobean Comedy, 1603-1613, (Madison, 1986), p.143 
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commercial marketplace of Jacobean London, but he occludes Marston’s satirical 
swipe at the insatiable hunger of a social economy governed by exchange. Thus, 
rather than being an emblem for anarchy because she does not conform, the courtesan 
serves as the scapegoat for a society uncomfortable with its nascent capitalism. 
Consequently, the Dutch Courtesan, Franceschina not only represents the fallen 
woman - the whore - she also signifies the extent to which Jacobean culture has 
produced sex as a commodity. In other words, Franceschina, the abject Other, serves 
as a spectre who does not allow the reality of early modern London to close into a 
‘unified whole’ but whose existence allows society to misrecognise the source of 
social disruption as something external. As Franceschina is a ‘foreign’ body in more 
ways than one it therefore seems evident that her presumably unchanneled erotic 
desire poses a greater threat to the stability of the social order than the safety of the 
men that would ‘use’ her, as she represents the very foundations of capitalism 
revealing that exchange value is the only value that really counts. In expelling her 
from society, the citizens of Marston’s London legitimate chaste love and holy 
marriage, forgetting that Franceschina’s damnation is a product of their society. And 
thus, Francischina’s reduction to silence at the end of the play – “Ick vill not speak. 
Torture, torture your fill. For me am worse than hanged; me ha’ lost my will” 
(V.iii.68) – literally and symbolically indicates the suppression of lust, particularly 
lust as an extreme. Puritanism is at the other end of the equation, with Malheureux’s 
prudishness proving to be his downfall, which Freevill cites as “Nothing extremely 
best with us endures”. (IV.ii.40) 
Foucault writes that “the idea of ‘sex’ [as it developed in the seventeenth 
century]…enables one to conceive power solely as law and taboo”.332 This type of 
                                                           
332 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, op. cit., p.155 
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power – an internalised orientation or subjectivation to cultural codes rather than 
adherence to them through physical repression or violence – is apparent in The Dutch 
Courtesan. Freevil perceives desire in terms of law and taboo and is concerned that 
his friend Malheureux has shifted his puritanical beliefs to the opposite pole, where he 
can no longer conform to the cultural definitions of licensed and transgressive sexual 
behaviour. As the play progresses, Franceschina becomes more and more monstrous 
which causes Freevill to enquire of Malheureux “Cannot all these [warnings] curb thy 
low appetite/ And sensual fury?” (IV.ii.11). As Julia Kristeva argues, love and desire 
purified by the language of the symbolic, is acceptable, while “sensual” lust, the 
language of the abject body, is taboo as “[a]bjection persists as exclusion or taboo” 
and also as “transgression (of the Law)”.333 Malheureux, in essence, transgresses the 
“law” of the nascent capitalist society of Jacobean England by attempting to conflate 
the dichotomy between abject and symbolic, pure and impure: his desire for  
Franceschina is within the bounds of the play, impure, and yet he still “must enjoy” 
her. (IV.ii.15) He thus threatens to reveal that the distinctions between impure and 
pure are simply social constructions.  
Nevertheless, Malheureux is not identified as the necessary sacrifice for the 
vindication of social codes: all danger, all anxieties about the destabilising force of 
commodification is displaced onto the whore, as he “that would loose all” need “but 
love a whore”. (V.iii.29) There is a paradox in operation here that demands the total 
suppression of Franceschina even though the young men of the play are informed by  
that “idea of sex” which allows them to “enjoy her, and blood cold…laugh at folly” 
(III.i.278) once they have gained access to a more socially acceptable woman. Their 
ability to make use of a “common bosom” (I.i.87) and then rejoice in state sanctioned 
                                                           
333 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York, 
1982), p.17 
 213 
marriages with ‘chaste’ women, smoothes over the contradiction that splits 
womankind into two distinct categories, the saintly and the fallen, the angelic and the 
demonic. 
 There is a contrast in stereotypes perpetrated by Marston: when Franceschina 
invades the home of Beatrice, stating that Freevill is dead and that she alone 
commanded his affections, Beatrice only moans, “He did not ill not to love me, but 
sure he did not well to mock me…yet peace and my love sleep with him!” (IV.iv.63). 
Franceschina, underscores the distinction, by becoming violent and revengeful when 
she discovers that she is to be cast aside by her lover: “If dat me knew a dog dat 
Freevill love,/ Me would puisson him”. (V.i.14) Indeed, her reaction fulfils the 
stereotype of a foreign whore, a stereotype that Marston exploits to cement 
Franceschina’s difference from the ‘proper’ citizens. Not only is she from the Low 
Countries, with an atrocious accent, she also wants to control herself and those who 
interact with her. Unlike Beatrice who accepts her position passively, Franceschina 
has a ‘will to power’; she not only roundly curses Freevill (“ick sall have the roge 
troat cut…St.Antony’s fire, and de Neapolitan poc rot him” [II.ii.49-51]), she also 
actively plots his and Malheureux’s death. Thus Beatrice is positioned as the most 
faithful and “patient” of lovers, one who gives men manliness, whereas Franceschina 
is condemned as one who would rob them of their masculinity: “I am not now myself, 
no man” complains Malheureux after seeing her. (IV.ii.28) 
The impression left by the weight of excessive passions and transgressive 
behaviours perhaps stems from a refusal to acknowledge the grotesque, ‘becoming 
bodies’ that constitute reality, but, as Phyllis Rackin states, “Despising lust as a mark 
of weakness and degradation, Renaissance thought gendered it feminine”.334  
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Moreover, in her essay on early modern sexuality, entitled “Historical Difference/ 
Sexual Difference”, Rackin argues that during the early modern period, “Excessive 
passion in either sex was condemned, but it was especially dangerous to men because 
it made them effeminate”.335 Effeminacy is less a fear of acting like a woman, than a 
fear of slippage between the symbolic and its abjected underbelly. Between the 
‘masculine’ symbolic order and everything this phallogocentric system descries, the 
perversity of a diacritical universe is evident. 
As a by-product of the system of ordering, as a symbol of its excess, the 
anomaly, ironically operates as the restitutor of the conceptual categories from which 
they are excluded. The stigma that they bear marks them out from the crowd, and 
conflates physical aberration with moral deviance whether they have been excessively 
greedy, or excessively puritanical. Whether or not, they have “out-villain’d villainy”, 
(AWEW, IV.iii.254) their covetousness incites the inversion of the symbolic order and 
their social instability is always and everywhere viewed as a threat to existing power 
structures.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In its exploration of internal alterity or differences within what are occulted or denied 
by extreme analytic or binary oppositions and related dialectical ventures, comedy as 
a form of deconstruction not only helps to unsettle the scapegoat mechanism, it poses 
the problem of how to relate to the “other” that is always to some extent within. This 
aspect of comic deconstruction bears institutional significance, as in how the anti-
semitism of The Merchant of Venice should be approached, or how one should 
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examine and perform the class-consciousness of All’s Well and Twelfth Night or the 
politics of community and nationhood in The Henriad. It forces the issue of how to 
come to terms with the “other”. It may thus enable one to perceive subtle 
methodological displacements in scapegoating in the way certain experimental or 
transgressive approaches are castigated or dismissed by defenders of conventional 
disciplinary lines. This approach is directly experienced in what could be termed as 
the ludic postmodernism of deconstruction in its suggestion that any form of identity 
is never pure other than through questionable processes of inclusion and exclusion 
which simultaneously raises the issue of how to articulate modes of relative 
specificity that remain subject to questioning and contestation.  
In studying the mix of didacticism and aesthetics in comedy, one is made 
aware of the tragedy that is installed along the margins of any comic play. This tragic 
aspect is not merely to be perceived as the liminal, but as that marginalised and 
excluded position which defines and constitutes the centre and source of comedy. The 
cruelty that is made manifest by the tragic sacrifice of scapegoat figures in comedy 
has something to teach us all, from both the victim’s perspective and that of their 
persecutors. Thus, it can be said that comedy bears the anamorphic stain of defiance 
and deviance at its very source. The tragic germ is the dangerous supplement at the 
heart of this hysteria-inducing form which continues to seduce and infect audiences 
collectively into delirious complicity with purgatory rituals of selective persecution. 
Like the anamorphic death’s-head imagery concealed in so much Renaissance 
art, the scapegoat is as a blind spot, an obscurantism shifting and cozening with 
mercurial wit until it is finally apprehended by the eye. The slippery multifaceted 
identity of the scapegoat inhabits a pivotal, liminal position, from which it is able to 
toy with the boundaries of orthodoxy and subversion. All scapegoats learn quickly of 
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the security in concealment, as they perpetually experience the exclusionary violence 
of the grotesque, but they also realise that their exclusion can be relocated at the 
centre of communal participation under the aegis of the carnivalesque. In the precincts 
of the ludicrous certain scapegoats enjoy an ability to draw others into the terms of 
their own festive world, repositioning themselves as a focal point for festivities and a 
source for carnival energies. Figures such as Falstaff offer exemplary instances of this 
device, but for the anti-comic gulls of The Merchant of Venice and Twelfth Night the 
violence of their repositioning almost destroys them. In All’s Well That Ends Well 
Parolles is representative of this self-consciously destabilising and unstable figure, 
knowing himself to be a ‘braggart’ but almost revelling in the confidence he possesses 
as “the thing that I am” (IV.iii.338). However, it is the inherent danger of this rite 
where subject positions remain unstable throughout that the role of pharmakos and 
pharmakeus are often interchangeable. As the instigator and perpetuator of the 
sacrificial rite of carnival the pharmakeus threatens to destabilise the Monarch of 
Misrule, to enact the reversal of fortune which makes the King, “a beggar, now the 
play is done”, (AWEW, Epilogue, 1) replacing the jester’s motley with the crown of 
thorns.  
The fear of occupying this position provides the ‘key-hole’ that is required not 
only by the viewer of anamorphic, or perspective art, but also by the spectator of the 
comic rite of the pharmakos. Anamorphic art suggests that the ultimate strength of 
performance lies in the play of perspectives which sensitizes spectators to those 
choices framing their own libidinal and ideological representation of aesthetic objects. 
In moving their bodies (and their minds) to enact the perspectival options of 
anamorphic art, the viewers transfer art from the frame (or the page) to the 
spectatorial and performative space, thus realising the side and split visions of 
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aesthetic oscillation. Memory traces, the powers of imagination, are activated by the 
representation of certain incongruities, of differences enacted by visual immigration 
and its supplementary libidinal and material vanishings. Therefore as a concept of 
transformation, anamorphosis allows us to grasp subjectivity as a ‘dynamic 
condition’, a matter of constantly changing body schema rather than as a fixed body 
image. An example can be gleaned from Falstaff’s own mutability as a dramatic 
figure both renowned as an insurpassably comic character and as one of indelible 
poignancy, which thus invaginates the logic of concealment in anamorphism.336 
The Renaissance understanding of anamorphism as a perspectival technique, 
designed to present one image when viewed directly and another if viewed from an 
angle, is deciphered by Stephen Greenblatt as that which is: 
…unseen or perceived only as a blur is far more disquieting than what may be 
faced boldly and directly, particularly when the limitations of vision are 
grasped as structural, the consequence more of the nature of perception than 
of the timidity of the perceiver. …We must distort, and in essence, efface the 
visible to perceive the invisible. …[T]o enter this non-place is to alter 
everything… and to render impossible a simple return to normal vision.337  
 
Before, the anamorphic left only an indistinguishable stain, but now that it has been 
located its skewed appearance is forever more apparent. The illusionist’s trick is 
uncanny in its estrangement, and in that delicious moment of surprise and incongruity 
more is revealed than is at first thought. Presuming that something was nowhere and 
is now here, we are propelled towards that non-place, the non-lieu of the comic u-
topia where incongruities and surprises are the bedrock of humour and entertainment. 
The pleasure of recognition is obvious, tantalising, producing a certain indescribable 
jouissance. And yet, the comparison of the anamorphic illusion in painting to the 
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anamorphic stain in drama is that we are plunged into the scapegoat’s estrangement. 
We perceive the issue as the pharmakos does, from that discomfiting position of 
unfathomable confusion in the victim. 
Operating like a camera obscura, the dark recesses of self-obsession produce 
the perfect surface for the presumably light relief of comedy to appear, for as the 
laughter and jeers begin to ring out, the tragic aspect recedes, otherwise the pleasure 
in humour would be vanquished. In this scheme, occupying the same textual space 
appears to defy the impossibility of generic systems doing so, as, 
we can neither separate them entirely nor bring them into accord, so that the 
intellectual gratification of radical discontinuity is as impossible to achieve as 
the pleasure of wholly integrated form.338 
 
We are as impressed by the resemblances as we are frustrated by the chasm that keeps 
separate that which is irrefutably conjoined. Indeed the tragic vein may have been 
tapped by the violent interiorisation of the scapegoat, but the threat of its explosion is 
contained by that Renaissance theorem of simpatico. As Hal’s comment on Falstaff,  
“Were’t not for laughing, I should pity him” (1 Henry IV, II.ii.106) reverberates  
throughout the comedies, the scapegoat crisis in evidence excuses itself. 
However, the anamorphic stain of the tragic that marks out the scapegoat of 
society’s dis-ease darkens and intensifies the comic preconception that the festive 
community is as like the everyday as it is different. It reveals that the two can only co-
exist briefly. As perspective attempts to realign momentarily, the tragic and the comic 
appear to overlap. The whirligig of time does indeed bring in its revenges as 
scapegoats find to their cost, with the instability of the inter-relationship between the 
festive and the quotidian, the chivalric and the carnivalesque, enforcing the idea that 
they inhabit each other in as much as they inhibit each other. Crucially they are both 
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repelled and impelled towards each other, as when Princes “have a truant been to 
chivalry” (I Henry IV, V.i.94) and waste the precious time precociously even though 
there is an overarching awareness that “If all the year were playing holidays, / To 
sport would be as tedious as to work”. (I.ii.197-8) Then the Lord of Misrule must be 
brought to book, and the licence for carnival revoked. The comic mask begins a 
rotation, the grin imperceptibly contorting into a grimace. 
According to Slavoj Žižek, Lacan’s name for the “pathological bias  
constitutive of reality”339 is anamorphosis. What we perceive as a tragic stain on the 
face of the comic also enforces an awareness that reality already involves our gaze, 
“that this gaze is included in the scene we are observing, that this scene already 
‘regards’ us”,340 appealing to us on a level of identification. This occluded self-
motivated construction of dramatic reality is viewed from a point which eludes our 
eyes, from a point which transgresses the boundary between inside and outside, both  
promoting and excluding the perspective of the foreign body. To be recognised is to 
be expelled, sacrificed as the source of contamination. The scapegoat incorporates 
many disguises in its attempt to elude identification, but within the rite of the 
pharmakos, in the theatre that is pharmakon we are all essentially foreign bodies, 
unaware that we are being played with, rather than being allowed to play.  
 Play is an important component in the development of the human; it is where 
we learn boundaries and limitations. In light of this comedy is a necessary form of 
play where humanity is permitted the freedom to experiment, and dream. These 
dreams may be denounced as mass hallucinations, transgressive depictions of 
alternative realities that are at worst disruptive, at best worthless. However, as this 
thesis has attempted to illuminate, comic currency has very real value and can be 
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exchanged in the purchase and sale of ideologies, both current and in recession. This 
is the location in which the comic form really excels: in the marketplace of cultural 
exchange. As we cross the threshold of the final chapter of this thesis the 
accountability of comic discourse will be called into question as to whether it is of 
benefit either to the individual or collective psyche. 
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Chapter 5 
Breaching the Symbolic Order 
 
 
 
 
The question of whether comic form is subversive or supportive of the social order 
raises complex questions concerning the ideological implications of literary forms; 
one implication is that literary conventions reinscribe social conventions, whereas 
another indicates that they may subvert them. Raymond Williams’s description of 
literature as “a form of practice in which ideology both exists and is or can be 
internally distanced and questioned…” offers a possible course through this dualistic 
argument. Following Althusser, Williams opens up an understanding of the literary as 
“one of the areas where the grip of ideology is or can be loosened, because although it 
cannot escape ideological construction…it is a continual questioning of it 
internally”.341 It remains to be investigated precisely how comic texts work 
simultaneously within and against ideology, and to identify which elements reinscribe 
and which challenge social conventions. Perhaps only then can a useful contribution 
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be offered to the subversion/ containment debate which has immured comic theory for 
so long. 
As Althusser and Macherey claim, art contributes to our deliverance from  
ideology even though its essential function appears to legitimate the power of the 
social class which controls the means of economic production.342 Dramatic comedy 
may emerge from disruptions of the social order, but to argue for it as a completely 
uninhibited and emancipatory form is made difficult as it appears to exploit social 
hierarchy at once plangently and lovingly. The action of comedy can, therefore, be 
described as a dialectic between the Other and the Self, between the forces of social 
disruption and the forces that re-establish the social order. This dialectical movement 
can be viewed as fore-grounding the construction of culture and the tension that is 
inherent in the diametrically formulated universe of the comic form. Comedy can thus 
be identified as addressing the tension between a subversive energy and a festive, 
playful element on the one hand, and the socio-political rituals through which society 
is ordered on the other. In this sense, comic discourse generates both pleasure and 
power. It invites a breach of rules, not so that the legislative boundaries can be 
forgotten but in order that correct behaviour may be reaffirmed. Nevertheless, it is not 
the immanence of societal balance that should concern us as much as the routes taken 
by comedy through the labyrinth of state ideology, as not only an exploration of the 
philosophy of the ‘underdog’ but as a productive constituent of idealist propaganda. 
 The Hegelian concept of Aufhebung may be profitably applied to this 
dialectical conundrum as it “represents the victory of the slave and the constitution of 
meaning”.343 This dialectic of confrontation reconstitutes the social order through 
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interrogation and realignment, but this ‘little’ victory is hard won. Derrida describes 
the Aufhebung as “the form of the passage from one prohibition to another, the 
circulation of prohibitions, history as the truth of prohibition”.344 In that comedy 
appears to dispel prohibition without suppressing it, it too remains within the same 
restricted economy of the Aufhebung, destined like all transgression to conserve or 
confirm whatever it exceeds. This definition of the Aufhebung leads us back, as 
Derrida notes, to the German verb Aufheben meaning to surpass while maintaining, 
just as the Aufhebung means to negate and to conserve at the same time. Comic 
discourse demonstrates this economy as it too “wastes nothing and profits from 
everything”.345 Comedy suggests certain positions to be heeded by, and by way of, 
philosophical aesthetics: firstly, that particular things can resist subsumption and yet 
yield meaning; secondly, that human happiness is promised, albeit in a negative 
fashion, as an immanent possibility; thirdly, that claims about what is possible can 
arise outside philosophy proper and become essential for philosophy; and finally, that 
all such claims, although objective, may nevertheless be sheer illusion, depending on 
what is done in response to such claims. 
To profit, or make sense of the incomprehensible, is how the comic 
ventriloquises philosophy although according to George Bataille this amounts to 
nothing more than “vulgar consciousness”.346 This is a sentiment shared by Pierre 
Bourdieu, who propounds a theory of comic humour whereby comedy enounces 
nothing because of its political neutrality.347 In further exploring a form that appears 
to attest to neither this nor that, a third term emerges in comic discourse that alludes to 
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a detachment, a dislocation that could only be called liberation, which could only 
amount to a raising of the bar. Scrutiny of comic discourse proves that this  
emancipation of the subject can only ever be achieved through play. 
The playfulness of comedy, however, is responsible for the production of an  
excess, a surplus described by Derrida as “the almost nothing into which meaning 
sinks, absolutely”.348 Here we are reminded of the danger as well as the pleasure that 
comedy invokes, as laughter exceeds dialectics and the dialectician: it bursts out only 
on the basis of an absolute renunciation of meaning, an absolute risking of death, what 
Hegel calls abstract negativity.349 Although laughter is not negativity, it is, as excess, 
an aporia: a seemingly insoluble logical difficulty. And yet, illogical, abstract thought 
often highlights the lack of logic in any single presupposition. According to Derrida, 
once a system has been “shaken” by following its totalizing logic to its final 
consequences, one finds an excess which cannot be construed within the rules of 
logic, for the excess can only be conceived as neither this nor that, or both at the same 
time – a departure from all rules of logic. That “certain burst of laughter [that] 
exceeds” philosophical form “and destroys its sense”350 the transformative power of a 
certain pleasure, which is derived from questioning, can be detected in the pleasure 
we may take from play, as playing goes some way to explaining the importance of 
comedy.  
 
Ludic Play 
 
Comic discourse as dialectical process, explores the space between the real and the  
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imaginary and manifests itself as the gap between what understanding can grasp and  
what it can only declare as logically possible. This dialectical process exposes itself  
within the illusion of mimesis where alternative modes of rationality point to the 
possibility of a more fully rational society. Hegel refers to the necessity of mimesis as 
spectacle, 351  (generally of tragic representation) as the locale where humanity can 
imagine the possibility of its mortality. Theodore Adorno’s reference to mimesis as a 
necessary semblance,352 however, relates more fully to comedy’s representation of 
subjectivity and society as a prerequisite for social evolution. This semblance of social 
consciousness may not radically revolutionise the social order but it does leave a 
residue of resistance to the inhumanism of the social system.  
Adorno’s formulation of dramatic art as societal semblance is especially 
disturbing as well as being especially illuminating because it is posited as an entirely 
necessary illusion, a socially unavoidable and instructive mirage, closely related to the 
remaining vestiges of ritual in theatrical rites. It is also a semblance of subjectivity, in 
both senses of that phrase: the production and reception of dramatic art requires the 
very subjectivity to whose pretensions and failures it attests. Moreover, in 
simultaneously engaging with and unmasking the constitution of subjectivity as 
semblance, dramatic art gives expression to those repressed voices whose liberated 
and pluralistic chorus would mark collective subjectivity, if only the logic of 
domination were surpassed. In this utopian sense too, dramatic art is doubly a 
semblance of subjectivity: a negative image of a different collective future, but one 
whose capacity to project what is possible stems from occluded layers of 
contemporary experience. 
There can be no horizon for dramatic historical change unless people can  
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imagine and enact something other than the prevailing modes of reality and reason. 
And for such imagination and such enactment there must exist a play-space for the 
staging of subjectivity’s many semblances. In the volatile space of the comic form, 
attempts to breach the symbolic order by interrupting the servile complicity of speech 
and meaning can either become reactionary or subversive. This is accomplished by 
attempting to annihilate the collusion between the symbolic order and the subject, 
whereby the individual unconsciously reiterates an occluded complicity with the 
systems of prohibition which constrain it. The subject of comedy is a system of 
relations between strata: the theatre, the psyche, society, and the world. Within that 
scene, on that stage, the punctual simplicity of the classical subject is nowhere to be 
found, since as art - in its perpetual quest for human freedom - makes the domination 
and impotence of the symbolic order apparent. Leading from Nietzsche’s 
problematical definition of tragedy,353 the Dionysiac urge in drama tends towards the 
dissolution of the illusion of self, thus the comic stage serves as a paradigm of the 
socio-political space which structures the representation of the social body at its 
political nexus. 
By examining precisely how mimesis serves to de-centre the strong 
constitutive subject it becomes apparent that there exists a narrow and essential 
correlation between the art of politics and the art of theatre. David Hawkes describes 
thus Machiavelli’s consideration of the deliberate deception in the construction of 
illusion: “an innovative ruler must disseminate a systematic illusion among his 
subjects if he is to retain power”.354 It appears then that illusion, as a form of 
deception, is ultimately necessary for political innovation and the reform of custom.  
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Jean-François Lyotard has taught us to distrust the seamless metanarratives of 
development which legitimate oppressive regimes,355 whether based in consent or  
terror. Likewise, Michel Foucault has reminded us that who possesses discourse 
possesses power, and ‘authority’, which is connected to ‘desire’, involves “the rules 
and processes of appropriation of discourse”.356 The egalitarianism of speech  
may be only an illusion, a game, but it is nonetheless a power-game where the rules of 
engagement demand subjection. Capable of redemption or destruction, comedy uses 
language in its quest for utopia as it stages contestations that attempt to transform 
dominant discourses, driven as it is by the desire to open up opportunities for 
resistance. This desire has a complex preoccupation with explicitly political 
investments made in those institutions designed to secure domination and subjection. 
It would be more modest, however, to trace the constraints and resistances of desire in 
their historical discontinuity, as desire, even when it is profoundly conventional, is at 
the same time the location of a resistance to convention. Desire demonstrates that 
individuals want more, and that more exists. 
 The ways in which Renaissance comedy depicts desire in its myriad libidinal 
excesses and constraints, unveils it as the point where ideology and fantasy conjoin. 
The comedy functions as a dream does with the audience - or “dreamers”- inventing 
their own grammar for the images and symbols presented to them. Comedy 
demonstrates how much we need mimesis to dream historical change and it is only for 
the sake of real historical transformations that comedy holds fast to the prospect of 
utopia, seeking its traces in a society desirous of transformations. 
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The Non-place of the Comic U-topia 
 
Much of what has been said so far in characterising the comic in formal laws and its 
capacity to represent and negotiate real social tensions, comes into focus with regard 
to what we may call the comic u-topia – what others have referred to as the agon or 
the argument which has harnessed philosophy to comedy since the anti-tragic 
dialogues of Plato. By allowing for social critique and utopian projection, comedy 
aspires to, or culminates in, a u-topia. Literally a “non-place” free of the constraints of 
the everyday world, detached from the old or dominant order and outside of time, a 
ludicrous context marked by the lack of conventional rationality and morality, where 
comic characters are protected from the threat of real violence and death. Such a u-
topia takes many forms. Often described as that ‘bliss beyond time’ in which 
everyone supposedly lives happily ever after, the ‘safe haven’ offered by comic play’s 
temporary escape from tyranny provides a different, detached perspective on things 
that is neither inside nor outside the realm of the theatre.  
Correspondingly, Derridean deconstruction is characterised in terms of a 
search for the non-place, the non-lieu, the non-site or u-topos from which to 
interrogate philosophy357 or any other dominant order. Deconstruction tends to what is 
neither inside nor outside, what does not ‘take place’ (n’a pas lieu), is not an ‘event’, 
or is an event (événement) whose advent (avénement) is to come (à-venir). On the one 
hand, this involves constant reference to what Derrida calls “undecidables” or “quasi- 
transcendentals”. These lexemes are recognised as non-concepts such as pharmakon, 
hymen, gram, and are defined as unities of simulacrum that inhabit but are not 
included in a system, resisting and disorganising it instead.358 These undecidables 
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might be described as u-topias of language, holes in the fabric of the text, punctures 
that punctuate the text and give it texture. These “non-places” then are not resources 
and reserves of meaning, but mark a mise en abyme, an abysmal staging and setting of 
meaning, a simultaneous creation and ruination of meaning. On the other hand, what 
is ‘accomplished’ by Derridean deconstruction is not some new system but 
“undecidability” itself.359 In other words, it seeks in its writing to inhabit and enact a 
u-topia, a “non-place” of alterity and otherness that marks the end of history, the 
closure of the history of meaning and being. 
 The way in which the u-topia shows itself and is inhabited is crucial to 
understanding the debates surrounding comic discourse as a form of deconstruction. 
Comedy as a contestatory discourse is evident in its narrative drive to overcome the 
paternal and patriarchal obstacles facing the renewal of the comic community. Of 
course, there is the problem of plays merely reduplicating the patriarchal structures 
they appear to interrogate, but there is also a strong case for comedy’s ability to use 
the logic of the symbolic order to unravel it and thereby subvert and overturn its 
phallogocentrism. Therefore, what is of greatest importance is precisely how comic 
discourse inhabits the structures it seeks to demolish, exactly how comedy reveals the 
impotence of the patriarchal order, and to what extent it causes a breach to occur 
within that symbolic structure. 
 
Dreaming Patriarchy, Dreaming U-topia 
 
The dream of patriarchal authority is a nightmare for both men and women alike. 
Daughters subdued for eager husbands beneath the rule of masculine will destabilises 
the contract of ‘mutuality’ that has been argued for since the late sixteenth century, as  
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the master/slave dichotomy is reinforced through the reiteration of oppression and 
exploitation. Throughout Renaissance comedy the demand for reciprocal love is 
played and replayed usually by young women quick to disguise their physical 
attributes and win the love of young men by rhetorical sophistry. The representation 
of these willing and wayward women is nevertheless often viewed as a reinforcement 
of patriarchal desires, of masculine fantasies as the dream of sexually experienced and 
available women is projected onto a procession of confused but delighted men.  
In The Comedy of Errors (c.1589) Antipholus of Syracuse is called husband 
and ordered home by a beautiful woman he has never seen before, who just so 
happens to be his estranged twin-brother’s wife: “To me she speaks; she moves me 
for her theme./ What, was I married to her in my dreams?” (II.ii.180-1). The 
gentleman’s relish of illicit sexuality is also evident in Twelfth Night (1601) where 
Sebastian can hardly believe his luck when an emboldened Olivia seizes him and 
drags him off first to the altar and then to her ‘estate’: “What relish is in this? How 
runs the stream…If it be thus to dream, still let me sleep”. (IV.ii.59-62) That 
comedies abound in dreams, that the very action of comedy seems to arise from the 
hinterland of waking consciousness, with its implausible denouements and illogical  
conclusions hints at the very etymology of its generic title.360 Comedy as ‘dream’ 
points to the very place where fantasies are enacted and symbols created which 
designates comic drama as the default sphere of dreams. Comedy thus presents itself 
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like, wish-fulfilment quality of comedy, as well as the nocturnal setting of the Dionysiac ritual, the 
pannuchis. 
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as a locale for tumultuous and disorderly experiment and investigation where failed 
dreams of human emancipation may be re-enacted in an attempt to keep such dreams 
alive. 
Comedy is in this case a unique and privileged type of cultural and psychic  
material, as the lasting theoretical suggestiveness of Freud’s Jokes and their Relation 
to the Unconscious attests to. If we view comedy as the imaginary phase prior to the 
holistic plenitude of the symbolic order (signified by restrictive closing scenes) we 
must also accept that accession to the symbolic is accompanied by an increase, rather 
than a lessening, of anxiety. This angst can only be alleviated by the ‘comic’ 
demonstration that acquisition of the symbolic is rather the pre-condition for a full 
mastery of the imaginary. This transition from the imaginary to the symbolic plays an 
analogous role in organising the syntagmatic movement of comic narratives from 
disorder to the term limit of the symbolic order itself, which bears a similarity to the 
now conventionalised structuralist paradigm of the passage from nature to culture. 
This, in turn, generates a submission to the Law, and indeed, the subordination of the 
subject to the symbolic order bears conservative overtones, with the possibility of a 
misappropriation of this clearly anti-utopian model seeming unavoidable. From this 
perspective, the story of the norm, of the symbolic order itself, is not that of a ‘happy 
end’, but rather of a perpetual alienation. 
 In Puck’s sweet lullaby, “Jack shall have Jill;/ Nought shall go ill;/ The man 
shall have his mare again, and all shall be well” (MND, III.ii.461-3) a connection is 
drawn between the alienation of women through commodity exchange and the 
commodification of comedy as the default sphere of patriarchal dreams. The 
unconscious aspect of comedy is thus to be read symbolically as a flood of new 
images, symbols of something unknown, repressed, or simply forgotten flow out 
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through comic discourse. To speak symbolically is therefore not to conceal meaning, 
but to express it and in having “his mare again” the male subject in comedy is 
subscribing to the subjection of women beneath the presumably ‘natural’ order of 
patriarchal dominion. Correspondingly, the dehumanisation of the female as an object 
of male desire also dehumanises the male who would ‘ride’ his sexual partner beyond 
the bawdy of innuendo and out into the realms of absolute tyranny and subservience. 
This “faery” lullaby is pertinent to the topos of tyranny as the representation of 
women as properly gendered subjects, and subjected to phallogocentric imperatives 
that are invariably staged in dream-like incongruities. As the female authority that has 
held centre stage in many plays is dismissed as a mere May game, the temporary 
release from everyday constraints is shown as having been righted by women whose 
skills of oration have magically evaporated into whimsical parodies of feminine 
obedience. Renaissance comedies, by insisting upon the performative nature of gender 
relations, finally reveal the radical contingency of patriarchal authority. However, in 
the performance of subject identity as ‘dream’ comedy attempts to represent itself as 
the unconscious of the social, always manifesting itself as a disrupter, a subverter of 
rationality and utility. 
 The “fierce vexation of a dream” (MND, IV.i.66) where daughters are no 
longer obedient to their fathers, nor wives to their husbands is brought “by some 
illusion” (III.ii.98) to an audience seduced by the societal simulacrum of comedy. To 
reveal the elements of dream which enable the dreamer to perceive those hidden or 
repressed aspects of themselves which need to be recognised before neurosis and 
disorder can be rectified, comedy as the imaginary of the social attempts to eradicate 
the tyrannical personality. Fathers like Egeus, who bring the full penalty of the Law 
down upon their daughter’s insolence, are mollified by love-lorn dukes keen to lay 
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down the weapons of war and the implements of execution in favour of “revelling”. 
(I.i.19) This preoccupation with fathers who invoke a harsh and intolerant patriarchal 
Law is peculiar to Shakespearean comedy where the fantasy of absolute patriarchy is 
presented as a troubled dream in need of translation. Nearly all of Shakespeare’s 
comic men are transformed under the tutelage of women who demand a reform of the 
existing social order. Nevertheless, the bridling of scolds and the harnessing of female 
sexual energy is played out at the limits of order, where emancipation and revolution 
co-exist, which forces comedy to conduct business on increasingly evasive terms. 
 
Reining in Daughters 
 
We may unwittingly collude with patriarchy’s appropriation of the symbolic as the 
field of full human subjectivity but comedy breaches the boundary between the 
imaginary and this logocentric order to release its tension but also to reinscribe it, 
forever in a different location. This permits a celebration of our humanity, providing 
not only the pleasure of entertainment but also a sense of power, by demonstrating 
that relationships and subjectivities can exist beyond the miserable limits of 
patriarchy. If patriarchal culture is that within which the self originally constitutes 
itself, it is always already there in each subject as subject. If this is so, then, how can it 
be overthrown if it has been necessarily internalised in anyone who could contest its 
validity? If the law of patriarchal culture is the law of the symbolic, the dead Father, 
then the living male has no better chance of acceding to that sovereign position than 
does the living female. One cannot kill the father who is already dead - one cannot 
contest his Law.  
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The will of a dead father is also the story of a primordially alienated self where 
the threat of aphanitic subjectivity (in which the subject seeking itself as presence 
only discovers itself as absence) constitutes an essential aspect of comic affirmation. 
In Richard Hillman’s Self-Speaking in Medieval and Early Modern English Drama: 
Subjectivity, Discourse and the Stage, the drama of the late sixteenth century is 
described as beginning “to portray the field of human relations as a symbolic order in 
which subjectivity is continually negotiated”.361 Likewise, Shakespeare recasts and 
demystifies the role of the patriarch by questioning the power of fathers (whether 
living or dead), a power that demands replication for the perpetuation of the 
patriarchal system.  
In the plays of Shakespeare that depict a father/ daughter relationship, the 
issue of a woman’s relationship to patriarchy inevitably gains a special kind of 
prominence. In A Midsummer Night’s Dream (1595), Theseus advises Hermia to 
consider the potentially fatal repercussions of her disobedience and hence her 
disavowal of her father’s rights of ‘authorship’ over her: 
 To you your father should be as a god; 
 To whom you are but as a form in wax, 
 By him imprinted, and within his power 
 To leave the figure, or disfigure it.              
 (I.i.46-50) 
 
The early modern father’s claim to authority, as the creator of his children in place of 
a transcendent deity points to an existentialist crisis whereby a daughter’s departure 
through marriage marks the end of paternal authority and control. To be “imprinted” 
with whatever denomination of currency the father sees fit, the daughter is valued for  
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her transactional value as a conduit not only on the economic nexus but also the 
political. 
A measure of control persisted in the father’s choice of a groom, and as Lynda 
E. Boose suggests, the emotional logic behind a father’s relation to his daughter’s 
marital partner may be in response to an elaborate demand for compensation:  
Faced with the inexorable loss of something emotionally valued, individuals 
need to devise some way to reimagine loss as benefit or at least equal 
exchange. Losing one’s daughter through an exchange that the father controls 
circumvents her ability to choose another man over him.362  
 
Egeus has accused Lysander of ‘bewitching’ his daughter with “love-tokens” which 
extend to a spell-like litany of “bracelets of thy hair, rings, gawds, conceits,/ Knacks, 
trifles, nosegays, sweetmeats…” (I.i.33-4) which have “stol’n the impression of her 
fantasy”. (32) Egeus’s accusations of witchcraft pale against his fury at the daughter 
who has “Turn’d her obedience, which is due to” him. (37) He declares “she is mine” 
(97) referring to his “right” to her, just as Lysander’s love-rival Demetrius has talked 
of the “crazed title” of his “certain right”. (92) 
 The comparison with Shylock is hard to ignore as both fathers demand justice 
for their wayward offspring. Shylock spits that he would rather that his daughter were 
dead at his feet (MoV, III.i.75-6) than wilfully disobedient. Egeus expects the 
Athenian law to put Hermia to death if she refuses to consent to his will: “As she is 
mine I may dispose of her;/ Which shall either to this gentleman/ Or to her death, 
according to our law”. (I.i.41-3) Shylock’s demand for justice is, however, also 
entwined with the theft of his wealth that Jessica has committed against him which 
                                                           
362 Lynda E. Boose, “’The Father’s House and the Daughter in It’: The Structures of Daughter-Father 
Relationships”, in Daughters and Fathers (Forthcoming) eds. Lynda E. Boose and Betty S. Flowers, 
cited in “Fathering Herself: A Source Study of Shakespeare’s Feminism” by Claire McEachern, 
Shakespeare Quarterly, 39: 3, (Autumn, 1988), p.273 
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undermines his ability to usure, stripping him of his earning capacity, his paternal 
authority, and hence his masculinity. The “boys in Venice” (II.viii.23) target his 
suffering with satirical precision “Crying, his stones, his daughter, and his ducats”. 
(24) It thus becomes clear from both Shylock and Egeus’s reactions to their daughters 
being “stol’n away” (MND, IV.ii.153) that we are observing the very real fears of 
ageing patriarchs who see daughters as vendible commodities. The difference between 
these two fathers, who are both engaged in matters of mercantile business, is that 
where Egeus sees Hermia as an asset in the market of exchange Shylock covets 
Jessica like a precious treasure, to be kept under lock and key. However, by the close 
of both A Midsummer-Night’s Dream and The Merchant of Venice, neither father, nor 
his consent, is required for the nuptial bands. A higher order of a presumably more 
benign nature has stripped them of their parental rights. 
 The rigidly stratified society which emblematises Hooker’s ‘Great Chain of 
Being’363 is temporarily suspended in comedy, which includes the supposed ‘natural’ 
discourse on power and the human subjects it constitutes. Through a social order 
taken as monolithic, and understood as absolute, breaches occur as the utopian 
impulse draws the subject towards an inversion of the imaginary into the real. This 
utopian project brings stage and audience together at the level of discourse where, as 
Hippolyta maintains, dreams shared communally, “told over” by “minds transfigur’d 
so together” grow to “something of great constancy”. (MND, V, 1815-7) Gathered 
into these comic texts is the burgeoning scepticism of Renaissance thinking, 
interrogating conventional signifying practices as recognised in the manifestation of 
the early-modern “crisis of representation”.364 In the comedies of this period, 
                                                           
363 cit., Lawrence Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558-1641, (Oxford, 1965), p.21. 
364 Jonathan Sawday, ‘Re-writing a Revolution: History, Symbol and Text in the Restoration’, 
Seventeenth Century, 7.2, (1992), p.171 
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scepticism tends to liberate the protagonists from their initial subjection to a place 
where consciousness is raised. 
The treatment of self-conscious theatricality in these comedies discloses the 
very workings of ideology through a form of carnival excess which seems to affirm 
nothing, but rather confirms the inequalities of the social order from an idealistically 
egalitarian platform. In this sense the emphatic use of couplets, proverbs, wordplay, 
and other illusion-breaking speech patterns display comic discourse as a provocateur 
of undecidability rather than as a judge of morality. Nevertheless, this level of 
discourse could only be termed as liberating since both men and women are 
emancipated from the stifling restraints of absolute and unquestioned patriarchy. 
Patriarchs are ‘cajoled’ into a position of lenience as phallogocentrism is manoevered 
into a relatively benign position. 
 To claim that comedy is predicated on the unfettered free-play of the signifier, 
however, places a critique of any comic text’s own ideological investments beyond 
reach, particularly with comic curiosities like The Taming of the Shrew (1593) where 
a politics of meaning would be impossible to locate from this perspective, unless the 
emancipatory potential of a text could be identified as covert but still applicable. A 
theoretical concern with questions of gender and sexuality as constitutive of the whole 
sphere of social relations has revealed to what extent comedy attempts to disrupt the 
symbolic order (of which, in this case, patriarchy is the most powerful constitutive 
discourse) at the level of ideology. Using the Foucauldian rhetoric of discourse as 
power, linguistic meaning, if not mastery, is precisely what is at stake in comedy. 
Characters may express pleasure in the sheer multivalancy of language, but the 
mastery of the symbolic order is synonymous with the presumably stable constitution 
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of subjectivity. Whosoever has mastery over language has the power to construct the 
identities of those around them, the power to constitute their reality.  
 
Taming Tongues 
 
Katherina the shrew is characteristically represented as a threat to the symbolic order 
of language, with her unruly behaviour and her scolding tongue. This has received 
substantial critical commentary and no study of the ‘dream of patriarchy’, constructed 
as it is for Christopher Sly in The Taming of the Shrew, can ignore the linguistic 
excesses of a woman who is gauged as a threat, as the shrew herself exemplifies an 
excess of meaning. Karen Newman sees Katherina’s “linguistic protest” as directed 
against “the role in patriarchal culture to which women are assigned, that of wife and 
object of exchange in the circulation of male desire”.365 Katherina is described as “so 
curst and shrewd/ That till the father rid his hands of her” (I.i.176-7) his highly 
marriageable younger daughter is off the market. Bizarrely, the whole monolithic 
edifice of patriarchy seems to balance precariously on the behaviour of one woman, 
which demonstrates comically how fragile the power structure of this signifying 
system is.    
Being taken possession of, becoming possessed by an-other leads Katherina 
into a nightmare world of torture, coercion, and alienation. By the time she reaches 
her new husband Petruchio’s house she “Knows not which way to stand, to look, to 
speak,/ And sits as one new risen from a dream”. (IV.i.169-70) In a dazed and 
confused state Katherina is susceptible to both the mental and the physical violence  
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inflicted upon her by the husband who “kills her in her own humour”. (IV.i.164) It is 
true that she has raised her hands to others on more than one occasion, even “binding” 
her sister Bianca while she interrogated her. She has lost control of her temper  
repeatedly, smashing a lute over Hortensio’s head, while reports are confirmed of her 
verbal aggression as an “irksome brawling scold”. (I.ii.184) But the “mad-brained 
rudesby” (III.ii.10) Petruchio is not only verbally intimidating; his characteristic 
violence and braggadocio appears to be permanently on display.  
In the ‘wooing’ scene Petruchio’s violent and scatological assault “Come sit 
on me” and “What, with my tongue in your tail?” (II.i.198 & 215) revels in the 
aggression of bawdy humour, stooping to the blatant facetiousness of inverting all the 
information he has received about Katherina: “And now I find report a very liar”, 
(237) before unveiling his final threat: “For I am he born to tame you, Kate”. (268) 
Those who see him as a player of roles (notably the cruel hawkmaster and servant 
beater of Act IV), as a Renaissance man who plays a part to teach those around him 
valuable lessons, should remember that his actions occur when no such role is called 
for. This is a man who terrifies his “ancient, trusty, pleasant servant Grumio”, (I.ii.45) 
and horrifies even the misogynistic patriarchs of Padua with his taming process. His 
monstrous, all-consuming ego is inflicted on all who might conceivably compete with 
him for authority or mastery and, as his servant warns, this is a man prone to vicious 
outbursts. Katherina should be forewarned that if she attempts to defy her prospective 
husband “he will throw a figure in her face, and so disfigure/ her with it that she shall 
have no more eyes to see withal than a/ cat”. (111-3) Theseus has described a father’s 
will thus, but in A Midsummer-Night’s Dream we are reminded that to win a woman’s 
love doing her “injuries” (I.i.16) will result only in emotional turmoil. Petruchio 
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however, sustains this manic mode and disorderly regime until he has achieved the 
kind of order he requires. 
Of course, Petruchio’s pursuit of wealth and status is not unrelated to his 
pursuit of power over words as demonstrated in his first scene on stage. The comic 
misprision of the “knock me here soundly” scene (I.ii.8) is extended throughout the 
play as “Katherine the curst” (126) comes face to face with her nemesis. Nevertheless, 
one must ask, just how effective Petruchios’s methods of coercion are366 as first 
Katherina loses her father and then her power over speech: 
 Call you me daughter? Now I promise you 
 You have show’d a tender fatherly regard 
 To wish me wed to one half lunatic, 
 A mad-cap ruffian and a swearing Jack, 
 That thinks with oaths to face the matter out.   
(278-81) 
 
Baptista may worry what the ‘mockery’ of such a match will do to his paternal 
authority but the gain he seeks is “quiet”. (322) Whether this means his desire for the 
quiet life yields a greater return than placing his daughter’s happiness before his own, 
or whether the economic gain he will make is an undisclosed amount, the stealth of 
his withdrawal from paternal association carries a certain poignancy. The quietness of 
this match is identifiable in the shameful complicity old Baptista shares with 
Petruchio. This rejection testifies to a father’s radical possession of his daughter, a 
possession which seems inappropriate to both the utopian projection of comedy and 
the contingencies of exogamy alike. 
The despair which the shrewish and waspish Kate experiences in this 
problematic comedy saturates this “kind of history”, (Ind. 138) with a feeling that  
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Without Baptista Petruchio would fail in his re-programming of Kate. 
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turns it towards the more “Lamentable comedy” (MND, I.ii.10) of the inept exchange 
of women as “goods” and “chattels”. (TS, III.i.226) We are continually being asked to 
question the overdetermined ideological conventions of social roles, which we are 
either sold or buy into.  
 Katherina’s nightmare begins when she is barred from the symbolic order (by 
the Law of the Father) and hence meaning. Her psychic defences are dismantled 
through humiliation and torture. Left with few options, she attempts to befriend one of 
her jailers, saying to Grumio:  
[I] am starv’d for meat, giddy for lack of sleep, 
With oaths kept waking, and with brawling fed; 
And that which spited me more than all these wants –  
He does it under name of perfect love.     
(IV.iii9-12)  
 
Love-as-hate recalls Kristeva’s depiction of the hatred of the consuming mother 
giving rise to a new erotic relationship. Likewise, “My only love sprung from my only 
hate!” (Romeo and Juliet, I.v.136) is described by Kristeva as containing that perverse 
“intense feeling of being within a hairsbreadth of punishment”.367 Petruchio obviously 
takes great pleasure in punishing Katherina’s hatred of him, inverting this hate and 
renaming it as love. According to this theorem love is born from hate and if hate 
seems too strong a word, in Elizabethan lore the belief was that love would follow a 
marriage.368 Petruchio uses love as a weapon and reveals the abusiveness of his 
breaching techniques in the violence he commits not only against Katherina, but also 
against language itself. 
 Kate recognises the emancipatory potential of language with her disquisition 
on the force of linguistic clarity: 
My tongue will tell the anger of my heart,  
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Or else my heart, concealing it, will break; 
And rather than it shall, I will be free  
Even to the uttermost, as I please, in words.  
(IV.iii.77-80) 
 
She realises that Petruchio “means to make a puppet of her”. (105) He believes he has 
“politicly begun [his] reign” (77-80) as the absolute monarch of all he surveys, 
including time itself. (187) He will rename the “signs and tokens” of the natural world 
as he perceives the natural order of patriarchy has been subverted by this shrewish 
woman. To master Kate he must ‘master’ language by naming and renaming all that 
he sees including Katherine herself who is now a “household Kate” (II.i.276) a 
common-or-garden housewife as opposed to an unruly woman who rails against her 
position as a vendible commodity, a metonym of masculine desires. 
 Kate has wit and wiles enough to see that she must humour her lord and 
master if she is to survive. She accepts that there is no future in taking arms against 
the prevailing structure of power, especially as her husband’s version of order verges 
on the insane. She takes Hortensio’s advice that to agree with everything Petruchio 
says would be the best policy, even though she herself is being thoroughly humiliated. 
However, as an intelligent woman, and a victim of violent coercion Kate finds her 
salvation in identifying with her captor. Her behaviour exemplifies what we recognise  
as the ‘Stockholm Syndrome’369 used to describe how hostages befriend their 
kidnappers once they are completely convinced of their own powerlessness. In these 
life-or-death situations victims often comply with their aggressors believing that these 
are actually ‘honourable’ beings who have been forced into taking extreme measures 
by social forces. In the cruel psychological twist evinced by this siege mentality a lack 
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of meaning is torqued up to instil the maximum of meaning in nothing. A glance, or a 
gesture, can be translated as kindness, as love, even though an unspeakable brutality is 
being meted out. 
 The curious build-up to Kate’s now notorious speech on patriarchal 
domination is ignited by an argument amongst women which signals how patriarchy 
destabilises the male/female distinction. Kate now occupies a raw and vulnerable 
subject position as opposed to Hortensio’s wealthy widow, who is newly wedded but 
obviously still insatiably independent. The widow’s assault on Petruchio’s misogyny, 
that “being troubled with a shrew” (V.ii.28) does not mean that all women are in need 
of taming, triggers an interest in Kate that resembles surprise at anyone able to  
challenge her violently abusive husband. She marvels at the widow’s quip that “He 
that is giddy thinks the world turns round” (20) but is herself roundly rebuked for 
having brought such ill favour to the women of Padua. The men at the banquet-table 
goad these women to a stand off in search of entertainment and gambling. Rather than 
a cock-fight a ‘cat-fight’ is expected, but as Kate now has “no more eyes to see withal 
than a cat” (I.ii.113) she has seemingly lost that ferociousness and is reduced to a 
‘hen’ clucking for the attention of that ‘cock-of-the-walk’ - Petruchio.  
Bianca seems always to have known how to play the game in this masculine 
order and thus to avoid aggressive confrontation. Petruchio attempts to embroil her in 
this hen-fight but she deflects his scurrilous jibes by anthropomorphising herself into 
a “bird” (46) concealed within a “bush”, (47) vulnerable to the bows and arrows of 
masculine attention but accepting of her role. Bianca as “the white” (186) on the 
archery target that Lucentio has “hit” (186) seems less of a prize in comparison to her 
sister Katherina who is the red, the bull’s eye that all patriarchs desire, the fiery 
woman tamed, subservient, subjected and entirely complicit with her aggressors. 
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But this has all been a dream, and a tinker’s dream at that. A dream  
fit for a drunken reverie where perhaps Sly has fallen back to sleep, as we do not hear 
from him or the players of the Induction again. In laying bare the dialectic between 
the master and the slave comedy peers through the microscope at the limits and 
successive possibilities of humanity. The human animal can barely know itself if it 
has not grasped this deterministic movement. But just as we have “slumb’red here” 
(MND, V.i.435) awhile has reasoned slumbered too? As Derrida asserts “Reason 
keeps watch over a deep slumber in which it has an interest”370 and this interest is 
invested in the notion that there is a certain method in madness. Therefore to identify  
comedy’s ideological disruption is to pay close attention to a certain political 
unconscious as the location of radical discontinuities between ideology and social 
praxis. Certain contestations have taken place which have resulted in perhaps barely 
decipherable transformations of dominant discourses. In the illusion of the theatrical 
play-space the assurance has been surreptitiously proffered that human beings are in 
discursive control, even as their dependency on deceptive signification is paraded. 
Like Beatrice in Much Ado About Nothing we have “often dreamt of unhappiness,/ 
and wak’d” ourselves “with laughing,” (II.i.312-3) and in this laughter we find an 
awakening. 
Towards a Therapeutic Dialectic 
 
The comedic Induction of The Taming of the Shrew bears testimony to the rigidity of 
class and gender assignments which marked the shifting paradigms of Elizabethan 
culture and its preoccupation with the constructs of power. One could read the  
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Induction as a satire of male chauvinism, especially given that it is presented as an  
entertainment for the duped tinker Christopher Sly, who indulges his repertoire of 
drunken, sexist remarks upon the threshold of the main play-text. In fact, the 
remainder of the play appears as a fulfilment of Sly’s most fundamental wishes: to be 
surrounded by possessions and to truly ‘possess’ a woman. But women are repulsed 
by this ragged tinker; both the hostess and Sly’s ‘illusory’ wife are keen to physically 
distance themselves from him, for obviously different reasons.  Moreover, Sly is only 
convinced of his lordly status when he is told he has a wife, which suggests ironically, 
how in this androcentric culture men depend on women to authorise their sexual and 
social identities.  
The Induction, however, is a theoretical curiosity as it appears primarily to be 
a framing device which does not completely frame the text. We are induced into the 
dramatic illusion of a play within a play, but never return to the Lord’s chambers, or 
to the figure of the drunken tinker.371 Through this broken, or intentionally incomplete  
frame, The Taming of the Shrew subsumes a different identity from the one  
traditionally ascribed to it. No longer can it be viewed as a social satire or a romantic  
comedy wherein the heroine is taken to the incomprehensible realm of the absurd and 
liberated through ‘play’ into the bonds of love; playfully ushered into the patriarchal 
symbolic order by her own willing incorporation of mimesis; to ultimately find her 
‘rightful’ place under phallocratic sovereignty. The consequence of the main text 
subsuming the Induction leaves Kate’s much contested speech on wifely obedience in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
371 In The Taming of A Shrew (1594) Sly is returned to the stage “in his own apparel” , still sleeping off 
the excesses he was previously suffering from. However, he is warned that his wife will “course” him 
for “dreaming” outside the tavern all night, which elicits the response from the tinker: “I now  
know how to tame a shrew, / I dreamt upon it all this night till now” , The Malone Society Reprints, 
Vol.160, (Oxford, 1998). 
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the final scene, open to infinite interpretation particularly as the closing line’s 
disavowal of reality “’T’is a wonder, by your leave, she will be tamed so” (V.ii.192-3 
Italics mine) presents a key to the text as a not only a site of paradox and interrogative 
wonder but an instance of the therapeutic properties of the comedic dialectic. 
 In Metaphysics Aristotle claimed that “it is owing to their wonder that men 
both now and at first began to philosophise”.372 In this sense comedy promotes an 
appreciation of wonder which acts as a structural principle in the creation of the 
‘marvellous’ movement of the dialectic. If we think of the dialectic as the paradoxical 
play of contradiction throughout comic drama then John Florio’s definition of paradox 
as something “contrarie to the common received opinion” pushes us ever closer to an 
understanding of Lucentio’s declaration that this play has been a wonder which 
demands a complete suspension of normal belief. Florio begins his definition of “a 
paradoxe” as “a maruellous, wonderfull and strange thinge to heare”373 which 
expresses Lucentio’s sentiment precisely. Working from this incredulous summation, 
back to Christopher Sly’s preposterous hood-winking, Kate’s speech becomes a 
source of paradox, of wonder, and fantasy. Therefore, from this closing line, which 
affords no real closure, The Taming of the Shrew can be reassessed as a mock 
encomium374 or an argument contra opinionem omnium where contradictions cannot 
be easily assuaged as they evince the therapeutic dialectic of comedy. 
           To identify the dialectic between illusion and reality is to recognise that 
Shakespeare manipulated dramatic register in order that his plays could become sites 
of ideological and institutional contestation. In his tragedies, wherein life’s tragic 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
372 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I (A), 2, 982b12-18 
373 John Florio, (1611), Queen Anna’s New World of Words, (Menston, England, 1968), [not paginated] 
374 The mock encomium is the earliest surviving paradoxical literary form, dating from the defenses of 
Helen written by Gorgias and Isocrates in the fifth century BC. See Barbara C. Bowen, The Age of 
Bluff: Paradox and Ambiguity in Rabelais and Montaigne (Urbana and Chicago, 1972) esp. 3-37. 
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inevitability instils terror in us, comedy steps in only fleetingly, to remind the 
audience of the unifying and redemptive force of laughter. Therefore, in a comedy 
like The Taming of the Shrew we must analyse the tragic-comic symbols of 
oppression and marginalisation as symptomatic of a therapeutic dialectic which seeks 
to raise an individual awareness of certain false propositions or contradictions which 
have become embedded in the collective psyche as part of an unconscious set of 
beliefs.                                                    
The first contradiction in this play to produce a sense of wonder and curiosity 
is presented to the audience through two ‘dreams’ or fantasies, wherein subjectivity is 
disclosed as illusory and therefore easily threatened and subverted. The ‘dream’ of 
lordship that is constructed for Sly destabilises contemporary notions of social 
stratification, while Petruchio’s misogynistic fantasy of rebellious woman tamed 
deconstructs gendered subjectivity and the conflict patriarchy initiates and sustains. 
The Lord’s (im)practical joke may appear to simply make “the beggar…forget 
himself” (Ind.i.41) as in a “flatt’ring dream” (46), but Sly’s own desires take 
precedence as we “let the world slip” (142) and enter the u-topos of the comedy. A 
description of this utopia, or non-place, exposes dramatic mimesis as the mirror of the 
unconscious where dream symbolism infiltrates the waking consciousness of the 
spectator.   
There is a striking resemblance between the Lord as advocate of misrule and 
Maria in Twelfth Night when he hatches a “jest” that will “persuade” Sly “that he hath 
been lunatic” (63) for “some fifteen year or more” (113); trapped in “abject lowly 
dreams”(32) where his poverty has been a figment of his imagination. This 
consummate pharmakeus dons the kind of disguise that we analysed in the previous 
chapter of the thaumaturge, or auteur, who takes up the role of director for the ensuing 
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action. Nevertheless, it is Sly’s hypnopompic befuddlement which begins to saturate 
the play as he grasps at a consciousness that he is being led to believe is false: “do I 
dream? Or have I dreamed till now?” (69), clutches at the Cogito as reality slides out 
of view. His tormentors then describe how he “waked as if [he] slept” (80) uttering 
the names of men “Which never were nor no man ever saw” (97). The implication 
here is useful for an understanding of the remainder of the play as ‘dream’ as the 
images provided by Sly’s memory are reflected in the events which immediately 
preceded his falling asleep: the repetition of being beaten and chased from the 
alehouse and the argument with the hostess. This extra-sensory external influence can 
be felt nudging at the major themes throughout this comedy, as Petruchio’s fantastical 
antics can be interpreted as distortions of Sly’s own experience via condensations of 
his desire to ‘rule’ over women. As the previous section explained, The Taming of the 
Shrew can be read as a “kind of history”, as an historical document of misogyny, or as 
a fantastical dream of patriarchal domination. It is through the analysis of the 
repertoire of dream symbolism in this play that we can read Kate’s speech as a 
fantastical illusion.                                                                                         
While there is no doubt that Kate is subject to patriarchal authority, it is also 
true that she wields an irreducible force of her own. Contradictions in the 
characterisation and story of this “curst Shrew” are not difficult to grasp in the theatre 
where they can be reflected in the non-verbal actions of the actor. These 
contradictions are not inaccessible even in the play-texts so long as readers work to 
contain the wonder and power within the imagined characters of the comedy. In 
reassessing this play as a misogynistic ‘dream’ the dialectic between power as wonder 
and knowing as interrogation, is embodied not as it is constituted exclusively by either 
one position or the other, but by a dizzying oscillation between the two. The Taming 
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of the Shrew is therefore a highly visible site of contestation on account of this 
interrogative contradiction. The dialectic allows us to hear, in Kate’s closing speech, 
the expression of a many sided resistance against Petruchio’s attempt to dominate and 
coerce her which must be read in the same ironic tone which Sly’s ‘wife’, 
Barthol’mew the page, is instructed to humour the “strange lunacy” (29) of a 
delusional drunkard. Kate’s speech has been variously associated with an evocation of 
her own bodily pleasure375 as if the claim to an overall sense of physical well being, 
being cared for, even being erotically delighted could be anything other than a 
disturbingly trite form of masochism.                                                                                  
 Once The Taming of the Shrew is re-read as a patriarchal fantasy, dreamt by a 
drunken tinker, Kate’s submissive speech can no longer be read as a serious 
moralisation as Kate’s change in dramatic register to such a quick, high, and absurd 
tone contradicts both her previous verbal aggressiveness and her weary vocabulary of 
submission. Lucentio is as equally unconvinced by this comic exaggeration of tone as 
the audience should now be, as they too “wonder” at this unlikely spectacle. This 
reinforces the sense that Kate is not a ‘real’ wife, but a ‘dream’ wife who delivers a 
speech which is central to the play’s comic theme, that a man’s achievement of 
absolute dominion over his wife can happen only in fantasy. However, Shakespeare’s 
dramatic sophistry weaves dream illusion with dramatic illusion by drawing the 
threads of historical actuality through a play-text which may, and then again, may not 
be a lesson in domestic deportment for men. This elaborate interweaving of historical 
and dramaturgical elements produces certain effects, ranging from indecision, to 
undecidability, to unreadability. This is part of the reason a feminist-historicist 
critique of the play relentlessly yields a reading of Kate as an unvendible commodity, 
                                                           
375 See Carol Rutter, Clamorous Voices: Shakespeare’s Women Today, (Routledge, 1989), pp.21-5. 
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a creature to be taunted and repudiated as something unnatural and laughable in an 
early modern milieu which taunted and repudiated all forms of rebellion in women. 
However, Shakespeare develops the character of Petruchio the wife-baiter into a 
ludicrous example of an overbearing patriarch and although Kate is undeniably 
“froward” when she makes her first stage appearance, it is her husband who is 
eventually depicted as a mentally unhinged extremist.                                                                       
 Even before the most recent wave of feminism, many relatively conservative 
play-goers have expressed a distaste for the unbridled male chauvinism and contempt 
for women that Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew represents, frequently in the 
most direct and physical terms. It is also sometimes noted parenthetically, almost as 
an apology, that the play must have been written as a “crowd-pleaser” to satisfy the 
low taste of an Elizabethan audience.376 However, the contention raised by 
reappropriating this comedy as the depiction of a dream illusion may be more in 
keeping with a truly early modern response to it. The proof can be found in a 
remarkable contemporaneous comedy, The Taming of the Tamer (1611)377 written by 
John Fletcher as a response to Shakespeare’s ‘taming’ play. This comedy is in every 
sense a sequel to The Taming of the Shrew and can also be regarded as a satire, a 
burlesque, and a tour de force that takes the earlier play into some remarkable 
philosophical and feminist territory. Fletcher’s sequel seems to answer the question of 
Kate’s presumed submission as the plot introduces the widowed Petruchio as a man 
who did not in fact, reach any point of rest in his quest to tame Kate, as she died while 
the marriage was still in a continuing state of struggle. There is no insinuation 
however, that his misogynistic aggression had anything to do with her demise, in fact, 
the comedy makes clear that he is now desperate to attain the victory which had 
                                                           
376 Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, ed. Robert B. Heilman (New York, 1966), xxx ff 
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eluded him for so long. His still faithful servant Tranio informs Petruchio’s new wife 
that “The bare remembrance of his first wife/ Will make him start in’s sleep, cry out 
for cudgels,/ And hide his breeches out of fear her ghost/ Should walk and wear’em 
yet” (I.i.4) an observation which incites the young Maria to rebellion. An analysis of 
Fletcher’s Aristophanic comedy, where conjugal relations are withheld from the 
groom on his wedding night, and he is barred from his own house, undermines many 
of the traditional assumptions whereby The Taming of the Shrew is conceived as a 
realistic farce controlled by the masterful Petruchio.                                                                                                                                                         
 To unpack this notion of the play as an extended dream sequence we must 
return to the Induction of the earlier play and question why there is so much emphasis 
on dreaming and the construction of illusion. The Lord has instructed his servants to 
speak “with a low submissive reverence” (Ind., i.53) while in the presence of 
Christopher Sly, much as Kate must humour Petruchio “With soft low tongue and 
lowly courtesy” (Ind.i.114). However, in the meta-fictional representation of the page 
boy who is transformed into a “humble wife” (116) Kate’s speech is mirrored as a 
deferential play of substitution ironically supplementing the drunken patriarch’s 
dream of mastery.  
The Lord advises his servants to ensure that the boy-actor will “rain a shower 
of commanded tears” to maintain the dramatic illusion of Sly’s mastery, but if he has 
not that “woman’s gift” to teach her eyes to cry, then “an onion will do well for such a 
shift,/ Which in a napkin being close conveyed,/Shall in despite enforce a watery eye” 
(24, 23, 26-8). The visual trickery of stage-craft is explained by this technique and the 
dramatic illusion of mimesis is extolled by the Lord as he enthuses over the 
performance he has initiated: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
377 John Fletcher, The Tamer Tamed, or The Woman’s Prize, eds. Celiia Daileader and Gary Taylor, 
(Manchester, 2004) 
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I know the boy will well usurp the grace,                                                                            
Voice, gait, and action of a gentlewoman:                                                                        
I long to hear him call the drunkard husband,                                                                
And how my men will stay themselves from                                                              
laughter 
   (131-134)  
The unexpected strain this image places on preconceived notions of collective reality 
induces an exhilarating sense of hilarity as a boy-actor convinces a “monstrous beast” 
(Ind.i.36) that he is a “mighty lord” (65) through “kind embracements” and “tempting 
kisses” (118). This representation of false consciousness could as easily be applied to 
Katherina as Barthol’mew, who may both be played by the same actor to enhance the 
conflation of dream and dramatic illusion.                                                                      
 In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud makes a distinction between the 
"manifest content" of dreams (what is actually dreamt) and the "latent content" of 
dreams (the unfulfilled wish that the dream represents).378 Although one must be wary 
of applying early twentieth century psychoanalysis to late sixteenth century thought, 
this division of dreams into two complete layers fits neatly into an analysis of The 
Taming of the Shrew’s structural conundrum. Dream content is rarely presented by the 
mind in a simple and direct fashion. Instead a complex dream is constructed from the 
basic elements. The raw dream symbols are distorted via condensation (compression, 
conflation and omission of dream elements) and "displacement" (shifting emphasis). 
This is followed by a process of "secondary revision" that takes all these (by now 
distorted) elements and assembles them into some more or less coherent narrative 
structure.The Induction can be thus read as the precursory period before the 
‘manifestation’ of the tinker’s dream finds expression in the “entertainment” of the 
play. The possibility that the tinker has slipped back into a solid sleep is forewarned 
                                                           
378 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams,  (New York, 1980), p.168 
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by not only the servant’s inability to rouse him, as they bathe and clothe him, but also 
by Sly’s own fear of falling into his dreams again (Ind.i.126). The unfulfilled wish 
component of the dream’s latent content therefore finds its source in the Induction 
where Sly’s confused memory provides a litany of symbols for analysis: in the desire 
for wealth and status, in the unchallenged mastery over women and the unquestioned 
respect from men.                                                                                                                                
 Rather than appearing then as a “rollicking, knockabout” farce, Kate’s taming 
illustrates the disturbing humour of what could be termed as ‘verbal’ slap-stick 
comedy. That is to say, that within the pleasure of laughter, our darkest and most 
brutal fantasies are expressed in an over-exaggeration of our prejudices. And yet, 
through this sense of play we are permitted to observe ourselves as we undergo an 
imaginative and emotional experience which in turn allows us to examine our own 
morality. In flaunting society’s most cherished orthodoxies, and embracing what the 
culture finds loathsome or frightening, comedy transforms this seriousness into a 
‘joke’, and then unsettles the category of the joke again by taking it seriously. 
Comedy therefore makes us probe deeply into the ways we are constructed both 
psychologically and culturally, and invites us to consider the power of humour, 
fantasy, and in particular, memory in our lives. Whereas tragedy represents the 
powerlessness of human experience, comedy represents the liberating consequences 
of accepting that powerlessness; even though this lesson may have been learnt 
through as many tears as guffaws. Freud goes further into this morass and suggests 
that very often our conscious mind actively tries to reject the messages of our dreams; 
we "repress" this knowledge. Dreams are often an expression of a repressed wish that 
we would rather not admit to - they thus indicate psychic conflict that can in turn be at 
the core of mental disturbance.                                                                              
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 Repositioning The Taming of the Shrew as an early modern prototype of 
psychoanalytical dream work, consists in alerting the viewer to those false 
propositions or contradictions which have become embedded in the collective psyche 
as part of an unconscious set of beliefs. Through a series of ‘contacts’ which include 
free association and ‘dream work’, the spectator becomes a patient, led by the 
dramatist to recall the circumstances surrounding the occasions of their original 
acceptance of beliefs which represent false propositions. In this way, the dramatist, in 
their clinical role as societal analyst, enables the individual to recognize their initial 
misrecognition. Moreover, the audience is furnished with a new epistemology as the 
source of their false consciousness is destabilized. From the strictly psychological 
point of view, preventative psychiatry is the name for philosophical analysis as 
compared with psychoanalysis. The aim of philosophical analysis is to usher in a 
greater truth, or knowledge of the external world, by the negative method of 
elimination. This is the method, of what we have termed in this thesis, the therapeutic 
dialectic of comedy.                                                                                             
 
Laughter as ‘Breaching’ 
 
The representational role of comedy repeatedly offers attempts to account for 
subjectivity in terms of spacing in what Freud calls a “topography of traces, a map of 
breaches”.379 We ought to examine closely the idea of breaching the symbolic order 
as the moment when comedy attempts to open up a play-space, breaking a path 
against resistances, rupturing and irrupting into the symbolic; here this ‘comic’ 
eruption traverses the imaginary and momentarily exposes the real.  In being able to 
                                                           
379 ibid., p.205 
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breach the symbolic order comedy therefore identifies the permeability of all 
symbolic systems. 
 As has been demonstrated in many early modern comedies the presumably 
monolithic edifice of patriarchy can be undermined from within. Safe from behind the 
cover of the illusion of mimesis the rigidly stratified hierarchy of Tudor and Stuart 
society may be portrayed as a chimera, as a network of symbolic co-ordinates 
permanently in flux and in need of maintenance. These revelations, however, raise 
difficult questions. The boundary between the logical and the illogical has been 
transgressed leaving behind the residue of an insoluble rupture, whereby pleasure 
itself can no longer act as the panacea theatre claims for it. “In a certain sense”, writes 
Derrida, there is no breaching without a beginning of pain”, citing Freud, and he 
continues, “Pain leaves behind it particularly rich breaches”380 which we have 
identified in several early Shakespearean comedies, although, in another sense, 
breaching as a form of breaking through, of surpassing previously insurmountable 
obstacles can be expressed as a form of jouissance. In comedy this inevitable moment 
is found in the movement from ‘tyranny to escape’ as defined by Frye,381 where the 
symbolic prohibition at the foundation of the social is theatrically staged and thus 
rendered dialectical. This climactic pleasure has a primarily transgressive aspect: it 
defies representation in the symbolic, and is conversely an aggressive, violent, and 
liberatory drive.  
Through Kristeva’s conception of laughter, which is synonymous with 
jouissance, the playfulness of comedy is also recognisable as the creative force which 
provokes the “quality of newness”,382 which textual experience brings to the human 
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subject. Nevertheless, the comic form has long been regarded as one which can 
“disjoint the precision of our thoughts”.383 According to Kristeva this dislocation 
functions at the level of the thetic, a phase which pertains to the boundary between the 
heterogeneous domains of the Symbolic and the Imaginary: 
The thetic – that crucial place on the basis of which the human being 
constitutes himself as signifying and/or social – is the very place textual 
experience aims toward. In this sense, textual experience represents one of the 
most daring explorations the subject can allow himself, one that delves into his 
constitutive process. But at the same time and as a result, textual experience 
reaches the very foundations of the social – that which is exploited by sociality 
but which elaborates and can go beyond it, either destroying or transforming 
it.384  
 
Freud himself observed that laughter is always social. And the fact that we never 
laugh alone, never without sharing something of the same repression, is amplified by 
his recognition that laughter is “highly infectious”385 and that the creative and 
companionable labour of laughter conceals that essentially human propensity towards 
exploitation. In the crude cackling of the hostile and sexually aggressive humour that 
Freud delineates, laughter is exposed as an enunciation that springs from the body’s 
libidinal depths and imagines the social subject as caught up in a pleasurable play of 
shifting solidarity with others. 
Laughter occupies the uncanny margin of non-being, a u-topian and sublime 
location where the socially constructed self is momentarily lost. The laughing, 
transgressing subject is a subject who enters these margins and brings back some form 
of knowledge from beyond the limit. In the comic u-topia a discourse emerges that: 
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One might call the poetry of transgression [which] is also knowledge. He who 
transgresses not only breaks a rule, he goes somewhere that the others are not; 
and he knows something the others don’t know.386  
 
In the discourse of comedy, words are played with by breaking, or bending linguistic 
rules. In other words, the linguistic knowledge of a comedy’s audience requires a high 
standard of proficiency to be able to deal with the ambiguities and hidden traps of, in 
this case, the English language. Languages seem to contain hidden traps at all levels 
of linguistic analysis, so that a transposed sound or syllable or a misplaced preposition 
can potentially cause havoc to the general meaning of an utterance. Such havoc 
provokes laughter, but the havoc caused by the display of alternative ‘truths’ reveals 
disturbing gaps in knowledge, breaches in the symbolic order of language itself. 
 The price of taking this mystical movement from symbolic to real, results in a 
liberating loss of self, which according to George Bataille387 is brought about by the 
thetic rupture caused by laughter. If laughter is understood in Bakhtin’s sense as 
existing through the disparity between the word and its comic image or the distance 
between language and reality, then this can be transposed to Bataille’s laughter which 
occurs through a transgression brought about by the limits representing one another. 
Echoing Bakhtin, Bataille claims that “nothing sublime can exist in man without its 
necessarily evoking laughter”.388 It is difficult to subscribe to Bataille’s hysterical 
form of laughter, as it quakes before the sacred, with the subject ‘breaking down’ in 
the presence of the transcendent.  
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In light of this, Milan Kundera is probably correct that “initially, laughter is 
the province of the devil”.389 There is little doubt that Bataille’s ‘dissoi-paralogoi’ 
begins as a muffled devilish response, an amused scoffing at the order of things. But 
in a flash, one is overwhelmed, overtaken. Both Kundera and Bataille say that this  
laughter “convulses” us, momentarily dispensing with meaning and memory, 
demanding a purely bodily response; there may be thought before but not in the midst 
of a laughing fit.390 In this laughter one experiences a moment of what Avital Ronell 
calls “hijacked existence”, a moment of “motionless…destitution”.391 This laughter, 
Kundera says, follows after thought as a “convulsion of the face”, and he assures us 
that “a convulsed person does not rule themselves, they are ruled by something that is 
neither will nor reason”.392 
 
Laughter and the Aesthetic 
  
Laughter produces an atmosphere of social euphoria and economic freedom. The idea  
of the ‘funny guy’ which crowns an approved form of sociability, is a particularly  
precious form of capital. What Bourdieu calls the “collective worship of the good 
life”393 resembles Bakhtin’s carnivalesque world only in that it is offered as a site of 
verbal inventiveness and alacrity. Bourdieu agrees that the symbolic universe of 
comedy may appear as absolutely natural, as totally free, but declares that this 
appearance of unbridled subjectivity is: 
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in its way neither more nor less free than the improvisations of academic 
eloquence; it overlooks neither the search for effect, nor the attention of the 
public and its reactions, nor the rhetorical strategies aimed at currying favour 
or gaining its goodwill: it rests on tried and tested schemes of invention and 
expression which are also capable, however, of giving those who do not 
possess them the feeling that they are witnessing brilliant manifestations  
of analytical finesses or of psychological or political  
lucidity.394  
 
He goes on to descry the collusion with symbolic power in which humour 
seemingly wholeheartedly participates. Referring to “the enormous redundancy 
tolerated by its rhetoric” and “the space it allows for the repetition of the forms and 
ritual phrases” which perpetuate “the fundamental values of the group” Bourdieu 
perceives comedy as ultimately expressing a “profoundly stable and rigid view of the 
world”.395 As he fulminates against the “system of self evident truths” which he 
believes comedy tirelessly reasserts, he propounds that an “essential identity, and 
therefore a place and rank” are assigned and reinforced in a relentlessly ideological 
way. His primary concern with this symbolic power or “symbolic violence”396 is at 
the level of form, where this invisible power is interminably misrecognised as 
legitimate. 
 One must concede, however, that comedy has a powerful deconstructive 
facility, whereby the dramatic and theatrical potential of finding, misreading and 
deciphering epistles and jokes on ink and paper - with all their infinite possibilities of 
indeterminancy, interruption, interpretation, and effects on the ear of the beholder - 
epitomises all the pragmatic problems of miscommunication and misrecognition. 
There is an extraordinary metadiscursive density at the heart of Renaissance comedy 
wherein its formidable rhetorical complexity and formal self-awareness traces the  
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miscommunication and misrecognition at the heart of Bourdieu’s “symbolic 
violence”. As we have already noted, in representing a society experiencing the 
transformative effects of an important paradigm shift, the early modern comic stage 
re-enacted subjectivities in flux. Depicting identity formation as ultimately unstable 
and in need of constant maintenance reveals the weight of prohibition at the very 
foundation of the social, which comic discourse projects in order to activate a 
powerful dialectic. 
 The entire thrust of Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Mind (1807) consists in 
the process by which knowing comes to know itself. Initially, what the subject knows 
is an object (an sich), say of sense perception. In a second moment however, the 
subject becomes aware of itself as knowing the object (für sich), and then becomes 
aware of its own role in constituting the object for itself (in whatever small degree) 
from dependence on this object to assure itself of the truth of its knowledge. This is 
the basic moment of the dialectic.397 The knowing subject passes an initial moment of 
“affirmation” of its object to an awareness of the inadequacy of this perception 
(hence, negation) to a new moment of reconciliation of the two previous moments in a 
higher (or deeper) view of the process, which then becomes the starting point of a new 
cycle of the dialectic. We call this movement of affirmation-negation-synthesis, on the 
part of the subject, “mediation” and as such it is also a process of self-assurance on 
the part of the subject.  
What propels the dialectic for Hegel, is not some hidden thrust within 
knowledge itself, but fundamentally desire.398 In this sense, in its diachronic 
articulation, comedy has a temporal duration, driven by the dialectic of desire which 
then disappears once self-assurance is achieved. According to Bourdieu’s argument, 
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once symbolic differentiation and exchange are established, the jouissance that is 
lusted after is reduced to an auto-erotic moment. For many, the temporary displacing 
of boundaries of socially established signifying practices is just that, a harmless bonus 
offered by a social order which uses the safety valve of comedy “to expand, become 
flexible, and thrive”.399  
 In her Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva refers to the “productive 
violence” of literature, or, more specifically, the text. She declares that the structuring 
and de-structuring movement of this signifying practice takes us on a journey to the 
outer boundaries of the subject and society. It is here that jouissance and revolution 
are entwined by gestures of “confrontation and appropriation, destruction and 
construction”.400 Thus, comedy operates at the level of the dialectic, oscillating 
between two oppositional poles of thought, mediating the space between what is 
accepted traditionally and what can be imagined as immanence.  
This opposition between a dualistic system and one where boundaries are lost 
coincides with Lacan’s opposition between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, but also, 
in feminist terms, with Cixous’ distinction between the Realm of the Gift and the  
Realm of the Proper: between the female/feminine “deconstructive space of pleasure 
and orgasmic interchange with the other”401 and the masculine tendency to structure 
reality into a rigid hierarchical system of binary oppositions. This paradigm of the 
initial male/female distinction draws upon discourses that are important in the 
formation of identity politics as the two systems respectively stand for two opposed 
                                                           
399 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.16 
400 ibid., p.26 
401 Toril Moi, Sexual/ Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory, (London, 1985), p.113 
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libidinal economies. The schematics of gender politics when highlighted by Lyotard’s 
Nietzschean libidinal economy402 implies that representation itself is a mechanism of  
repressive power and should be understood from the parameters of patriarchy.  
Freud’s idea of the child born free but who is forced into a state of repression 
within months of birth can be used to interrogate not only the subject’s enslavement to 
the symbolic but the allegedly superior theory of humour from within the confines of 
the bifurcated structure of patriarchy. Derogatory humour which seeks a butt in 
identifying a scapegoat, conceals repressed feelings of fear and anxiety; thus reading 
Freud on humour suggests that there is both an economic and a phallic threat. In 
comic discourse, there is a curious verbal coinage of phallic power, as its linguistic 
inflation somehow pitches power beyond all language and value, at the apogee of 
rhetoric. 
 
Comedy’s Privie Parts 
 
As Patricia Parker has pointed out, in examining the Renaissance stage we are not 
only better able to understand the shifting nature of subjectivity, but we also gain an 
insight into the “shifting nature of social exchange and verbal coinage”.403 There is an 
obvious and intrinsic correlation between the plays of the Renaissance and their 
contemporary culture which reveals “a period when English was not yet standardised 
into a fixed orthography, obscuring on the printed page the homophonic networks 
possible before such boundaries were solidified”.404 The flood of words from foreign 
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languages into early modern English not only caused confusion, it caused a crisis of 
representation. Many in the Renaissance, notably John Florio,405 thought of words as  
things, and thus as things, words themselves were susceptible to logical definition.  
The word itself remained empty of content, a sign-thing that pointed to or labelled 
other things outside it, but the word as sign could nonetheless be described uniquely 
so as to distinguish it for native speakers. It is unsurprising then that ‘perspicuous’ is a 
favourite word with the linguistic reformers of the Renaissance406 as the translucency 
of language was preferable to the prismatic, that realm of signification where the 
signifier reflected a whole spectrum of meanings.  
Saussure identified the impossibility of linguistic perspicuity during the early 
twentieth century through his identification that: 
language is radically powerless to defend itself against the forces which from 
one moment to the next are shifting the relationship between the signified and 
the signifier. This is one of the consequences of the arbitrary nature of the 
sign.407 
 
According to Saussure, linguistic forms may lack physical correspondence with the 
world of things but there must be a fixing of meaning albeit temporarily for coherence 
to exist. Saussure’s distinction between language as systemic, and language use as 
individual and creative is still subsumed beneath a self-regulated conformity. Lacan 
formulated this point de capiton through the notorious “phallic” symbol so dear to 
vulgar Freudian literary criticism and it is to the imperialism of the phallus as the 
primary signifier that we now turn. 
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Lacan saw the phallus as protruding into the backdrop void of meaning-
potential represented by memories of a sheltered, prelinguistic space. He thus saw the 
phallus or its social correlate, the name of the father as the micro-sign of all meaning 
per se.408 The phallus thus becomes the very instrument for “the Lacanian 
provocation”409 that leads Derrida to critique the primacy, indeed the imperialism of 
the phallic signifier and of the symbolic order as they were formulated by Lacan. In 
reiterating Freud’s belief that castration anxiety is responsible for the institution of the 
symbolic order, of the Law, of the Name of the Father, and thus of signification itself, 
Lacan reinstates what Jane Gallop calls an archaic phallo-eccentrism410 which is hard 
to validate within deconstructive or feminist methodologies. Nevertheless, the absent 
or truncated phallus remains central to modern psychosexual fantasy as it provides 
mediation between libidinal analysis and the linguistic categories required for a 
common conceptual framework for the interrogation of the ideological construction of 
the subject. 
In ‘The Factor/Postman of Truth’411 the reasons for Derrida’s particularly 
vitriolic attack on Lacan’s appraisal of the phallus is based upon his insistence that 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is phallogocentric and metaphysical. The indeterminate 
presentation of the phallus as the transcendental signifier is revealed as a disturbing 
androcentrism which predicates the whole theory of sexual difference on woman’s 
lack. The feminine terrain of lack, of marginality, in relation to the phallus is 
supposedly open to men and women alike and corresponds to an aphanitic subject 
position which is above all an economic-dispossession anxiety. The mobility of this 
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subject position initially manifests itself as a disruption of all representation, which is 
a substantial aspect of the denouement of dramatic comedy. As the comedy unfolds, 
and the criss-crossing plots of deceit, exile and averted death multiply, the dangerous 
potency of the phallus is again deposed and revealed as completely arbitrary rather 
than as a transcendental signifier of difference. In the Lacanian system, the 
unconscious, from which jouissance emerges, is a feminine space: it is the space of 
the Other, and as such, it is the place of comedy. From within the jouissance of comic  
play the qualities of excessiveness and defiance give the phallus a renewed value 
within the symbolic system even if that value is somehow degraded. Unveiled, the 
phallic potency of comic discourse can be recognised as lawlessness under an 
otherwise repressive legalistic regime.  
 The undeniably emblematic association of the phallus with the penis as a 
concrete, empirical referent still remains closely guarded in Lacan’s ‘The 
Signification of the Phallus’.412 In the Imaginary realm of comedy the monolithic 
emblem of the phallus is reiterated as the priapic symbol found in ancient comedy, 
amidst the nebulous haze of fertility and fecundity surrounding the renewing totem of  
phallic potency.413 The phallus can therefore be identified as the protagonist in this 
Lacanian narrative of the birth of desire as it can be traced back through time to the 
earliest known rituals of agrarian increase and systems of exchange. It seems curious 
that comedy has long been termed a passive, feminine form when its primary signifier 
is priapic. However, the fescennine origins of comedy appear to represent the 
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indefinite plurality, the infinite variety of female genitalia as opposed to the phallic 
seriousness of meaning. The word, the logos which has a phallic fullness, a certain  
self-sufficiency points to the way in which comic discourse combines linguistic  
elements as it moulds the fluid and inconsistent forces of language. In this eroticized 
form of discursivity speech becomes ‘imaginary’ ceasing to fulfil its function as an 
articulation of the symbolic order, which is the proper locus of language, spilling back 
into the semiotic play-space of language.  
According to Kristeva, this movement refers to art, as “the semiotization of the 
symbolic – thus represents the flow of jouissance into language”.414 In this sense the 
‘mastery’ of comic discourse conceals the potential of phallic aggression by 
pretending to be mere neutral legality. Comedy performs a dialectical exchange 
between the semiotic world of fluid, unstructured and unstable possibilities, of 
freedom and play, of unfixed identity and polymorphous perversity and the symbolic 
world of social inhibitions, or restriction and prohibition. This movement from 
semiotic to symbolic, from freedom/aberration to social integration implies the 
movement from a pre-Oedipal to an Oedipal state. This movement is only implied 
however, as there exists an oversimplification in this sublation which misses the 
significant investment made in the world of comic non-conformity. Nonetheless, the 
quest for a mature psyche, exemplified with particular acuity in the romances, does 
compare fruitfully with the psychoanalytic appraisal of the signification of the 
phallus.  
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Lacan’s formulation of this prime signifier of phallic proportions has 
infuriated critics since its first appearance as it is kept firmly within the shifting sands 
of the double entendre. Both the penis and not the penis, the phallus is a signifier 
which in the process of symbolization becomes more real than the real. It may be no 
more than signifier and can play this role only when it renders ‘latent’ the real of 
which it is only a representative. The phallus cannot make the real penis present as it 
displaces the organ with a phantasmatic symbol of potency and power. As Jean-
Joseph Goux explains, “The phallus is the general equivalent of objects, and the father 
is the general equivalent of subjects, in the same way that gold is the equivalent of 
products”.415 The phantasmatic phallus is thus the bridge thrown over dichotomy, 
over gender and genre distinctions, over reason and madness.  
However, to say that the feminine form of comedy possesses an 
incontrovertibly phallic integrity is to deploy a vivid, almost surreal metaphor 
connoting both power and danger. Comedy, as a symbol of the law, is also symbolic 
of the phallus, but in destabilising the law of language, the law of the father, comedy 
is also symbolic of a ‘semiotic’ power. In other words, the feminine realm of language 
(the ‘semiotic’, or poetic language) overturns the domination of the masculine realm 
of language (the symbolic, the law of signification represented by the phallus). It is 
through the playfulness of the double entendre, or sexual innuendo, that comedy 
provides instances that explore speech as a site of political resistance against 
patriarchy and phallogocentric thinking. As this thesis has examined, the semiotic 
force of comedy is locked in a perpetual dialectic with the phallic potency of tragic 
signification as one form attempts to subjugate the other. In the following section this 
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process will be analysed in relation to the curious hybrid of the revenge comedy, of 
which John Marston’s The Malcontent is a crucial example. 
 
Civilisation and its Malcontents 
 
Throughout this dialectical process, comic discourse breaches both, the rules of social 
decorum and those aesthetic conventions, or generic laws that Patricia Parker refers to 
as “the enclosure or formal integrity of the well made play”416 through a pervasive 
network of wordplay and structural innovation which toys with the very notion both 
of generic stability and the stability of gender. The ability to transgress boundaries, to 
rupture the presumably stable confines of order has long been the province of comedy 
which can be verified through recourse to the ithyphallic which is related to the herm 
or boundary stone that marked the ancient places of exchange. As we have already 
discussed in comedy’s attempt to ‘dream’ a more benign form of patriarchy, the 
meaning of market exchange is “gain at the expense of another” as it is out-with “gift 
exchange and confined to the predatory sphere”.417 All coherence depends upon  
linguistic exchange and it is through the material cheating or hidden traps that this 
transaction accommodates that comedy takes such pleasure in exposing.  
Committing a fraud verbally, conspiring to confuse or perjure the truth, can be  
caricatured by the figure of the trickster who employs all strategies of unequal 
exchange, whatever their provenance. Whether propitiary or predatory, tricksterism 
visibly embodies the collective recognition of the cross-purposes in any linguistic 
exchange. In The Taming of the Shrew, Petruchio’s desire to “wive it wealthily” 
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(I.ii.73) is driven by “gold’s effect” (91) but his infatuation with exchange implicates 
him as something other than the patchwork clown of his wedding day, and as a 
predatory trickster throwing off his semantic cover. 
Sharing with Proteus the image of duplicity, if not of multiplicity, the Greek 
god Hermes was known as both trickster and thief, although he was also known as the 
patron of trade. As Jean-Christophe Agnew has observed, his “skill at the oath” or 
rather “his ability to manipulate the literalism that others bring to transactions is 
unique to him” as this great “professional boundary crosser”. 418 Hermes can also be 
viewed as the patron of all who attempt to undermine the illusion of order through 
unrestrained verbal and mental play. One such Hermetic devotee was the playwright 
John Marston who, as the enfant terrible of the Jacobean theatre was lambasted for his 
use of vile and vulgar language. In 1926, Algernon Swinburn referred to Marston as a 
“fierce and foul-mouthed satirist”,419 claiming that:  
at one moment he exaggerates the license of artificial rhetoric, the strain and 
swell of the most high-flown and hyperbolical poetic diction; at the next, he 
falls flat upon the naked level of insignificant or offensive realism.420  
 
It is of course this sheer perversity that fascinates the reader of Marston particularly as 
his use of Italianate words and phrases appear to reinstate that most Lacanian of 
provocations. Indeed, the “offensive realism” that Swinburne pinpoints is actually at  
“the naked level” of a particularly insouciant significance. 
  In the sexual metaphorics of The Malcontent (1604), Marston’s preoccupation 
with verbal and moral dissonance in the first part of the play, pivots on the curious 
interjection of the word ‘Catzo’, a word which veils the phallic potency of language  
                                                           
418 ibid.,  p.20 
419 The Age of Shakespeare: The Complete Works of Algernon Charles Swinburne, ed. Sir Edmund 
Gosse, C.B. and Thomas James Wise, vol. 11, (London, 1926),  p.353 
420 ibid., p.355 
 270 
within the fertility of comic discourse. In John Florio’s Queen Anna’s New World Of 
Words (1611) 421 the Italian word for “penis”, cazzo is defined as “a mans privie 
member”; and also Cázzo ritto is glossed as “a stiffe standing pricke”. There is also 
the nearby reference to Cazzica “an Interjection of admiration, What! Gods me! God 
forbid, tush” which bears only scant resemblance to the “Catso/Catzo” reprinted in 
every edition of the play and generally glossed as “an obscene expression”422 or 
“obscene exclamation of disgust”.423 To veil the Malcontent’s verbal ejaculation as 
merely an “obscene exclamation” evades the subversive project of comedy to utilise 
language that both stages the many systems of the symbolic order and forces a 
breaching of those systems. Jean-Joseph Goux informs us that there is an unconscious 
regulatory law operating over the “symbology” of language whereby force 
(breaching) “creates value but has no value; it is excluded from the world of 
values”.424 It is therefore from within the self-regulated censorship of “symbology” 
that we begin to trace the value of comic discourse itself. 
In the prism of the word ‘Catzo’ a myriad of meanings are reflected back 
wherein Hobbes’s aphorism: “Words are wise men’s counters but the money of 
fools”425 is inverted through the syllogistic wit of the subversive Malcontent, 
Altofronto/ Malevole. Marston’s creation knows that there is only one currency for  
which all these tokens of ours should be exchanged, and that is wisdom. Thus, with a 
mind to the theorem of the logos, Malevole complains of mankind’s corruption of 
epistemics by citing the Devil as not only a master trickster but as “the best linguist of 
our age”. (I.ii.26-7) The malcontent Jaques in As You Like It (1599) wants to become 
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a jester so that he can speak freely to condemn evil and cleanse the world. Malevole 
too demands a rite of purgation declaring that he will seek his “just revenge” against  
the Duke who has usurped his position. His realisation that disguise “doth yet afford 
[him] that which kings do seldom hear, or great men use – Free speech” (I.i.154-6) 
covers more than his need for concealment as a banished duke; it conceals a 
malignancy that the comedy must work against to expurgate. 
These irreverent vociferations mark him out as a ‘malcontent’ but also as the 
possessor of a subversive intellect, which has already set him apart from the rest of 
the court. His weary wish to be “one of the duke’s hounds” (I.ii ) alludes to his present 
exclusion from aristocratic society and his position as a jester among the dogs at the 
foot of his master’s table. And yet, he stands as an athema to the courtiers’ immorality 
and like a fool whispering truths into the duke Pietro’s ear, he reveals how he shall 
employ “those old instruments of state, / Dissemblance and suspect” (I.iv.9-10) to 
reinstate himself and cleanse the court of corruption. In the same vein as Iago, 
Malevole plays the “Machieavell” to torment the minds of the men around him by 
targeting their male insecurities. Thus, says Malevole, he will steal from his enemy 
Pietro “a richer gem” than the crown –his peace of mind. 
In the upside-down moral of this resolution, the real object of satire shifts to 
that most obsessive concern of early modern official morality, female chastity. 
However, the full force of the duke’s fury at being made a cuckold is comically 
undercut by Malevole’s bizarre exclamations which climb over superlatives towards 
the climactic “Catzo!”: 
PIETRO: Death and damnation! 
MALEVOLE: Lightning and thunder! 
PIETRO: Vengeance and torture! 
MALEVOLE: Catzo!     (I.iii.97-100) 
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The subversive energy with which Malevole seems to discharge this word is all the 
more intriguing when we return to the etymological root of this braying expletive as 
the Italian cazzo, or penis. Pietro’s distracted “O, revenge!” (101) suddenly appears as 
a desire for revenge against the very organ which threatens and assures his place 
within the symbolic order.  
The simpering Duke of Genoa, Pietro Iacomo, has entered a living hell the 
moment that this malevolent jester utters the name of the object which has potentially 
come between him and the security of his wife’s womb. It is as if Pietro has been 
violated himself by the phallus that Malevole brandishes amidst the “pistols and 
poinards” of his call to arms. It is in the strangeness of this utterance and the 
resonance it bears upon the dialogue that haunts and fascinates the listener, since 
whether it is whispered or bellowed, the reference is unnerving in its ability to 
provoke uneasiness.  
  In this context, ‘Catzo’ can be taken as a metaphor of an imbalanced kind. In 
its metonymic operation it becomes the phallus, no longer the anatomical penis, but 
the symbolic representation of the division between gendered subjects. As the 
“privileged signifier”426 the phallus substitutes one sexual part and erects itself as the 
whole of sexuality and as Lacan has described his choice of this particular signifier, in 
one of his characteristic double entendres, it is “what stands out and is most easily 
seized upon”.427 Pietro seizes upon this signifier as what he both lacks and desires, for 
it offers stability and authenticity of meaning, as well as authority and power. The 
unnameable object of desire may remain beyond demand, beyond the signifier, but as 
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Catherine Belsey reminds us, “desire speaks, in the unconscious, in the Other. And its 
own signifier is the phallus”.428  
Thus, it is Marston’s use of ‘Catzo’ as the unintentional stand-in for Lacan’s 
infamous double entendre, that erects itself as the objet a desired by Pietro’s wife, 
Aurelia, as the lost object in the unknowable real. This positions Aurelia abjectly as 
her whole dramatic raison d’etre is to exist as a sexually insatiable woman, a whore 
whose unchanneled libido will bring down the entire court and cause the collapse of 
her husband’s political potency. With desire itself being split between the quest for 
satisfaction in the real, a refusal of the signifier, on the one hand, and the desire of 
(for) the other, the origin of meaning forever entails ‘a lack of being’ and until the 
characters of this play are relocated within the symbolic order they are dispossessed 
liminaries awaiting transition from the imaginary into the real. 
The ‘Catzo’ speech has an undeniably transitional impact, pertaining as it does 
to a ritual act of denigration. It is particularly apocalyptic for Pietro as the usurper 
whose role in the marital bedchamber has been assumed by an adulterer and who now 
finds himself reduced to the status of the disguised and exiled duke who has brought 
him to this place. The danger inherent in this transitional stage is made manifest by  
the possibility of tragic consequences. Pietro claims that he will kill the possessor of 
the illegitimate phallus and perform “sharp surgery where naught but death amends” 
(II.iv.85) as he himself would rather die:  
Before her shame’s displayed! Would I were forced to burn my father’s tomb, 
unhele his bones, and dash them in the dirt, rather than this! This both the 
living and the dead offends. 
     (II.iv.81-4) 
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In the aphanitic moment of Pietro’s realisation429 le corps morcele of ‘Catzo’ refers to 
a common obsessional fear of losing coherence and self-identity, which is represented 
in the imagination as a disintegration or chopping-up of the body. The disembodied 
‘Catzo’ which threatens Pietro also stands for the sexual stand-in in a comedy 
unmasking the pretensions of a corrupt court.430 
Likewise, Pietro is forced out of the dream of absolute authority and 
exteriority to the law, and into a nightmare of illegitimate desires. The word ‘Catzo’ 
in The Malcontent performs a metonymic operation of transgressive sexual desire, 
improper sexual conduct and unsolicited incarcerations and banishments, presumably 
legitimated by the phallogocentricism of patriarchal jurisdiction. This does not 
legalise the impropriety of the events within the text, but serves to exaggerate a set of 
presumptions upon which masculine prerogative rests. As such the metaphor of the 
‘Catzo/phallus’ is best read on the figural as opposed to the anatomical level.  
Both Pietro and Malevole may stand before the law in search of justice but 
conversely Malevole finds himself outside the law in his exile while Pietro attempts to 
reinstate the law, which has been benighted. The signifier of the ‘phallus’ arrives  
laden with meaning, repeating the moment of disruption of the imaginary by the nom 
du pere, instituting the desire, the drive or urge to return to the utopian state of the 
imaginary, of coherence, of oneness from which the subject has been exhiled. 
Malevole and Pietro are attempting to find their way back from the Induction of this  
“bitter play” to the imaginary realm of comedy where redemption and resurrection are  
assured. These two characters become doubled with one another, each dependent  
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upon the other for their identity, each redefining meaning for the other and in the 
closing acts of the play this relationship can be seen as truly symbiotic. The 
implausible compulsion of this comedy unites husbands and wives who only moments 
before had seemed parted for ever; holy nuptial bands are restored and an expulsion 
imposed upon the tragic-scapegoat figure of Mendoza, who may well be cast off the 
cliff he intended for Pietro. But, as we are drawn towards a judgement upon these 
players, we are drawn before the Law, the law of the symbolic order, where the 
slipperiness of the signifier reminds us that the propriety of language may slide off 
into bawdy at any moment.  
Also at risk is the “integrity of the well made play” that is alluded to at the 
beginning of this section, especially since Marston’s play hovers on the brink of 
upsetting the aesthetic law of genre. The Malcontent is not only complex in structure 
and in language; the complexity of its generic constitution achieves a balance between 
comedy and tragedy, laughter and horror, and, mercy and revenge. A revealing 
departure from the highly fashionable revenge tragedy, this play slips into the hybrid 
realm of tragic-comedy, where there is always the possibility that comedy will 
become tragedy. However, just as Malvolio and Feste demonstrate that comedy does 
indeed bring in its revenges, The Malcontent treats comic revenge as an opportunity 
for social and political renewal. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although sufficiently close to obscenity to risk occasional prosecution the comedies 
of Tudor and Stuart England only make sense in relation to a fairly strict moral code. 
This insight into the machinations of dramatic comedy reveals a paradox in the claim 
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that bawdy reinforces morality by subverting it, and like all paradoxes this requires 
scrutiny both psychologically and politically. Repetitive jokes about sex, illegitimacy, 
and mastery all testify to the framework of a social order in which marriage and 
family solidarity are taken absolutely for granted, and yet simultaneously there is a 
subversion at work where social critique and utopian projection are permitted. 
Comedy does not merely seek out topicality for plot, it plunges its characters and its 
audience into a controversy of one kind or another which relates to a structural 
principle of Elizabethan, or Jacobean personal, familial, and social life. The many 
sermons and homilies that dealt with the sovereignty of the family and the civic duties 
of the individual were a direct reinforcement of patriarchy in the household and the 
absolutist state. If we understand comedy as retrieving metaphors for art from political 
affairs we detect an articulation of a crisis in patriarchy itself specifically where the 
containment of erotic energies is concerned. In this sense, comedy as the “final resort 
of civilisation”431 finds a contemporary resonance in the much overused definition of 
post-modern humour as “a weapon of mass instruction”.  
 There needs to be a normative standard for deviance to exist. There is no 
boundary between linguistic competence and ideological competence and hence no 
boundary between the ‘purely linguistic’ elements in the semic construction of words 
and ideological elements in their construction. But, a word or usage is deviant not in 
relation to some fixed lexical usage, but rather in relation to the terms in which the 
common sense of a particular culture defines it. To define signifiers in terms of 
attributes of objects or other referential items elides any differences that may exist 
between verbal signifiers and theatrical signifiers. Altofronto may thrust his hips 
forward as he bellows his Italianate insult, but equally impressive would be an 
                                                           
431 Jerry Palmer The Logic of the Absurd: On Film and Television Comedy (London, 1987), p. 13 
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indignant stage whisper. The deviance lies with the normal use of the word itself as an 
expletive - a curse imbued with threatening menace. 
 This utterance becomes intensely ironical in that there are clearly two semantic 
levels involved: the meaning of the words the Duke is capable of understanding on the 
basis of his limited awareness of the whole situation, and the meaning that the 
Malcontent and the audience are able to attach to what is being said. This ‘obscene’ 
word is central to the logic of the absurd in that the listener is involved in the 
construction of a surprise (the peripeteia); implicit in this is the primacy of two 
enunciative roles, the speaker who delivers the surprise and all those who receive it. 
But equally central to the logic of the absurd is that the surprise is more implausible 
than plausible, which clearly constructs the ‘butt’ of a joke, the third enuciative role, 
as asserted by Freud. 
 Recent re-interpretations of Freud’s theory have questioned the centrality of 
the listener.432 For instance, the listener can be conceived of as no more than an 
instance of the Law, the instance where repressions take their form and have their 
effectivity. This is clear if one considers Freud’s discussion of dirty jokes, which have 
their origin in sexual desire. The expression of this desire is made possible by the 
specific pleasure of jokes which subvert the inhibitions against the aggression of 
desire. It is also an act of aggression against the object of desire, which gives pleasure 
to the listener by subverting their inhibitions too. 
 The ‘butt’ is the object of aggression, which is directly hostile in the sense that 
the unconscious drive that is allowed free rein by the joke is aggression itself with no 
other drive hidden in it, such as sexual desire. ‘Catzo’ can thus be viewed as an act of 
aggressive subversion, as a ‘tendentious’ joke, because the pleasure it gives serves a 
                                                           
432 E.H. Gombrich, ‘Freud’s Aesthetics’, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 12 (1962), p.301-17 
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purpose of releasing some drive otherwise subject to repression. Therefore, one could 
also describe ‘Catzo’ as the childish demand for play that the pleasure principle 
requires, as the play of the signifier, where the sign also brings with it an impact.  
‘Catzo’ arrives with the suddenness and force of the “thunder and lightning” 
(I.iii.101) thrown by the gods at tragic mortals: it gives the listener much more than 
they bargained for and the result is almost physical. Just as the “essence of a slapstick  
gag is a physical assault on, or collapse of the hero’s dignity”,433 ‘Catzo’ throws a 
custard pie in the blissfully ignorant Pietro’s face. So, as Malevole says, he has stolen 
“a richer gem” than the crown from the Duke: he has degraded him through ridicule 
and stolen his masculinity. 
 ‘Catzo’, as the transliteration of the priapic symbol of comedy, represents the 
disruption of the social order through a force which causes a breach to occur which 
cannot be easily mended. The phallic aggression of this rupture is concealed by the 
claim of neutrality. Humour is at all times subversive and conservative, offensive and 
inoffensive, serious and ridiculous. Attempting to combine laughter and aesthetics 
flies in the face of Kantian metaphysics as the two appear to be so indissociable but 
the laughter, or jouissance, that comedy elicits from its audience is delivered at a 
controlled moment: a moment the comedian calls the ‘punch line’, the moment that 
the analyst identifies as barely concealed aggression and desire. 
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Conclusion 
The Bawdy Politik 
 
 
 
 
 
The phantasm of fixed identity, as a narcissistic instability that interminably 
questions, ‘is this me or the other?’ finds a safe haven within the imaginary confines 
of comedy. Cutting across the static opposition between the individual and the 
collective whose effects we have observed by interposing between them the mediation 
of a generic structure capable of functioning both on the level of individual 
gratification and on that of social structuration, comedy’s rigorous attempts to breach 
the symbolic order must be read in terms of its semiotic representation of the conflict 
between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’: metaphysically sanctioned order and those material 
historical forces which challenge its hierarchical structures. To this extent, Tudor and 
Stuart dramatic comedy is not just a form of entertainment but a form of 
representation: a representation of all those symbolic structures through which order 
articulates itself. In addition to producing its other, interestingly as a demonic 
challenge which requires containment and decontamination prior to reintegration, the 
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process also offers opportunities for resistance. These opportunities involve a 
subsequent transformation of symbolic structures as the ideologies which hold them in 
place crumble beneath the weight of comedy’s ambivalent confrontation with the 
other of its imaginary. 
The ambiguity of comedy lies in its uncovering of the very contradictions that 
it sets out aesthetically to domesticate. In this sense, comic discourse is all the less 
confined to the ideologically saturated prison-house of language, as it starts by 
tackling logocentrism. In its assault on the primacy of the sign, comedy conceives a 
utopian vision derived from the idea of a language in which word and thing unite 
without loss. In this utopia of knowledge, language as the symbolic order, the word as 
Law, which forms the human subject in its own image, can be approximated through 
the effort to unmask false names, an effort at once conceptual and resistant to 
conceptual limitations. Comedy as this order of language is, indeed, an unconscious 
form, which presents signification in jokes, wordplay, parapraxes and the 
condensation of repressed desires. But the liberation which this imaginary affords is 
contained within an undoubtedly restricted economy.  
Foucault articulated the constitution of the subject through language in his 
conjecture that discourse is power,434 and in Bakhtin’s dialogic imagination 
opportunities for resistance are identified from within the carnivalesque. As the 
dialogic is closely linked to Bakhtin’s notion of the carnivalesque – to popular forms 
that disrupt and relativize meaning in opposition to ‘official’ discourse – the mutual 
interdependence of thought, language and social process is identified in its attempt to 
                                                           
434 The two principle texts in which Foucault evaluates and substantiates his model of power relations 
are Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, (Brighton, 1980) and The 
History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, op. cit. Also Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault 
beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,(Chicago, 1982), pp.208-226. 
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close down the polysemy of language.435 Foucault’s argument that the modalities of 
discourses and discursive practices actually produce both the knowledge and the 
social itself,436 with modalities functioning differently in different historical 
‘epistemes,’ positions power in a discursively productive as well as repressive field437 
where its needs must set boundaries.  
Foucault’s writings have consistently shown how so-called objective historical 
accounts are always products of a will to power enacted through formations of 
knowledge. Within specific institutions and in comedy as aesthetic experience, 
sustenance is obtained from the immanence of the artwork, where a transfigured 
world is promised. This may seem speculative and reductive but without the mimetic 
possibilities of dramatic comedy morality would surely lapse into either cynicism or 
despair. Comedy is driven by the unthinkability of despair, and aims at an experience 
of the possible that exceeds what is currently considered to be possible. In comedy’s 
privileging of dreams, those repositories of humanity’s repressed desires, a path is 
broken towards utopia, a breach is forced against its systematic imprisonment in a 
depoliticised cultural praxis. 
 Breaching the symbolic order is tantamount to breaching all monolithic 
systems of exclusion and as Foucault has outlined, the procedures for controlling and 
delimiting discourse operate from the ‘exterior’,438 functioning as systems of 
exclusion. In comedy this is evident in the discourse which puts power and desire at 
stake. Romantic comedy, for example, explores what is at stake in its movement from 
                                                           
435 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans. R.W Rotsel, (Ardis, 1973), p.102-3 
436 Power/Knowledge, op. cit., p.121 
437 ibid., p.139 
438 Foucault, ‘The Dicourse On Language’, The Archaelogy of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan 
Smith, (London, 1972), pp.218-9 
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a harsh and violent patriarchal order to a more benevolent patriarchy that is capable of 
including and valuing women out-with commodity exchange.  
In Much Ado About Nothing (1598), the plot turns on the ‘niceties of 
matrimonial law’ but, as in all the romances, there exists a problematical emotional  
climate that nurtures the bond between father and daughter. The paternal law is 
predicated on loss, and the loss of identity when the daughter chooses another man 
over her father. For example, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream Leonato’s “Fatherly 
and kindly power” (IV.i.73) exceeds the expectations of exogamy. As his daughter is 
no mere commodity to be exchanged in a male marketplace, but an aspect of his 
identity, Leonato exposes the emotional costs of patriarchy. From this middle ground 
between Egeus and Shylock comedy reveals that patriarchy is hardly a monolithic, 
coherent entity speaking with one – either liberating or oppressive – voice, but 
composed of, indeed founded in, ideological contradictions, inconsistencies, and 
incongruities. Fathers like Leonato express the depth and character of their love for 
their daughters – a potentially destructive love – in a vocabulary that is inconsistent 
with the images of fathers that their culture propagates. Comedy then, re-idealises the 
patriarchal system, though in terms so highly artificial that they make us conscious of 
their presence and the emotional logic that they dissemble. 
Phallogocentrism as an ideological apparatus is the enemy of everyone: men 
stand to lose by it, differently, but as seriously as women, therefore comedy does 
allow us to imagine a real liberation of sexuality in a transformation of our collective 
relationship to the body and the individual relationship of one body to another. 
Working through the ludic principle of play as necessary semblance, an 
approximation of the immense material organic sensual universe that is humankind 
also equates with radical political transformations in the dramatic arena. The effects of 
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these projections and transformations on the libidinal economy of the Renaissance to 
the present day have been bought and sold through a linguistic currency, yet it is only 
because this currency was propagated within a comic economy that we have been able 
to buy dreams of possible emancipation. In the absence of the critical and utopian 
“truth content” (Wahrheitsgehalt)439 of comedy a fundamental transformation of 
society would be even more difficult to imagine. 
Comedy can therefore be identified as an expression of the way society 
understands itself. It is an aesthetic representation of a human-centred world. It voices 
the philosophical principle that from now on the subject will be the reference point of 
all reality. Upon the early modern public stage, long before Descartes’ Cogito, a 
metaphysics of subjectivity found one of its most remarkable expressions, and in 
dramatic comedies that determine precisely how social identities and relationships 
connect the material and the cultural, the economic and the social, the construction of 
subjectivity is shown inflecting the forms and values of its circulation. These dramatic 
comedies complicate the oppositions between community and individual, trust and 
self-interest in an urban environment that was rapidly embracing capitalist ideologies. 
Comedy undoubtedly signals the experience that a certain culture has grown 
old, that something new is coming. This transition however, is only possible if 
consciousness undergoes the new experiences facilitated by the sceptical disposition 
that comedy strives for. Paradoxically, the thrilling sense of ‘newness’ scepticism 
induces is also the term limit through which the self-sufficient and frivolous 
cheerfulness of the comedy gets lost. In these new experiences the implications of the 
principle of the autonomous subjectivity which is decisive for the comedy, come to 
                                                           
439 Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism, 
trans. D. Midgley, (Cambridge, 1991), pp.1-35 
 284 
light. These new experiences are indicated by a term already familiar to readers of 
Hegel’s Phenomenolgy, as “the unhappy consciousness.” Hegel writes:  
We see that this Unhappy Consciousness constitutes the counterpart and the 
completion of the comic consciousness that is perfectly happy within itself.440  
 
The text is clear: the unhappy consciousness is not only that into which comic 
consciousness turns. It is at the same time a change in which this consciousness 
accomplishes itself.  
The comic experience leads consciousness into a ‘hall of mirrors’ where the 
self quickly loses its uncomplicated enjoyment of itself and becomes unhappy. 
Paradoxically, the consciousness has to become unhappy in order to obtain the 
‘happiness’ promised by the comedy. This ‘unhappy’, uneasy consciousness results 
from the experience of scepticism, a scepticism generated by the provisional, and 
hence, presumably worthless conclusions of comedy. Thus, the optimism generated 
by utopian immanence is destroyed by the very scepticism that the comedy has striven 
for. According to Hegel’s formulation ‘happiness’ seems to indicate a limit-position. 
The comedy may evoke the unhappy consciousness of scepticism but it is the truth of 
the whole odyssey of consciousness that differentiates its final components. Is the 
truth then not always postponement, anticipation, longing?  
Beginning with the presumption of freedom, not with the truth of it, comedy 
starts as abstract self-consciousness. The remarkable thing about the whole movement 
of realisation which follows is that it will become more and more apparent that it 
cannot realise by itself this true subjectivity, this actual self-being. Liberation from the 
unhappiness of the consciousness originates from a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the singularity of the self without the unity of the universal, of identity and alterity. 
                                                           
440 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, (Oxford, 1977), p.454 
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The unhappiness of the consciousness can then only be dissolved if this universality is 
admitted. The comic is thus the kind of dramatic art that most urgently calls for self-
resolution, and so it comes much closer to the kind of dialectical movement Hegel 
sees in thought. The comic character exemplifies a dissolution of finitude and one-
sidedness and it does so with a light-hearted readiness for self-dissolution: viewing 
events with optimistic lightheartedness. 
In keeping the dialectic between excess and its restraint open, comedy can be 
identified as the pharmakon wherein sources of energy and danger are contained. 
Drawing antitheses together, comedy shows how juridical law is constructed and 
deployed, but in disclosing the complicity with legal sanctions that state institutions 
rely upon comedy demystifies their operations and destabilises both constitutional law 
and aesthetic law. This deconstructive process not only recapitulates the 
democratising potential of comic scepticism, it uncovers the realisation that comedy is 
itself an unstable entity; difficult to define as it purposefully defies categorisation. 
 On the one hand there is the desire of aesthetics to be significant, to be 
relevant, to be useful or to impart some secret transcendent knowledge, even if that 
knowledge is only knowing that one does not know, that no-one knows. On the other 
hand, there is a desire for freedom, the desire not to be bound to the past, or even the 
desire for significance. One may long to retreat from the politics in the streets to the 
magical forest of the Academy, from the world to the labyrinth of the imagination. 
But the double bind of comedy is also the double bind of aesthetics, and one must be 
aware that one politics is always being played off against another. Then we may 
understand that the discourse of the aesthetic is to be approached like an ideological 
switchboard, where the comic is a parasitic but still structural noise on the line, which 
hotwires the aesthetic across into questions of power via political, theological and 
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ethical concerns. And if we listen carefully we can begin to weigh the paradoxical 
arguments which have been waged against comedy; from those who would cast the 
Comic out beyond the precinct of the Academy, as the very essence of the inessential, 
as that category of the ‘free particular’ or the non-categorical, or those who debate 
whether we can keep the liberating corporeal force of laughter safe from the danger of 
incorporation. Then perhaps, we will recognise that only comedy and laughter 
themselves can wrench us dialectically out of this tautology. 
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